All or Nothing: Avoiding Inefficient Compromise in International Cooperation. by Urpelainen, Johannes
ALL OR NOTHING:




A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2009
Doctoral Committee:
Professor James D. Morrow, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Barbara Koremenos, Co-Chair
Professor Tilman M. Borgers
Professor Arthur Lupia
Associate Professor William Robert Clark





   	
 
   
   

  





 " #$ 
 %
    &    
 
  '	 "( "














   & 
 	 $$

 $     










  % " % 
 # 











1   
 
   
   
 $ . -
		
 
 % !   $ 
  











#!% 2, %"#-!  





















: "   %
























74 % $ 
$ 	




























   65


       







5: % &   	   	
 	   6:

     $ 
74 "     >9













  $&   $


   

    459
:7 "  $ 

    $ 47@
64 %  
    $














International cooperation is notoriously prone to bargaining failure. States cooper-
ate “under anarchy,” so they cannot rely on external enforcement by a benevolent
third party as a commitment mechanism or to deter such costly bargaining as eco-
nomic sanctions or warfare.1 Scholars of international cooperation contend that in
such a precarious environment, an international agreement must be self-enforcing.2
Specifically, the division of gains must reflect the parties’ relative bargaining power
and remove any incentives to defect in the future. When either one of these condi-
tions fail, a state deems it profitable not to comply with the international agreement.
Consequently, international cooperation should be most successful when an efficient
compromise is readily available.
In this dissertation, I conduct a theoretical investigation of those unfortunate in-
ternational cooperation problems that preclude efficient compromise by their very
nature. Consider, for instance, the politics of international standard setting. Virtu-
ally all states agree that international standardization and harmonization is highly
desirable, given the magnitude of the gains that international economic exchange pro-
duces. But each state prefers to impose its pre-existing domestic standard to minimize
adjustment costs and to gain a competitive advantage over foreign producers in the
international market.3 Domestic standards often involve systematic differences in de-
sign that preclude the use of a simple “blended” standard as a compromise. Two forms
of bargaining failure are thus likely. First, states can engage in costly bargaining to
impose their domestic standard on others through threats. Second, they can “water
down” the international agreement by designing a mutually acceptable compromise
standard that fails to maximize technical effectiveness and minimize adjustment costs.
1Oye 1986.
2Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Barrett 1999; Fearon 1998, 1995; Koremenos, Lipson
and Snidal 2001.
3Abbott and Snidal 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Schmidt and Verle 1998.
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These two forms of bargaining failure prompt two questions that have received
limited attention in the extant literature. First, which issues in the domain of in-
ternational cooperation preclude efficient compromise? While previous research has
acknowledged the existence of such problems and studied various solutions, such as
issue linkage and side payments, the literature has not examined the reasons behind
inefficient compromise in any detail.4 I show that increasing returns, or the increasing
marginal value of a more favorable allocation of the gains from cooperation, provide
a deep and broadly applicable explanation for inefficient compromise.5
Second, how are states to cooperate when efficient compromise is impossible?
Building on international cooperation theory, I consider the problem of institutional
design when the risk of inefficient compromise looms large. The theoretical results
qualify, extend, and sharpen previous theories of international cooperation while gen-
erating detailed and empirically testable predictions.6
Bargaining and Increasing Returns
In international politics, negotiations fail for various reasons. Among the plethora
of potential causes, incomplete information and commitment problems figure most
prominently in the literature on bargaining failure.7 Under incomplete information,
a state misrepresents its resolve to obtain a better agreement on the division of gains.
Sometimes the other state offers an unacceptable agreement, so a risk of bargaining
failure is present.8 When a commitment problem is present, a mutually acceptable
agreement exists but it will not stand the test of time as one of the parties will
ultimately renege.9 Notably, neither cause is intrinsically related to the nature of
the issue. Incomplete information often pertains to the strength of an outside option,
such as trade sanctions or warfare. A commitment problem could result from changes
in relative bargaining power over time. Finally, domestic political constraints that
prevent leaders from conceding can prompt bargaining failure even when the protag-
onists themselves agree on the existence of an appropriate solution to the cooperation
4Sebenius 1983; Stein 1980; Tollison and Willett 1979.
5For the concept of increasing returns, see Arthur 1989; David 1994; Pierson 2000a;
Romer 1986.
6Fearon 1998; Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Morrow 1994.





In this dissertation, I investigate those international cooperation problems in
which the issue itself precludes inefficient compromise. The following definition cap-
tures the essence of the problem:
Definition 1. A problem of inefficient compromise exists when a division of
gains that reflects the parties’ relative bargaining power is impossible or dissipates
surplus from cooperation.
In other words, a problem of inefficient compromise implies that the parties must
sacrifice efficacy to strike a mutually acceptable bargain.
Which issues involve a problem of inefficient compromise? The concept of in-
creasing returns, which refers to the increasing marginal value of a more favorable
allocation of the gains from cooperation, provides a general explanation:
Definition 2. Let πi ∈ [0, 1] measure the share of gains that state i obtains from
cooperation and ui(πi) the corresponding payoff. Increasing returns are present
when λ · ui(πi) > ui(λ · πi) for all πi ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ (0, 1).
This definition suggests that, in the presence of increasing returns, state i prefers
obtaining all of the gains from cooperation with probability λ to obtaining a share λ
of the gains.
Figure 1.1 illustrates. The payoff to state i = 1, 2 is given on the vertical axis as a
function of its share on the horizontal axis. In this game, either player gains a payoff
1 if it obtains the asset as a whole. The decision to divide the asset equally, which is





prefer a random allocation of the entire asset to either player with equal probability,
to “splitting the difference.”
[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
Two theoretical remarks on the problem of inefficient compromise are in order. First,
in a highly abstract sense, “indivisible” assets are a special case of increasing returns.11
10Allee and Huth 2006; Milner 1997; Schelling 1960.
11See Fearon 1995; Hassner 2003; Powell 2006 for the role of indivisibilities in in-
ternational bargaining.
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To see why, observe that indivisibilities are theoretically equivalent to increasing re-
turns when division is possible but it dissipates all surplus from cooperation. Thus,
it is not necessary to differentiate between indivisibilities and increasing returns in
empirical applications. Second, increasing returns are accompanied by a commitment
problem. When states prefer obtaining the entire asset with some probability, they
can allocate the asset randomly provided that they can credibly commit to accepting
an unfavorable outcome. Much of the theoretical analysis in this dissertation pertains
to institutional designs that help states avoid or solve this problem.
Consider some empirical examples. First, a territorial conflict over an island is
likely to involve increasing returns. The island could be too small to be split into
multiple viable economic and political units; it is certainly easier to defend without
division. In Chapter 2, I analyze international legal settlements concerning competing
sovereignty claims over islands from this perspective. Second, some territorial conflicts
involve “intangible assets” such as ethnic or historical possession and homeland ties.12
If both parties view minor concessions as unacceptable, it could be difficult to divide
the territory without sowing the seeds of future conflict.
Third, the returns to reputation are often increasing. In international finance,
for example, creditors cannot verify the conditions underpinning each default. I
such circumstances, the only way to maintain a good reputation is to diligently pay
back debts even under severe hardship. This could explain why some poor countries
have insisted on paying back their debts in full despite extreme domestic difficulties.
Indeed, Tomz shows that creditors have often rewarded such countries with drastically
lower interest rates.13 A good example is the newly independent Republic of Finland
in the 1930’s, a poor and unstable democracy in economic recession that promptly
paid its debts and gained a reputation as a reliable debtor for decades to come.
Fourth, the problem of international standard setting already addressed above is
a good example of increasing returns in political economy. Fifth, trade and other
economic disputes over the legality of a product ban or any other form of direct
regulation complicate division.14 The advantage of direct regulation is its simplicity,
so a muddled compromise removes most of the desired effect.
Sixth, legal precedents involve increasing returns.15 In the transatlantic dispute
over growth hormone in beef production, both parties were aware of the far-reaching
12Hensel and Mitchell 2005.
13Tomz 2007.
14Guzman and Simmons 2002.
15See Busch 2007 for a theoretical analysis of legal precedents in international trade
law.
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consequences of concessions. The European Union would have compromised its
sovereign right to environmental and health regulation, while the United States would
have shown green light to possibly protectionist regulation in more important export
markets, such as Japan.16 Yet both parties understood that a clear rule is necessary
to facilitate international economic exchange and reduce uncertainty surrounding the
multilateral trade regime.17 Finally, institutional design is most efficient when the
underpinning principles are clear and unambiguous.18 If states disagree on these
principles, as was the case when the developed and developing countries bargained
over an international commodity fund to stabilize world prices,19 a compromise re-
quires a complex agreement that does not provide clear and robust rules for behavior
now and in the future.
Avoiding Inefficient Compromise
To avoid inefficient compromise, states engage in institutional design.20 They write
international agreements to regulate collective behavior, which is useful when uncon-
strained pursuit of individual goals results in a collective-action failure. To model
the design of these international agreements, I use game theory and institutionalist
methodology.21 I model the international cooperation as a “game” with collectively
undesirable equilibria and consider changes in behavior that would bring about an
improved outcome.
The analysis that I conduct draws heavily on the extant literature. The problem
of inefficient compromise was analyzed by scholars of international cooperation theory
in the study of “issue linkage” as a means to expand the bargaining space and permit
compromise when one is not readily available.22 By linking two or more issues, the
bargaining parties can achieve a de facto compromise across issue areas. Although
each party must yield in one or more issue areas, it receives compensation in others. A
particularly straightforward issue linkage is a direct side payment, such as a financial
16Vogel 1995.
17Kerr and Hobbs 2002.
18Morrow 2002.
19Finlayson and Zacher 1988; Krasner 1985.
20Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
21Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003.
22Sebenius 1983; Stein 1980; Tollison and Willett 1979.
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reward to clinch a deal.23 Indeed, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal conjecture that the
“issue scope” of international agreements expands a distribution conflict surrounding
the issue grows more intense.24 Fearon argues that the possibility of issue linkage is
a good reason to rule out indivisibilities as an explanation for interstate war, because
the costs of militarized conflict must exceed the costs of issue linkage.25
Although this literature provides a foundation for theoretical analysis, it suffers
from three shortcomings. First, scholars have yet to systematically analyze the reasons
behind inefficient compromise. This poses a problem for empirical analysis because
the conditions under which there is demand for issue linkage remain unclear. My
analysis of increasing returns is relevant here.
Second, the literature does not investigate plausible alternatives to issue linkage.
Empirically, this shortcoming prevents testing of international cooperation theory
because the full “choice set” is not considered. Theoretically, this limited focus leaves
circumstances in which issue linkage is not feasible uncovered. Linkage bargaining is
costly, so it is useful to consider alternatives that sometimes carry lower transaction
costs. I consider various commitment mechanisms that permit ex ante mutually
desirable lotteries and agreements. I also consider ways to prevent the emergence of
international cooperation problems that give rise to inefficient compromise.
Finally, previous research does not shed light on the differences between bilateral
and multilateral cooperation, Although such scholars as Martin and Ruggie investi-
gate multilateralism as an alternative bilateralism in general, they they do not analyze
cooperation problems that are multilateral by their very nature.26 Others contend
that multilateral negotiations carry ceteris paribus higher transaction costs, without
studying these costs in any detail.27 My analysis shows that the differences between
bilateral and multilateral cooperation are significant and reach well beyond transac-
tion costs.
Summary of Results
This dissertation has four substantive chapters. Each chapter addresses the prob-
lem of inefficient compromise from a different perspective. Two of them focus on
23Kuziemko and Werker 2006.
24Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
25Fearon 1995.
26Martin 1992; Ruggie 1992.
27Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
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multilateral cooperation in particular. I present the results by chapter.
Chapter 2: A Theory of Interstate Arbitration
In Chapter 2, I analyze interstate arbitration. This focus is motivated by three
startling features of interstate arbitration. First, it requires mutual consent and
is thus strictly voluntary. However, if the parties can agree on arbitration, why
cannot they simply strike a bargain instead? Second, interstate arbitration typically
produces starkly asymmetric awards that clearly indicate who won the dispute. Why
do the parties specifically request that the arbitration tribunal specifically declare
a winner, instead of forging a mutually acceptable compromise? Third, interstate
arbitration is almost exclusively public – in contrast to commercial arbitration, which
is predominantly confidential. Why do states willingly surrender authority over the
publication of the proceedings?
Existing explanations for international dispute resolution that draw on bargaining
theory cannot account for interstate arbitration. It does not involve costly signals to
reveal information, and it does not facilitate communication between the disputants,
so it is poor means to solve a problem of incomplete information. Its public nature
does create some commitment capacity through a reputational mechanism, but the
asymmetric nature of arbitration awards gives the loser an additional incentive to
defect. Finally, the asymmetric awards are particularly harmful if states use inter-
national dispute resolution as a “smokescreen” to legitimize domestic unacceptable
concessions.28
I develop a simple explanation for interstate arbitration based on an institution-
alist analysis of inefficient compromise. With increasing returns, two parties can
strike an efficient ex ante compromise through a lottery. Interstate arbitration as a
lottery is less costly than pathological forms of bargaining, which explains why the
awards must be asymmetric. Interstate arbitration is public to build the commitment
capacity necessary to enforce this lottery. The theory generates a variety of empir-
ically testable hypotheses on the relationship between the cost of bargaining, power
asymmetries, and the nature of the arbitration award.
To illustrate the theory, I consider empirical examples. First, I analyze the Hanish
Islands Crisis and the resulting Eritrea/Yemen (1998/1999) arbitration at the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration. Second, I consider recent “special agreements” in the
28Allee and Huth 2006.
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International Court of Justice.
Chapter 3: Preventive Care: Increasing Returns, Domestic In-
stitutions, and International Regulation
The importance of international regulation and standard setting has greatly increased
with the integration of national economies.29 In an integrated world economy, states
must find ways to standardize and harmonize domestic regulatory policies to avoid
raising non-tariff barriers to trade.30
In Chapter 3, I study the relationship between domestic regulatory institutions
and international regulation. I claim that domestic regulatory institutions are subject
to increasing returns over time, which causes a regulatory “lock-in” that complicates
harmonization and standardization due to high adjustments costs.31 Thus, if states
have previously adopted incompatible domestic regulatory institutions, the cost of
mutual adjustment increases over time. However, if states anticipate a future lock-in,
they can intervene to prevent it. Specifically, states can coordinate the development
of nascent domestic regulatory institutions. I label this practice “preventive care.”
I deduce the conditions under which preventive care is feasible and desirable. Most
importantly, it is likely to succeed in new regulatory issues not burdened by domestic
institutional deadweight. Its most important advantage is a reduction in adjustment
costs that mitigate the problem of inefficient compromise. Another important advan-
tage is the self-enforcing nature of preventive care: if compatibility locks in, defection
becomes increasingly difficult over time.
To assess the empirical plausibility of the theory, I conduct a comprehensive case
study of transatlantic cooperation on the harmonization of chemical testing require-
ments in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Seemingly technical, this issue exhibits remarkable variation in success and failure.
Using extensive analysis of primary sources and dozens of elite interviews with regula-
tors and industry representatives in the United States, the European Union, and the
OECD, I show that variation in incompatibilities pertaining to domestic regulatory
institutions explains variation in success and failure. When such incompatibilities un-
dergo lock-in, harmonization is difficult and cooperation proceeds slowly over time.
29Alesina and Dollar 2000; Abbott and Snidal 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Spruyt
2001.
30Bradford 2003; Sykes 1995.
31Arthur 1989; Pierson 2000b; Unruh 2000.
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When such incompatibilities are absent or easy to remove, success in cooperation fol-
lows. Most importantly, the analysis explains the diverging trajectories of success on
mutual acceptance of testing data and failure on mutual acceptance of manufacturing
and marketing notification by companies.
Chapter 4: A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Issue Linkage
and Delegation in Multilateral Negotiations
In Chapter 4, I turn to multilateral cooperation. I study the role of issue linkage and
delegation to an international committee in preventing costly bargaining and ineffi-
cient compromise in multilateral negotiations over policy coordination. Specifically,
are these bargaining techniques unproblematic, or can the opportunity to link issues
or delegate decision-making power cause rather than solve international cooperation
problems?
I begin by showing that the multilateral policy coordination problem is qualita-
tively similar to the corresponding bilateral problem. Unless states have an overriding
incentive to coordinate policies or a hegemonic coalition can impose its preference on
others, there is a risk of inefficient compromise or failure to coordinate policies.
The analysis of institutional design reveals a striking gap between bilateral and
multilateral cooperation. I show that neither issue linkage nor delegation can reduce
the payoff to any state in bilateral cooperation. In multilateral cooperation, this
conclusion only holds with certainty if unanimity rule is used or there is exactly one
group of states that can link issues or delegate to an international committee. If there
is potential for competition, however, opportunistic issue linkage and delegation can
reduce the payoff to all states.
The analysis provides insight into the higher-order negotiations over institutional
design. First, I show that in pure coordination problems, states have a collective
incentive to proscribe issue linkage and delegation. Second, I show that a hegemonic
coalition always resists issue linkage and delegation because it can secure full coordi-
nation to its preference in isolated negotiations. Other states, however, could benefit
from these bargaining techniques to form a counterhegemonic coalition. Finally, I
show that when the risk of inefficient compromise or coordination failure looms large,
states benefit from issue linkage or delegation that requires collective approval.
9
Chapter 5: The Over- and Undersupply of Enforcement Power
in International Public Good Provision
In Chapter 5, I consider the problem of international public good provision. The
empirical record is puzzling, as states have almost exclusively chosen issue-specific
reciprocity over explicit sanctions, such as trade restrictions, to enforce coopera-
tion.32 This seems counterproductive because the enforceability of reciprocal agree-
ments is limited in multilateral cooperation: states cannot threaten severe punish-
ments through reduced public good provision because of the high collective cost. Why
cannot they use sanctions through issue linkage instead?
The model that I construct has two core elements. First, I model international
public good provision as a repeated game with multiple players. Second, I include
a bargaining stage at which a “winning coalition” of powerful states determine the
content of the international agreement. Bargaining is costly, which is particularly
appropriate for multilateral agreements that often require participation by developing
countries with severe capacity constraints.
Comparing reciprocity and sanctions through issue linkage, I find a remarkable
strategic rationale for reciprocity. While sanctions do create more collective enforce-
ment power than reciprocity, they also increase the returns to relative bargaining
power. When enforcement power is in abundant supply, powerful states can enforce
exploitative agreements. Thus, weak states refuse to participate in the negotiations.
Consequently, powerful states stand to gain from reciprocity as a credible commitment
to a mutually acceptable division of gains.
The analysis has important implications for international public good provision in
the contemporary world economy. First, the model suggests that the growing bargain-
ing power of rapidly industrializing countries such as China and India could increase
international public good provision. As their influence in negotiations increases, they
are willing to consider sanctions through issue linkage to enforce cooperation. Second,
the analysis implies that states can limit the supply of enforcement power when the
returns to trade protectionism decrease. If world market integration renders liberal-
ization more attractive, it can help states achieve a higher level of international public
good provision. Contrary to the infamous “race to the bottom” hypothesis, economic












Figure 1.1. A game with increasing returns.
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Chapter 2
A Theory of Interstate Arbitration
1 Introduction
Arbitration is a legal technique of dispute resolution, wherein the parties to a dispute
mutually commit to a judgment by an external tribunal. Its ad hoc voluntary na-
ture differentiates it from adjudication and its external nature differentiates it from
mediation. Although usually associated with domestic and international commerce,
arbitration is also used by states to resolve political disputes. The uses of arbitration
in international politics include, inter alia, territorial conflicts and the interpretation
of international agreements. For example, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
has an explicit arbitration function and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issues
judgments based on ad hoc “special agreements” between states.1
However, interstate arbitration presents a genuine theoretical puzzle: if the par-
ties to a dispute voluntarily commit to arbitration, why cannot they simply strike a
bargain to resolve the conflict instead? This is particularly puzzling in political dis-
putes because lack of technical knowledge, which is a central reason for commercial
arbitration, is rarely important. Indeed, interstate arbitration seems a particularly
unappealing technique of international dispute resolution for two reasons. First, it
typically produces a starkly asymmetric “award.”2 Why do states resort to a tech-
nique that creates winners and losers, instead of pursuing a compromise? Second,
interstate arbitration is usually public – in stark contrast to commercial arbitration,
1Boockmann and Thurner 2006, 120 and Sohn 1982-1983. Many international
agreements, and bilateral investment treaties in particular, contain provisions for
compulsory arbitration (Koremenos 2007). This paper focuses on voluntary arbitra-
tion only, because compulsory arbitration is essentially a form of adjudication.
2Baratta 1989, 28.
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which is almost always confidential. Why do states accept public proceedings despite
the associated “sovereignty costs?”3
The contribution of this paper is a functionalist explanation for interstate arbi-
tration. The analysis draws on bargaining theory, which provides three reasons for
bargaining failure: incomplete information, commitment problems, and indivisibili-
ties or increasing returns.4 I claim that interstate arbitration is a rational response
to the particular type of bargaining failure that stems from indivisibilities or increas-
ing returns, which are for instance common in disputes that involve sovereignty over
an island or the legality of a product ban. These factors prompt bargaining failure
because compromise is impossible (indivisibilities) or inefficient (increasing returns).
Thus, both parties have a strong incentive to engage in costly bargaining to win the
dispute, perhaps through warfare or economic sanctions. The prospect of victory
through bargaining results in protracted conflict, which is costly for both parties.
As Powell observes, indivisibilities – and by direct extension increasing returns –
create a commitment problem.5 Costly bargaining is essentially a wasteful “lottery”
through which the disputants randomly allocate the asset according to a probability
distribution that reflects their relative bargaining power. If the parties could somehow
substitute a less costly lottery for zero-sum bargaining, they would increase their
expected payoffs. However, a credible commitment is necessary because the loser has
an incentive to renege ex post by engaging in costly bargaining.
I argue that interstate arbitration is a low-cost lottery through which the arbi-
tration tribunal issues a probabilistic award. A sovereign state can credibly commit
to it because reneging on a public award carries reputational consequences. States
view the process as probabilistic because the tribunal can interpret the relevant rules
and principles in multiple ways. However, the odds are common knowledge: states
appoint the members of the tribunal, choose the relevant rules, and consult their na-
tional experts. Indivisibilities and increasing returns explain the striking asymmetry
of arbitration awards. When division of the asset is impossible or inefficient, states
should only compromise ex ante to maximize their expected payoff.
The institutional features of interstate arbitration are remarkably functional for
solving the problem. First, the public character of interstate arbitration provides a
commitment mechanism. In international politics, adequate commitment capacity is
3Abbott and Snidal 2000, 436-440.
4Fearon 1995 does not discuss increasing returns. For present purposes, an asset
is subject to increasing returns if division dissipates some surplus. Below, I show that
indivisibilities are but a special case of increasing returns.
5Powell 2006, 177-180.
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not guaranteed.6 States cannot request a central authority to enforce the arbitration
award, but they can condition their reputation on complying with it.7 If the payoff
from future cooperation is high, the commitment is credible. Moreover, the arbitration
proceedings are impartial and external, so the award is more legitimate and acceptable
to domestic interest groups.8
Second, the institutional design of interstate arbitration promotes neutrality and
independence. The parties usually appoint the members of the tribunal, which re-
duces the risk of bias, and mutual consent prevents the use of arbitration against
the interests of a state. The strictly external nature of the proceedings, on the other
hand, increases the cost of manipulating the arbitration tribunal. Consequently, the
institutional design of interstate arbitration forms an effective impediment to costly
manipulation. States can coerce, blackmail, or bribe the tribunal, but the cost of such
activities is high. The decision to arbitrate is in the parties’ hands, but the incentive
to engage in zero-sum bargaining during the proceedings is low, which reduces the
cost of interstate arbitration.
To formalize the theory, I construct a simple bargaining model over an asset that
is subject to increasing returns. States can request arbitration, but their only source
of commitment capacity is reputation. I show that states benefit from arbitration
without any commitment capacity when bargaining is very costly, and that states can
successfully resolve a dispute through arbitration even when bargaining is a lucrative
outside option if reneging carries negative reputational consequences. Specifically,
states enforce the commitment to arbitration by refusing to arbitrate with a deviator
in the future.
2 Understanding Interstate Arbitration
Interstate arbitration is a legal technique of international dispute resolution, wherein
states submit a dispute to a neutral third party for settlement. This third party is
usually a self-identified arbitration tribunal, which deliberates according to rules cho-
sen and is composed of members appointed by the parties. During the proceedings,
however, the parties’ role is limited to submitting their claims and evidence, and the
arbitration tribunal independently issues an arbitration “award.” Consequently, in-
6Oye 1986.
7Chayes and Chayes 1993, 177.
8Allee and Huth 2006.
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terstate arbitration is not equivalent to mediation or adjudication. Unlike mediation,
interstate arbitration is not a process in which the parties seek compromise with ne-
gotiation support. Unlike adjudication, it is not compulsory and thus cannot be used
to enforce compliance with international law.
Interstate arbitration achieved a prominent role as a method of legal dispute res-
olution at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, where the great powers of the time
agreed on establishing the PCA for peaceful dispute resolution.9 The method was in
active use during the first two decades of the 20th century, but its popularity declined
with the possibility of adjudication at the Permanent Court of International Justice
since 1922 and the general demise of internal law since the 1930’s. Recently, interest
in interstate arbitration has renewed. For example, in 1998 and 1999 the PCA gave
two celebrated awards that peacefully resolved the protracted and violent conflict
between Eritrea and Yemen on sovereignty over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea.10
However, the number of cases at the PCA and the ICJ continues to be smaller than
the number of cases with compulsory or adjudicative elements.11 The purpose of this
paper is to provide a detailed explanation for the former subset of cases only, not
international dispute resolution in general.
Currently, the PCA stands out as the prominent forum for interstate arbitration.
In addition to voluntary arbitration, it has recently served as the dispute resolution
body for important multilateral agreements such as the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).12 It now also resolves commercial disputes in which
one of the parties is not a state. Another important forum for interstate arbitration
is the ICJ, which allows states to sign a voluntary “special agreement” instead of
the conventional adjudicative procedure.13 Finally, many international organizations
perform a de facto arbitration function. An example is the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, which can recommend international food and veterinary standards when
states seek harmonization but fail to agree on a specific standard.
Although the practice of interstate arbitration varies, it is characterized by four
general features worth discussing in some detail. First, interstate arbitration requires
mutual consent.14 Although some international agreements, such as most bilateral in-
9Baratta 1989.
10Permanent Court of Arbitration 2005.
11Fischer 1982. In some of these cases the states agreed on the need for a legal
resolution.
12Sohn 1982-1983; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002.
13Mitchell and Hensel 2007.
14Baratta 1989.
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vestment treaties, refer to“compulsory”arbitration with strong adjudicative elements,
conventional interstate arbitration is founded on a mutual decision. Unless dictated
by a separate international agreement, the PCA only considers cases in which both
parties agree on arbitration. Similarly, an ICJ special agreement must be mutually
submitted.
Second, interstate arbitration is external to the parties. Unlike mediation, in-
terstate arbitration does not purport to facilitate dialogue between the disputants.
When two states submit a dispute, they commit to honoring the award. They do not
bargain with the arbitration tribunal, and the arbitration proceedings do not provide
a mechanism for direct communication between the parties.
Third, interstate arbitration usually results in an asymmetric award that clearly
indicates which party “won” the dispute.15 While this practice is unremarkable in
adjudication, the explicit purpose of which is to discipline violators, it is striking in
voluntary dispute resolution: arbitration tribunals do not pursue compromise. For
example, Stuyt documents 451 individual cases of interstate arbitration between 1789
and 1990 and finds that in 225 of these cases, a clear winner could be identified.16
Only 30 cases can be characterized as compromise with reasonable certainty. In the
remaining cases, either the award was unavailable, no award was given, or the result
was unclear. Even if one half of these cases were actually compromises, the vast
majority of all arbitration awards would follow the winner-loser logic.
Finally, interstate arbitration is typically public. States rarely choose to conduct
the arbitration proceedings in secrecy, while arbitration proceedings involving private
parties are almost exclusively confidential. All cases of interstate arbitration at the
PCA and the ICJ, for example, are fully public. To the contrary, the PCA has 22
pending cases involving a private party, and only three of these cases are public.17
Moreover, the role of the PCA is limited to “administrative support” in two of these
three cases.
A functionalist explanation for interstate arbitration should include a rationale
for the counterintuitive combination of these features. At first glance, the necessity
of mutual consent seems to fit poorly with the external nature of the proceedings and
the asymmetric nature of the modal arbitration award. If the purpose of interstate
arbitration is dispute resolution, why should the parties be isolated from the process
instead of pursuing a negotiated compromise? Similarly, the choice of public proceed-
15Baratta 1989.
16Stuyt 1990.
17As of May 2, 2008.
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ings is counterintuitive given the “sovereignty costs” that surrendering the authority
to conceal or release information carries.18
2.1 The Usual Suspects: Incomplete Information and Com-
mitment Problems
Bargaining theory offers three potential explanations for failure: incomplete infor-
mation, commitment problems, and indivisibilities or increasing returns.19 Of these,
incomplete information and commitment problems with a fully divisible asset have
received most attention.20
To begin with, consider incomplete information. As game theorists have shown,
uncertainty over the opponent’s resolve sometimes prompts an unacceptable offer on
the division of the disputed asset.21 Had the bargaining parties known exactly which
offers the other party prefers to a costly outside option, they would have found a mu-
tually preferable agreement and avoided costly alternatives such as warfare or trade
sanctions. However, based on the four features outlined above, interstate arbitration
is not useful in solving the problem of incomplete information. Bargaining theory
predicts that the parties should send “costly signals” that reveal information on the
parties’ resolve.22 Yet interstate arbitration is voluntary, not particularly costly, and
does not involve visible strategic “moves.” If the parties were to reveal information
through costly signaling, they should simply create scope for it. Similarly, interstate
arbitration does not facilitate communication. Instead, states should choose media-
tion for negotiation support. Externalizing the process to an independent arbitration
tribunal is not a good substitute for mediation.
If incomplete information is not a problem, bargaining failure is nevertheless pos-
sible when the bargaining parties cannot credibly commit to an agreement.23 For
example, states sometimes choose warfare to prevent the opponent from growing
stronger in the future. More generally, bargaining failure is possible whenever a
potential agreement involves incentives to defect as in a Prisoners’ Dilemma.24 If
credible commitment is not readily available, the parties must find an enforcement




22Fearon 1997; Spence 1973.
23Powell 2004, 2006.
24Axelrod and Keohane 1985.
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mechanism.
The public nature of arbitration permits reputational consequences for non-compliance,25
but interstate arbitration turns out to be a poor solution to commitment problems
in general. Most importantly, the external nature of the proceedings and the asym-
metric awards are not functional for preventing defection in the future. To solve a
commitment problem, states should negotiate a compromise that reflects their relative
bargaining power and announce a public commitment to it. If they need international
law to bolster the commitment, they can sign and ratify a formal international agree-
ment with specific enforcement provisions.26 Interstate arbitration creates no added
value, and a starkly asymmetric award actually gives the loser an additional incentive
to defect, so interstate arbitration could even aggravate the commitment problem.
These limitations suggest that neither incomplete information nor commitment
problems provide an adequate explanation for international arbitration. In contrast,
they offer plausible explanation for adjudication or compulsory arbitration because
states can use a legal challenge as a costly signal and/or to punish defectors.27
2.2 Bargaining and Increasing Returns
In addition to incomplete information and commitment problems, bargaining failure
is possible if the disputed asset is subject to increasing returns. Increasing returns
imply that compromise is not efficient, as some surplus is dissipated upon division:
Definition 1. Suppose states A and B bargain over an asset of size 1 and let
ui(πi), where πi is the share that state i obtains, be the non-negative payoff to state
i. The asset is subject to increasing returns if and only if both states i = A, B prefer
obtaining any share πi ∈ [0, 1] with probability λi to obtaining a smaller share πi · λi
with certainty, for all λi ∈ [0, 1], and this preference is strict for some λi.
This definition implies that in the presence of increasing returns, a state would rather
obtain the entire asset with probability λi than a share of λi with certainty. When
the marginal value of each additional unit of the asset is increasing, it is optimal to
“gamble” on obtaining the entire asset.
A special case of increasing returns is indivisibility, which implies that the asset
25See Chayes and Chayes 1993; Paulson 2004; Tomz 2007.
26Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
27Reinhardt 2001; Rosendorff 2005.
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disappears upon division:
Claim 1. If an asset is indivisible, so that ui(πi) = 0 for all πi 6= 1, it is sub-
ject to increasing returns.
To understand this claim, note that an indivisible asset is worthless if it is divided.
Thus, a state would rather obtain the entire asset with any probability rather than a
share of it.
The problems that increasing returns create can be illustrated by using three sim-
ple two-player games sketched in Figure 2.1. The game on the left is a classic Battle of
the Sexes. Failure to cooperate creates no surplus, but any cooperative arrangement
results in unequal distribution of gains with payoffs (2, 1) or (1, 2). The mixed strat-
egy equilibrium, in which both players choose their strategy randomly, is inefficient.




) because coordination failure sometimes occurs.
Choosing between (U,L) and (D, R) randomly would yield payoffs (1 + λ, 2 − λ),
where λ is the probability of choosing (U,L). This solution is efficient and mutually
profitable for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. The game in the middle is a Deadlock, and it seems as if
neither player had an incentive to cooperate. However, the pure-strategy equilibrium
gives payoffs (3, 3) while randomly choosing between (U,L) and (D, R) would yield
(2 + 3λ, 5 − 3λ), which both players prefer when 2
3
> λ > 1
3
. The game on the right
reflects increasing returns without indivisibilities. Unlike Battle of the Sexes and
Deadlock, this game does not have a discrete strategy space. The pie is physically
divisible, but equal division dissipates surplus. Randomly choosing between 0 and 1







). Both players prefer randomization when 3
4
> λ > 1
4
.
[FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
In each case, the problem of inefficient compromise reduces to creating a lottery
that is less costly to implement than bargaining. Even if the asset is subject to in-
creasing returns, the expected payoff can be divided without loss of surplus through
probabilistic allocation. Consequently, a mutually profitable agreement is always pos-
sible. A low-cost lottery prevents distributional conflict from dissipating surplus, but
credible commitment by both players is necessary because the loser has an incentive
to renege. This is why Powell argues that the broader class of commitment problems
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subsumes indivisibilities:28
Claim 2. If states bargain over an asset that is indivisible or subject to increas-
ing returns, the allocation is efficient if and only if state A obtains the asset with
probability λ and state B obtains the asset with probability 1 − λ.
Remarkably, no matter how asymmetric the states are, the ex post allocation must
never involve any division.
To be sure, a lottery is not the only means of preventing bargaining failure in the
presence of increasing returns. For example, Fearon dismisses indivisibilities as an
explanation for interstate war on the grounds that although many issues are indeed
indivisible, “the real question in such cases is what prevents leaders from creating
intermediate settlements.”29 States could use issue linkages or side payments to pre-
vent costly bargaining.30 However, the method states choose depends on costs and
benefits. While any lottery requires some commitment capacity, issue linkages and
side payments require negotiations across issue areas and carry transaction costs.31
Thus, states have an incentive to implement the lottery described in Claim 2 when
the cost of issue linkage or side payments is higher than the cost of that lottery.
Are increasing returns empirically relevant? To begin with, the most straightfor-
ward example of a physical indivisibility is an island with strategic value. Unlike in
most territorial disputes, states cannot simply“split the difference.” Another example
is an international product or process standard.32 Industries and companies desire
harmonization to reduce transaction costs, but each party prefers retaining its domes-
tic standard to avoid adjustment costs. Often the most efficient solution is to choose
among pre-existing, proven national standards, which implies that division through a
compromise standard dissipates some of the surplus. Similarly, a simple product ban
is sometimes the most efficient means of controlling a negative externality.33
Increasing returns also affect bargaining over norms and legal principles. For ex-
ample, as Vogel argues, transatlantic bargaining over the European ban in 1985 on
beef hormone, used extensively by American beef exporters, was complicated by the




31Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
32Mattli and Büthe 2003.
33Guzman and Simmons 2002.
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world.34 The European Community could not yield because it would signal willing-
ness to negotiate its sovereign right to protect consumer health, while the American
exporters were loath to see similar regulations emerge in more important markets,
such as Japan. Yet a clear rule would reduce uncertainty and increase confidence in
a rule-based international trading system. Similarly, many international disputes in-
volve contradictory sovereignty claims based on ethnicity or historical possession. In
such situations, division could fuel hostilities and pave way for future conflict, which
suggests the presence of increasing returns even though the territory is physically
divisible.35
Importantly, increasing returns are conceptually distinct from domestic political
constraints. If the asset is not subject to increasing returns but leaders cannot com-
promise due to domestic political constraints, the only problem is a bargaining failure
at the domestic level. International dispute resolution could add legitimacy to the
process and thus provide a“smokescreen” for concessions.36 This explanation is useful
in understanding international dispute resolution in general, but it cannot account
for the asymmetric nature of arbitration awards.
2.3 A Functionalist Explanation
The above discussion suggests that increasing returns are empirically relevant. More-
over, it implies that states need a low-cost lottery to which they can credibly commit.
If interstate arbitration is such a lottery with a credible commitment mechanism, and
its institutional features match the associated problems, increasing returns provide a
logically coherent explanation for interstate arbitration.
Let us first verify that interstate arbitration is indeed strategically equivalent to a
lottery. On the one hand, the arbitration award must be subject to uncertainty. This
condition is easily fulfilled in any dispute requiring arbitration. Even if the parties
choose a clear set of rules according to which the arbitration tribunal is to deliberate,
it is impossible to anticipate the outcome with certainty. Any moderately complex
framework of rules allows multiple interpretations, and international law is highly
complex.37 On the other hand, the bargaining parties must agree on the odds. Given
the well-defined mandate and composition of the arbitration tribunal, the parties
34Vogel 1995.
35Hensel and Mitchell 2005.
36Allee and Huth 2006.
37Franck 1995.
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can form “common conjectures.”38 Additionally, the set of expected probabilities is
limited to those that both parties prefer to costly bargaining.39 Finally, states can
also consult national specialists such as international lawyers to obtain an estimate
of the likelihood of a favorable award.
Consider next the four institutional features. First, the presence of increasing
returns offers a rationale for mutual consent and asymmetric awards. When a com-
promise dissipates surplus so that both states obtain a higher expected payoff through
a lottery, a mutual commitment to an asymmetric award is rational. When compro-
mise is impossible or inefficient, it is better to choose a winner. Thus, increasing
returns explain the puzzling tendency of arbitration tribunals to neglect compromise.
Second, the external nature of interstate arbitration provides two important ben-
efits. On the one hand, insulating the arbitration tribunal from state influence is
useful because it dampens the incentive to engage in costly bribery, blackmail, or
coercion.40 Although it is impossible to fully isolate the arbitration tribunal from
major powers’ influence, the institutional design increases the cost of such activities.
This increases states’ willingness to engage in interstate arbitration, because they
can expect a fair hearing and a favorable award with sufficiently high probability.41
On the other hand, the external nature of interstate arbitration also confers legiti-
macy on the proceedings.42 With increasing returns, it is difficult for the loser to
explain its domestic audiences why the opponent “took it all,” so domestic legitimacy
is particularly important.
Finally, the public nature of the proceedings offers a commitment mechanism. If
states announce a public commitment to the award and condition their reputation for
bargaining in good faith on compliance, they increase the cost of reneging.43 Even
if states possess “multiple reputations” in different issue areas, as Downs and Jones
argue, they can create a system of reputational consequences upon violation.44 If third
parties could not compare the award with the loser’s ex post behavior, a reputational
mechanism would not function. If a purely domestic commitment mechanism, such
as an independent judiciary or a democratic legislature,45 is not sufficient to create
38Morrow 2002.
39Aumann 1974.
40Haftel and Thompson 2006.
41Some bias towards major powers is useful for incentive compatibility (Posner and
de Figueiredo 2005).
42Allee and Huth 2006.
43Tomz 2007.
44Downs and Jones 2002.
45Martin 2000; Powell and Mitchell 2007.
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adequate commitment capacity, such a reputational mechanism is useful.
3 The Model
To formalize the theory, I construct a simple bargaining model in which the disputed
asset is subject to increasing returns. I then embed this bargaining model in a simple
repeated game to examine the role of public commitment and reputation.
3.1 The Dispute Game
Suppose states A and B are in a dispute over an asset of size 1 that is subject to
increasing returns. Both states choose simultaneously whether to unilaterally initiate
a costly bargaining process Γ. If neither state initiates, they settle on an exogenous
allocation (πA, πB) = (π, 1 − π). If at least one state initiates, each state i = A, B
obtains a bargaining payoff γi less the cost of bargaining ci.
If states reach the settlement, the value of share πi to state i is ui(πi). To sim-
plify exposition, let ui be twice differentiable and normalize ui(0) = 0. By increasing
returns, ui(πi) and u
′
i(πi) are strictly increasing in πi, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The settlement (π, 1− π) is exogenous for simplicity and could inter alia reflect rela-
tive bargaining power. Throughout, I assume that if there is at least one settlement
(π, 1 − π) that both states prefer to costly bargaining, such a preferred settlement is
chosen.
[FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
Either player can unilaterally initiate costly bargaining, which could be a war of
attrition or any other costly bargaining procedure.46 I do not model this outside
option explicitly, because it only shapes behavior through expected payoffs: a war
of attrition in the future is equivalent to an inefficient compromise if the expected
payoffs are equal. If either state i initiates costly bargaining, both pay a strictly pos-
itive cost ci and obtain an expected payoff γi, which is strictly lower than the payoff
from obtaining the entire asset without bargaining, ui(1). This is a generalization of
the conventional model in which γi = pi · ui(1), where pi is the probability that state
46Sutton 1986.
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i obtains the asset in its entirety through conflict. I omit the pathological possibil-
ity that both states choose to initiate costly bargaining even though they prefer the
settlement.
Both bargaining and settlements can be inefficient, or Pareto-dominated by some
lottery on the ownership of the entire asset:
Definition 2. An allocation (π, 1 − π) is inefficient if and only if uA(π) < λ · uA(1)
and uB(1 − π) < (1 − λ) · uB(1) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Bargaining is inefficient if and
only if γA − cA < λ · uA(1) and γB − cB < (1 − λ) · uB(1) for some λ ∈ [0, 1].
Below, I omit the trivial case in which bargaining is efficient.
In the absence of interstate arbitration, the dispute game prompts the following
outcomes:
Claim 3. The equilibria of the dispute game are as follows:
1. If there does not exist an allocation (π, 1 − π) such that γi − ci ≤ ui(πi) for
i = A, B, at least one state j ∈ {A, B} such that γj − cj > uj(πj) initiates the
costly bargaining process.
2. Otherwise states settle on an allocation (π, 1 − π) such that γi − ci ≤ πi for
i = A, B.
The first part is standard.47 If there is no “zone of agreement,” at least one state has
an incentive to initiate a costly bargaining process. The second part shows that if
bargaining is too costly, a settlement is possible. However, almost all settlements are
inefficient:
Claim 4. The outcome of the dispute game is inefficient unless the equilibrium
allocation is (1, 0) or (0, 1).
This claim implies that increasing returns could create a commitment problem. If
only the states could somehow commit to a lottery over the ownership of the entire
asset, they could increase their expected payoff. Unfortunately, such a lottery is use-
less without commitment capacity because either player can initiate costly bargaining
should it lose. Figure 2.3 illustrates.
47Fearon 1995; Powell 2006.
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[FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
The only situation in which states can avoid inefficiency is one in which bargain-
ing is so costly that at least one state prefers yielding to bargaining. The potential
outcomes of the game can therefore be classified:
Proposition 1. The dispute game has four forms that give rise to different equi-
libria:
1. Excessive bargaining costs. If ci ≥ γi for i = A, B, in equilibrium neither
state initiates costly bargaining and any allocation (π, 1 − π) is possible.
2. Asymmetric bargaining costs. If cA < γA but cB ≥ γB, in equilibrium
neither state initiates costly bargaining and any allocation (π, 1 − π) such that
uA(π) ≥ γA − cA is possible.
3. Inefficient compromise. If ci < γi for i = A, B and there exists an allocation
(π∗, 1− π∗) such that ui(π
∗
i ) ≥ γi − ci for i = A, B, in equilibrium neither state
initiates costly bargaining and any allocation (π, 1−π) such that ui(πi) ≥ γi−ci
for i = A, B is possible.




i ) ≥ γi − ci for i = A, B, at least one state j ∈ {A, B} such that
γj − cj > uj(π
∗
j ) initiates the costly bargaining process.
Consider the equilibria in turn. In excessive bargaining costs, the cost of bargain-
ing ci is so high relative to the value of the asset that both states would rather give up
the asset than undergo the bargaining process Γ. Consequently, the bargaining situ-
ation requires coordination in the presence of distributional conflict. Paradoxically,
however, by Claim 4 any allocation other than (1, 0) or (0, 1) is inefficient. Below, I
analyze the role of interstate arbitration in solving such coordination problems.
In asymmetric bargaining costs, only one of the states is willing to accept any
allocation of the asset. The other state has an advantage in bargaining because it can
credibly threaten not to accept an unfavorable allocation. The range of allocations
that are feasible in equilibrium now depends on the expected payoff γA to the ad-
vantaged state A and its bargaining cost cA. This does not imply, however, that the
settlement would necessarily favor the advantaged state: it only sets a lower bound
for the payoff that this state obtains.
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In inefficient compromise, both states can credibly threaten to refuse an offer
that is unfavorable. However, if there are allocations that both prefer to costly bar-
gaining, they will choose one of them. This is the canonical situation, in which both
parties have an “outside option” and the problem is to choose an allocation among
those that both prefer to their respective outside options.
In costly bargaining, there is no allocation that both states prefer to bargain-
ing. Substantively, this scenario is only possible because of increasing returns. With
indivisibilities, it must occur unless at least one state prefers losing the entire asset to
costly bargaining. Even though costly bargaining is never the best possible outcome,
as the lottery described in Definition 2 shows, it can dominate an inefficient compro-
mise. For example, suppose γi =
1
2
·ui(1) so that the costly bargaining process allocates
the entire asset to state i = A, B with probability 1
2
. Then if 1
2




for at least one state i, it strictly prefers paying the bargaining cost to an egalitarian
compromise. If this is so for both states, they engage in costly bargaining through
mutual agreement. This outcome is nevertheless inefficient, as a credible commitment
to a lottery that allocates the asset to state i = A, B with probability 1
2
would remove
the bargaining cost ci.
3.2 Interstate Arbitration
Arbitration can be incorporated in the model as a lottery in which a tribunal chooses
an award (π, 1 − π) probabilistically. Before observing the arbitration award, each
state i = A, B must “recognize” the arbitration tribunal as legitimate. Since mutual
consent is required, the arbitration tribunal does not issue an award unless both states
recognize it. However, the announcement is only legally binding if the states have the
necessary commitment capacity to enforce it. Otherwise, arbitration can only help
the states by establishing a “focal point.”48
Formally, consider the following game:
1. Both states i = A, B choose simultaneously whether to recognize the arbitration
tribunal. If at least one of them does not recognize the arbitration tribunal, they
play the equilibrium of the dispute game, as specified in Proposition 1, and
the game ends.
2. If both players recognize the arbitration tribunal, it issues an exogenous arbi-
tration award (πA, 1− πA) favorable to state A with probability λ and another
48Garrett and Weingast 1993; Schelling 1960.
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exogenous arbitration award (πB, 1− πB) favorable to state B with probability
1 − λ.
3. Both states i = A, B observe the exogenous arbitration award (π∗, 1 − π∗)
and choose simultaneously whether to unilaterally initiate costly bargaining. If
neither state initiates, they obtain the payoffs from the arbitration award (π∗, 1−
π∗). If at least one state i = A, B initiates, they play the costly bargaining
process Γ, but each initiator must also pay an additional, strictly positive cost
zi.
Throughout, I assume that the probabilities and the exogenous awards are common
knowledge. Exogeneity is without loss of generality, as the awards could be inter alia
determined by the relative bargaining power of the states, the strength of their legal
case, or the composition of the arbitration tribunal.49 I endogenize the cost zi of
reneging, which I refer to as commitment capacity, below by constructing a repeated
game in which reneging on an arbitration results in refusal by other states to engage in
arbitration, which is costly. In this section, however, I let the cost remain exogenous.
Without imposing any further assumptions on the probabilities and the awards,
the range of potential equilibria is wide. I restrict attention to optimal probability
distributions (λ, 1 − λ) and awards (πA, 1 − πA), (πB, 1 − πB) upon which the states
cannot Pareto-improve by choosing another arbitration tribunal instead. Throughout,
I let π0i denote the equilibrium share of state i if a settlement is reached without
arbitration. Substantively, this share is most likely increasing in the bargaining power
of state i.
Consider now equilibria when arbitration is possible:
Proposition 2. In excessive bargaining costs, both states recognize the arbi-
tration tribunal. It recommends (1, 0) with probability λ and (0, 1) with probability
1 − λ, where λ is such that uA(π
0) ≤ λ · uA(1) and uB(1 − π
0) ≤ (1 − λ) · uB(1).
Neither state reneges.
When bargaining is so costly that both states prefer yielding to bargaining, they
can choose from a range of random allocations that Pareto-dominate the expected
settlement (π0, 1 − π0). Consequently, the expected settlement sets a lower bound
for the expected payoff from arbitration to both states. With increasing returns, it
is always optimal to allocate the asset in its entirety. The situation can therefore
49Johns 2007; Posner and de Figueiredo 2005.
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be thought of as a coordination problem in which starkly asymmetric allocations are
necessary to achieve an efficient ex ante compromise. Somewhat paradoxically, the
absence of credible outside options results in starkly asymmetric arbitration awards,
the risk of which they are willing to accept ex ante.
Proposition 3. In asymmetric bargaining costs, both states recognize the
arbitration tribunal. It recommends (πA, 1 − πA) = (1, 0) with probability λ and




i ) ≥ π
0
i
for i = A, B and πB is minimized subject to uA(π
B) ≥ γA − cA − zA. Neither state
reneges.
When the cost of bargaining is asymmetric, one of the states has a credible out-
side option. Ex post, this state must obtain an arbitration award that it prefers to
reneging, which sets a lower bound for the share that it obtains upon an unfavorable
award. Its ability to threaten costly bargaining also sets a lower bound on the prob-
ability λ that it obtains a favorable award. This judicial bias is necessary to render
arbitration incentive-compatible.50 With increasing returns, it is always optimal for
both states to either allocate the entire asset to the advantaged state or choose the
allocation that is barely acceptable for it.
Proposition 4. In inefficient compromise, both states recognize the arbitra-
tion tribunal. It recommends (πA, 1 − πA) with probability λ and (πB, 1 − πB) with




i ) ≥ ui(π
0
i ) for i = A, B
and πji is minimized subject to ui(π
j
i ) ≥ γi − ci − zi for i 6= j. Neither state reneges.
If the equilibrium outcome is an inefficient compromise without interstate arbitra-
tion, both states have a credible outside option. With increasing returns, the optimal
arbitration tribunal chooses between the two allocations that are most asymmetric.
The expected settlement (π0, 1 − π0) in the absence of arbitration determines the
lowest and highest possible probability that state A obtains a favorable award.
Proposition 5. In costly bargaining,
1. If commitment capacity zi is high enough for i = A, B, both states recognize
the arbitration tribunal. It recommends (πA, 1 − πA) with probability λ and
(πB, 1 − πB) with probability 1 − λ, where λ is such that λ · ui(π
A
i ) + (1 − λ) ·




i ) ≥ γi− ci for i = A, B and π
j
i is minimized subject to ui(π
j
i ) ≥ γi− ci−zi
for i 6= j. Neither state reneges.
2. If commitment capacity zi is low enough for some i ∈ {A, B}, at least one state
fails to recognize the arbitration tribunal. At least one state j ∈ {A, B} such
that γj − cj > uj(π
0
j ) initiates costly bargaining.
It is only in the case of costly bargaining that arbitration could completely fail.
Without commitment capacity, there is no allocation that both states would accept
instead of engaging unilaterally in costly bargaining. If both states have adequate
commitment capacity, however, they can choose asymmetric allocations randomly.
With increasing returns, both states obtain a higher ex ante payoff. Importantly,
they must choose the probabilities of obtaining a favorable arbitration so that both
states are willing to recognize the arbitration tribunal, despite the fact that they also
commit to accepting an unfavorable award with positive probability.
Notably, the model leaves the exact choice of probabilities open. On the one hand,
one could invoke standard bargaining solutions such as the Nash Bargaining Solution
to obtain a precise prediction.51 Since the rules of the arbitration proceedings are
determined by the parties, they could, for example, choose the arbitrators so as to
build in some judicial bias. On the other hand, in reality it is well possible that the
states do not know the exact probabilities. Since the range of acceptable probabilities
is quite wide, this flexibility implies that the model is robust to small changes in
expectations.
3.3 Comparative Statics
To apply the model empirically, it is useful to consider the effect of changes in the
parameters on the feasibility of arbitration and the nature of the resulting award.
I focus on the expected payoff from bargaining (γi − ci), the rate at which returns
increase (u′i), and commitment capacity (zi).
Proposition 6. Consider an increase in the net expected payoff from bargaining,
γi − ci, for one state i, while holding the expected settlement π
0
i constant.
1. In excessive bargaining costs, a large enough increase transforms the game
into asymmetric bargaining costs.
51Nash 1950.
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2. In asymmetric bargaining costs, when i = A, the share πA of the advantaged
state A increases upon an unfavorable award; when i = B, a large enough
increase transforms the game into inefficient compromise.
3. In inefficient compromise, the share πji of state i upon an unfavorable award
increases. A large enough increase transforms the game into costly bargain-
ing.
4. In costly bargaining, if arbitration is possible, the minimal expected payoff
from arbitration and share πji of state i upon an unfavorable award increases; if
arbitration is not possible, the outcome remains unchanged.
As the expected payoff from bargaining increases, states are less willing to engage
in arbitration. If arbitration is possible, however, the value of the outside option
increases and the value of the unfavorable award to state i must increase. The value of
the favorable award is not affected because the“winner” in the arbitration proceedings
never has an incentive to renege. Finally, if the outcome in the absence of arbitration
is costly bargaining, an increase in the value of this bargaining process must increase
the expected payoff to a state.
A striking implication of the analysis is that when the net expected payoff from
bargaining is low for both states, the likelihood of a “compromise” arbitration award
increases ex post with the net expected payoff from bargaining for either state i. For
example, when the relative bargaining power of state i increases, one expects to see an
equal distribution of gains more frequently. This is so simply because the state whose
expected payoff from bargaining increases cannot credibly commit to losing the entire
asset, so the arbitration tribunal must increase the value of the unfavorable award
to it. While the empirical implications are counterintuitive, this is not a theoretical
paradox: the expected payoff from arbitration to the increasingly powerful state can
certainly increase. Figure 2.4 illustrates.
[FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
Proposition 7. Consider utility functions ui, ũi and payoffs from bargaining γi, γ̃i








1. The pair of bargaining costs (c̃A, c̃B) under ũi, γ̃i is larger than the pair of
bargaining costs (cA, cB) under ui, γi above which excessive bargaining costs
occurs.
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2. The pair of bargaining costs (c̃A, c̃B) under ũi, γ̃i is larger than the pair of
bargaining costs (cA, cB) under ui, γi below which costly bargaining occurs.
3. For any pair of bargaining costs (cA, cB) = (c̃A, c̃B), the smallest acceptable
share π∗i for state i = A, B under ui, γi is larger than the smallest acceptable
share π̃∗i under ũi, γ̃i.
This proposition holds constant the expected benefit from bargaining relative to ob-
taining the entire asset, and examines the effect of “increasingly increasing returns.”
This corresponds to an increase in the severity of the distributional consequences of
asymmetric allocations, and the consequences are predictable: states are more willing
to engage in costly bargaining, which shrinks the set of parameters for which arbitra-
tion is feasible and the extent to which the arbitration award can be asymmetric. As
increasing returns become more important, the value of arbitration increases but, by
Proposition 7, it is increasingly difficult for states to credibly commit to an unfa-
vorable award.
Proposition 8. Consider an increase in commitment capacity zi for one state i.
1. In excessive bargaining costs, the outcome is unaffected.
2. In asymmetric bargaining costs, the share πB of the advantaged state A
decreases upon an unfavorable award.
3. In inefficient compromise, the share πji of state i decreases upon an unfavor-
able award.
4. In costly bargaining, interstate arbitration first becomes feasible for some
allocations (πA, 1 − πA) and (πB, 1 − πB), and the share πji of state i then
decreases upon an unfavorable award.
As commitment capacity increases, it is easier for states to commit to an unfavor-
able award. They can implement more asymmetric ex post allocations as the cost of
reneging increases.
Proposition 9. Consider an increase in commitment capacity zi or a small enough
decrease in the net expected payoff from bargaining, γi − ci, for one state i such that
the game is not transformed.
1. In excessive bargaining costs, the expected payoff cannot be increased for
both states.
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2. Otherwise, it is possible to increase the payoff to both states by choosing more
asymmetric ex post allocations (πA, 1− πA) and (πB, 1− πB) and manipulating
the probabilities (λ, 1 − λ).
On the one hand, the minimal payoff that state i must expect from interstate arbi-
tration decreases. This is so because the value of the outside option decreases, so the
threat to engage in costly bargaining is less potent. On the other hand, the effect of
a decrease in the net expected payoff from bargaining has another, counterintuitive
implication. As the value of the outside option decreases for one of the states, it is
possible to implement arbitration proceedings that increase the expected payoff to
both states. In the presence of increasing returns, states can expect more asymmetric
allocations, which reduces deadweight loss. The ability to commit to legal settlements
allows more effective use of international law in dispute resolution.
Ideally, states could “collude” to increase the common cost of bargaining. A prob-
lem with this approach is, however, the possibility that the state whose net expected
payoff from bargaining decreases, is exploited by the other state: implementing ar-
bitration proceedings that benefit both states is possible, but it is also possible to
implement arbitration proceedings that only benefits one of the states.
Consider finally changes in the expected settlement (π0, 1− π0), perhaps because
the relative bargaining power of the two states changes and it affects the expected
settlement:
Proposition 10. If the share π0i of state i in the expected settlement increases, its
minimal expected payoff from arbitration increases in excessive bargaining costs,
asymmetric bargaining costs, and inefficient compromise.
Predictably, an increase in the value of the expected settlement increases the minimal
payoff that a state must obtain from interstate arbitration.
3.4 Reputation and Enforcement
The proposed commitment mechanism is reputational, which would explain the public
nature of interstate arbitration. I consider briefly a dynamic game in which long-
term relationships emerge to examine the conditions under which the reputational
mechanism generates commitment capacity.
There are n states, where n ≥ 2 and each state i is randomly assigned to play the
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dispute game characterized above with another state j. For simplicity, the probability
ρ of being paired with another state is constant across all states. However, the
nature of the dispute is determined probabilistically. Formally, for each period t
and state i, conditional on being assigned to bargain, the payoff-relevant parameters
θi = (ui, γi, ci) are drawn from some state-specific and time-invariant multivariate
distribution Θi. A special case of interest is n = 2 and ρ = 1, which corresponds to
an “enduring rivalry” between two states.
For analytical tractability, each player has a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). If
the expected payoff from period t for player i is denoted by uti, the discounted payoff





δt · uti. (1)
The equilibria in focus are as follows. First, in the one-stage Nash equilibrium,
each player always behaves optimally as if no future play was forthcoming. Formally,
this corresponds to optimal equilibrium play when commitment capacity is zero. If
mutually beneficial arbitration is possible without commitment capacity, it is thus
implemented. Let UNi denote the discounted payoff for state i in this equilibrium.
Second, in a commitment equilibrium each player is tagged a“friend” if it has never
deviated from the equilibrium path and an“enemy”otherwise. These tags are common
knowledge, and when an “enemy” is present in a dispute game, neither bargaining
state i = A, B ever recognizes the arbitration tribunal. Otherwise mutually beneficial
interstate arbitration is implemented whenever possible.
The function of a commitment equilibrium is to enable arbitration proceedings
when commitment capacity is necessary. This is sometimes possible because a state
that reneges loses the benefits from interstate arbitration in the future. Let UCi
denote the discounted payoff for a “friend” in the commitment equilibrium and UDi
the discounted payoff for an “enemy.”
As shown above, interstate arbitration is sometimes possible in a Nash equilibrium.
It is reasonable to focus on the case in which the Nash equilibrium is preferred to





In a commitment equilibrium, it is enough to ensure that no state has an incentive
to renege upon an unfavorable award, for I have shown in the previous section that op-
timal interstate arbitration can always be arranged so that both states i = A, B stand
to gain ex ante. While it is not possible to characterize all commitment equilibria
explicitly, this constraint turns out to have considerable explanatory and predictive
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power.
To begin with, the maximal benefit from reneging is





i ) denotes the value of the unfavorable award when the incentive to
renege is largest. On the other hand, the cost of reneging determines commitment
capacity,







In a commitment equilibrium, one must therefore have:
Proposition 11. In any commitment equilibrium and at any time t, any two bar-
gaining states i = A, B recognize an optimal arbitration tribunal if and only if the
dispute game is such that, for i 6= j, there exist possible unfavorable awards πji such
that γi − ci − ui(π
j







Consider the empirical implications of this constraint. First, as the expected pay-
off from bargaining (γi − ci) grows, it is increasingly difficult to enforce interstate
arbitration. As I have shown in the section on comparative statics, powerful states
that assign high value to winning the dispute and expect low-cost bargaining cannot
be induced to engage in interstate arbitration unless they find the unfavorable award
acceptable. This finding suggests that when a reputational commitment mechanism
is necessary, states are most likely to arbitrate disputes in which the value of winning
is low relative to the cost of bargaining. Even great powers engage in interstate arbi-
tration under certain circumstances, but the most important disputes are resolved in
other fora.
Second, the reputational commitment mechanism depends on the value of inter-
state arbitration in the future. This value is in turn determined by the frequency of
bargaining (ρ), the likelihood of encountering a dispute in which arbitration is ben-
eficial, and the expected payoff from arbitration. This finding provides a potential
explanation for the frequent use of arbitration in “enduring rivalries,” in which the
frequency of bargaining is very high.52 It also suggests that arbitration is most useful
when the frequency of disputes that require arbitration is high. Finally, it shows that
the expected payoff from arbitration in the future is at least partially determined by
the need to ensure that states have incentives to comply. If a state cannot commit
52Allee and Huth 2006.
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to interstate arbitration in important disputes, its commitment capacity can be en-
hanced by increasing the likelihood that it obtains a favorable award in the future.
Since the need for commitment capacity is determined by the value of the outside
option, interstate arbitration should exhibit a bias that favors powerful states.
4 Examples
In this section, I apply the theoretical model to disputes that states have submitted
to interstate arbitration. I consider the “Hanish Islands Crisis” between Eritrea and
Yemen in some detail and offer a cursory examination of recent special agreements
submitted for resolution in the ICJ.53
4.1 The Hanish Islands Crisis
The Hanish Islands Crisis was a violent conflict between Eritrea and Yemen over the
three Hanish Islands in the Red Sea.54 The dispute escalated into violence in 1995
when the Eritrean military invaded the island amidst the construction of a hotel and
a scuba diving center by a German company and the Yemeni government. According
to contemporary sources, the Eritrean military interpreted the Yemeni troops brought
to the Hanish Islands to protect the construction workers as an attempt to establish
Yemeni sovereignty over the islands.55 After negotiations collapsed and the cost of
bargaining increased on both sides, the parties submitted the dispute for arbitration
at the PCA on October 3, 1996.56 The Eritrea/Yemen (1998/1999) arbitration, which
resulted in a total victory for Yemen, resolved the dispute peacefully and was cele-
brated among international lawyers as a landmark event in the history of interstate
53Another recent case of importance at the PCA is Belgium/Netherlands (2005)
or the “Iron Rhine Arbitration.” The dispute involved contradictory legal claims,
which are generally subject to increasing returns. However, another dimension of the
dispute was financial burden sharing, which is not subject to increasing returns. If
the theory proposed in this paper applies, the primary obstacle to compromise were
the contradictory legal claims.
54For an excellent account of the crisis, see Lefebvre 1998.
55“Eritrea: Battle for a Sandpit.” Indian Ocean Newsletter December 23, 1995.
The onset of the dispute can therefore be attributed to incomplete information and




To apply the model, I divide the dispute into two periods. The first period encom-
passes the months before, during, and after the violent conflict in 1995. It exemplifies
a dispute in which interstate arbitration is not feasible because the cost of bargaining
ci is low for at least one of the states i ∈ {A, B}. The second period, which en-
compasses the time between initial submission in 1996 and the arbitration award in
1998 , exemplifies a dispute in which the cost of bargaining ci is high for both states
i = A, B. Together, these two periods correspond to times t and t+1 of the dynamic
model with n = 2 and a high probability ρ of bargaining in each period.
The disputed asset was the archipelago, which comprises three islands of some
significance. By far the most important of these islands is the Greater Hanish Island,
which is valuable for navigational purposes, tourist revenue, fishing rights, monitoring
the Red Sea, and oil exploration.58 That the Hanish Islands are subject to increasing
returns is likely for three reasons. First, division of the islands, all of which are rela-
tively small, reduces their economic value. Second, upon division the islands contain
the seeds of future conflict because a potential aggressor can easily inflict significant
damage on the other side. If the islands are controlled by a single state, however, a
surprise invasion from the sea is difficult to implement. Finally, the United Nations
Law of the Sea assigns 12-mile “territorial sea” rights to the owner of the islands,
which corresponds to a significant share of the narrow Red Sea.59 For these reasons,
both states likely prefer controlling the entire archipelago with some probability λ to
controlling λ per cent of the archipelago.
In the first period, the cost of bargaining ci was low for both parties and Eritrea
in particular. Until 1995, the islands were occupied by a handful of Yemeni fisher-
men only. Upon the construction works, Yemen established a military presence of
approximately 200 lightly-armed soldiers, which Eritrea interpreted as a sign of ag-
gression. Given that the islands are distanced from the mainland on both sides, it
was easy for the Eritrean military to conquer the islands with minor losses; both sides
lost less than two dozen lives in a conflict that lasted three days.60 The payoff from
bargaining γi was also relatively high for Eritrea, the government of which expected
to permanently lose the islands if the Yemeni military presence was to be sustained.
As Proposition 1 predicts, this situation of costly bargaining resulted in a
57Permanent Court of Arbitration 2005.
58Lefebvre 1998, 372-376.
59Schofield and Pratt 1996.
60“Eritrea: Battle for a Sandpit.” Indian Ocean Newsletter December 23, 1995.
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conflict. The Eritrean military conquered the islands, and bilateral negotiations began
immediately. The parties failed to make any progress towards a settlement despite
mediation by the United Nations General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali by October
1996, when the parties agreed to submit the dispute for arbitration at the PCA.61
Two factors are particularly important in explaining why the parties ultimately
engaged in arbitration. First, the dispute was at risk of escalating into a broader
regional conflict between the Arab League, which supported Yemen, and Israel, which
was accused of assisting the Eritrean military in the invasion.62 This clearly increased
the cost of bargaining ci for both parties, for the regional security situation was already
fragile before the dispute.
Second, the cost of the dispute increased for both countries due to “more pressing
foreign policy problems.”63 Yemen was simultaneously involved in an intense border
dispute with Saudi Arabia. Negotiations following a memorandum of understanding
signed in February 1995 failed to resolve the dispute by 1997. In Eritrea, the Eritrean
Islamic Jihad Movement joined forces with the Eritrean Liberation Front to overthrow
the government, thus posing an immediate threat of political survival to the latter.64
Later, the relationship between Eritrea and the wealthier and more powerful Ethiopia
also deteriorated into a full-blown war. As predicted by model, in the resulting
situation of excessive bargaining costs on both sides, Eritrea and Yemen had an
incentive to submit the dispute for interstate arbitration. They agreed that each
state can choose two judges for a five-member tribunal, and the fifth judge is chosen
together.
The outcome of the arbitration was strikingly asymmetric: Yemen gained control
of all three Hanish Islands and Eritrea, the sovereignty of which was established over
minor islands characterized as “navigational hazards” by the arbitration tribunal,
was forced to withdraw its troops immediately.65 This result is counterintuitive, as
conventional bargaining models predict some kind of division, perhaps so that Yemen
gains the largest islands and Eritrea the others. In the presence of increasing returns,
however, this outcome is perfectly understandable. The model predicts that when
the cost of bargaining is high on both sides, the arbitration tribunal chooses the most
61Antunes 2001.
62“Arab League Backs Yemen in Dispute with Eritrea.” United Press International
Cairo December 3, 1995; “Eritrea Wants Change in Monitoring of Yemen Row.”
Reuters World Service September 3, 1996.
63Lefebvre 1998, 379.
64“Horn of Africa: Alliances.” Africa Confidential February 14, 1998.
65Kwiatkowska 2001; Permanent Court of Arbitration 2005.
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asymmetric award available.
It is not possible to directly verify the ex ante probability λ that Yemen win
the dispute, but the claims made by the two states support the interpretation that
they specifically requested that the arbitration tribunal issue a starkly asymmetric
award.66 Both states claimed full sovereignty over the islands on historical grounds
and submitted historical and cartographic evidence in support, but contemporary
observers could not assess the relative strength of the competing claims.67 Since the
arbitration proceedings were initiated on mutual consent, they could have equally
well designed the terms of the proceedings so as to achieve a division of the islands.
That they mutually consented on arbitration on these terms provides strong evidence
in support of the theory proposed above.
Additional evidence can be obtained by comparing the claims that the two states
made with the second part of the arbitration proceedings, which concerned maritime
claims related to the the Greater Hanish Islands. Strikingly, the claims submitted
by the states were almost identical and, unsurprisingly, the arbitration award was
a compromise that recognized the validity of both the Eritrean and Yemeni claims.
Antunes writes that “where no mid-sea islands were involved, claim-lines of the two
States did not differ significantly.”68 A natural interpretation of the maritime claims
is that they were submitted on the side as a minor addition to the territorial claims,
which were the major point of contention.
Finally, as the theory predicts, both states have complied with the arbitration
award.69 In excessive bargaining costs, neither state has an incentive to renege
upon the unfavorable award. Despite losing control of the Hanish Islands, Eritrea
promptly withdrew its military from the islands.
Alternative explanations have severe limitations. First, the peaceful resolution
was unlikely to reflect mere changes in relative bargaining power. If the decrease in
the relative bargaining power of Eritrea was the only reason for a peaceful resolution,
Eritrea could have simply withdrawn from the islands without need to engage in
interstate arbitration at the PCA. Instead, the states agreed to initiate the arbitration
proceedings. Second, the domestic political explanation that Allee and Huth offer,
which emphasizes the legitimacy of legal international settlements, is incompatible
with the asymmetric award.70 If the purpose of arbitration was to simply provide a
66Kwiatkowska 2001; Permanent Court of Arbitration 2005.
67Westing 1996.
68Antunes 2001, 318.
69“Eritrea: Hanish Islands Ruling.” Reuters October 13, 1998.
70Allee and Huth 2006.
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smokescreen for a compromise, the states would not have publicly claimed sovereignty
over the entire archipelago. The arbitration tribunal would have divided the asset to
“save face.” It is unlikely that the putative Eritrean domestic opposition, embedded in
a society “infused with nationalism,” would have accepted a crushing defeat without
any resistance simply because the decision was made in The Hague.71
4.2 Special Agreements in the International Court of Justice
Interestingly, the four most recent special agreements submitted to the ICJ involve
contradicting sovereignty claims over islands.72 In Botswana/Namibia, the court
found that the contested Kasikili/Sedudu island belongs to Botswana.73 In Indone-
sia/Malaysia, the court ruled that Malaysia has sovereignty over the disputed Litigan
and Sipadan islands. In Benin/Niger, the court endorsed Niger’s sovereignty over
the Lété Goungou island in the River Niger, which is by far the most valuable of the
contested islands. In Malaysia/Singapore, the most important island of contention,
Pedra Banca/Pulau Batu Puteh was awarded to Singapore while Malaysia gained the
Middle Rocks as a minor concession. The decision was by majority not unanimity in
each case.
The parties have complied with the rulings.74 In Indonesia/Malaysia, the Indone-
sian foreign minister expressed disappointment but observed that Indonesia is“obliged
to respect”the judgment.75 In Benin/Niger, both parties immediately“vowed to abide
by the decision.”76 Commenting on the Botswana/Namibia award, a spokesperson for
the Center for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa, said that “The dog
that didn’t bite is massively significant here ... [t]he underlying premise is that there
will always be conflict between states, including states that have friendly relations
... [w]hat matters is how the conflict is addressed.”77 In September 2008, Singapore
and Malaysia “reiterated their commitment to honour and abide by the International
71The quote is from “Three Tiny Islands in the Red Sea May Cause Arab-African
Feud.” Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 19, 1995.
72Botswana/Namibia (1996), Indonesia/Malaysia (1998), Benin/Niger (2002),
Malaysia/Singapore (2003).
73The island is known as Sedudu in Botswana and Kasikili in Namibia.
74Mitchell and Hensel 2007.
75“Malaysia Gets Disputed Islands.” BBC December 17, 2002.
76“Benin-Niger: International Court Rules That Main Disputed Island Belongs to
Niger Not Benin.” IRIN Africa December 7, 2005.
77“Peaceful End to Island Rift Builds Hope.” Los Angeles Times December 25,
1999.
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Court of Justice’s judgment.”78
These special agreements provide suggestive evidence in support of the theory.
Dividing islands is difficult and could involve loss of strategic and economic value.
Instead of pursuing compromise, the parties explicitly requested a resolution on the
validity of contradictory claims of sovereignty. The awards were asymmetric, but both
parties have welcomed the resolution and complied with the rules set by the ICJ.
5 Conclusion
States use voluntary interstate arbitration to resolve disputes over assets that are sub-
ject to increasing returns. If compromise is inefficient or impossible, the disputants
stand to gain from a low-cost lottery over the ownership of the asset, but such a lot-
tery requires commitment capacity. Interstate arbitration is strategically equivalent
to this lottery due to its voluntary nature and the starkly asymmetric awards that it
produces. Moreover, its public nature enables a credible commitment through rep-
utational consequences upon deviation. Thus, indivisibilities and increasing returns
provide a functionalist explanation for interstate arbitration. The formal analysis
confirms this intuition and the comparative statics provide a basis for a systematic
empirical analysis.
These results situate interstate arbitration in the broader domain of international
law and suggest that it is remarkably functional for preventing a specific yet important
type of bargaining failure. If international law is indeed functional more generally,
states should have the ability to adapt it according to their specific needs in different
contexts. Consequently, it is unlikely that any single theory could explain interna-
tional dispute resolution in general. Instead, scholars should explore in great detail
the relationship between the nature of the dispute, which varies highly across cases,
and the specific form of dispute resolution that states use.




Equilibria of the Static Game
The equilibrium concept used is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In the dispute
game without interstate arbitration, neither state initiates bargaining if and only if
ui(πi) ≥ γi − ci for i = A, B. Otherwise, at least one state j ∈ {A, B} such that
γj − cj > uj(πj) initiates the costly bargaining process Γ and the other state is
indifferent between initiating and not initiating. I omit inefficient equilibria in which
both states initiate the costly bargaining process Γ even though ui(πi) ≥ γi − ci for
i = A, B.
For interstate arbitration, proceed by backwards induction. Upon receiving the
arbitration award (π, 1−π), state i = A, B has an incentive to initiate the bargaining
process Γ if and only if γi − ci − zi > ui(πi). Otherwise the payoff to both states
i = A, B are determined by the arbitration award (π, 1 − π). In the other proper
subgame, in which at least one state i = A, B has not recognized the arbitration
tribunal, they obtain the payoffs from the dispute game analyzed above.
Consider thus the decision to recognize the arbitration tribunal. Let πi denote the
share of state A when the award was favorable to state i ∈ {A, B}. If both states
recognize it and neither state reneges, the expected utilities are
λ · uA(π
A) + (1 − λ) · uA(π
B);
λ · uB(1 − π
A) + (1 − λ) · uB(1 − π
B).
For both states to recognize the arbitration tribunal, it must therefore be the case
that these expected payoffs exceed the payoff without arbitration, which is either
ui(π
0
i ) or γi − ci, depending on whether the expected settlement (π
0, 1 − π0) is such
that both states i = A, B prefer to the bargaining process Γ.
Finally, consider the possibility that states recognize the arbitration tribunal even
if one of the potential arbitration awards is such that the loser reneges. Without loss
of generality, let this state be B. Then the expected utilities are
λ · (γA − cA) + (1 − λ) · uA(π
B);
λ · (γB − cB − zB) + (1 − λ) · uB(1 − π
B).
State A is now willing to engage in arbitration if and only if uA(π
B) ≥ γA − cA.
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But then both states prefer the allocation (πB, 1−πB) to arbitration, so the proposed
lottery cannot be Pareto-efficient, which contradicts the notion of optimal arbitration.
Throughout the analysis, I assume that both states recognize the arbitration tri-
bunal if it yields a weakly higher expected payoff than the outcome without arbi-
tration. There are also pathological equilibria in which they do not recognize the
arbitration tribunal because they expect both states to initiate the bargaining pro-
cess Γ under any conditions. I omit these equilibria because they are substantively
implausible and inefficient.
Equilibria of the Dynamic Game
In each period t, state i bargains with state j 6= i with probability ρ. It is thus
bargaining with someone with probability ρ · (n − 1), so one obtains 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
n−1
.
If state i bargains, the parameter θi is drawn from the time-invariant multivariate
probability distribution Θi, where the support of Θi is such that the resulting game
is a valid dispute game described in the main text.
In the uniquely chosen one-stage Nash equilibrium, states play each period t op-
timally, implementing some optimal arbitration tribunal whenever possible without
commitment capacity. Optimal arbitration is described in the main text. In a com-
mitment equilibrium, states play exactly as in the one-stage Nash equilibrium, with
the exception that if commitment capacities (zA, zB) enable mutually profitable arbi-
tration proceedings in a dispute game at time t, both states recognize the arbitration
tribunal and abide by the arbitration award.
Commitment capacities {zi}i for the n states are generated as follows:
1. Each state i is tagged“friend”as long as it does not deviate from the equilibrium
path and “enemy” otherwise.
2. If there is no “enemy” present in any dispute game, both bargaining states i =
A, B recognize the arbitration tribunal if and only if γi−ci−ui(π
j





The arbitration proceedings are taken to be mutually profitable and optimal.
3. If an “enemy” is present in any dispute game, neither state ever recognizes
the arbitration tribunal. This is clearly a Nash equilibrium, for no state can
unilaterally initiate arbitration.




i , where the inequalities are generically
strict.
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Proof of Claim 1
With ui(πi) = 0 for all πi ∈ [0, 1), we have πi · ui(1) > ui(πi) for all πi ∈ (0, 1) and
πi · ui(1) = ui(1) for πi ∈ {0, 1}. 
Proof of Claim 2
The lottery described in the claim gives the following expected utilities:
EUA = λ · uA(1) + (1 − λ) · uA(0) = λ · uA(1);
EUB = λ · uB(0) + (1 − λ) · uB(1) = (1 − λ) · uB(1).
Differentiating with respect to λ, any change in the probabilities leaves one state
worse off. If there is a Pareto-dominant lottery, it must therefore involve a division
of the asset for at least one outcome. The expected utilities are
EU∗A = λ
∗ · uA(π
A) + (1 − λ∗) · uA(π
B);
EU∗B = λ
∗ · uB(1 − π
A) + (1 − λ∗) · uB(1 − π
B).
Set λ = λ∗ · πA + (1 − λ∗) · πB and note that by increasing returns,
(
λ∗ · πA + (1 − λ∗) · πB
)
· uA(1) ≥ λ
∗ · uA(π
A) + (1 − λ∗) · uA(π
B);
(
1 − πB − λ∗ · πA + λ∗ · πB
)
· uB(1) ≥ λ
∗ · uB(1 − π
A) + (1 − λ∗) · uB(1 − π
B).
Thus, the second lottery cannot be Pareto-dominant. 
Proof of Claim 3
See the equilibrium analysis of the static game above.
Proof of Claim 4
Examine the proof of Claim 2 and set πA = πB ∈ (0, 1) for i = A, B. The inequalities
are strict. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
Refer to the equilibrium analysis of the static game and consider the four parts in
turn. First, suppose ci ≥ γi for i = A, B. Recall that ui(0) = 0 so that any allocation
(π, 1 − π) produces a higher payoff than the costly bargaining process Γ. Second,
suppose cA < γA but cB ≥ γB. State A does not initiate the bargaining process Γ
when uA(π) ≥ γA − cA. State B never initiates the bargaining process Γ. Third,
suppose ci < γi for i = A, B. If both conditions in the third part of Proposition
1 hold, neither state i = A, B initiates the bargaining process Γ. Finally, suppose
ci < γi for i = A, B and there does not exist an allocation (π, 1 − π) such that both
conditions hold. Then at least one state i ∈ {A, B} initiates the bargaining process
Γ. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose (π∗, 1 − π∗) /∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. By Claim 3, the outcome is inefficient in the
set of feasible outcomes. Thus, (π, 1−π) contradicts the optimality of the arbitration
proceedings. The bounds on probability λ are a necessary and sufficient condition for
both states to recognize the arbitration tribunal instead of obtaining the expected
settlement (π0, 1 − π0). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Refer to the equilibrium analysis of the static game and consider possible arbitration
awards. For any lottery such that π0i > λ · ui(π
A
i ) + (1 − λ) · ui(π
B
i ), state i does not
recognize the arbitration tribunal. For any lottery such that γA − cA − zA > uA(π
B),
state A reneges.
It remains to consider all other allocations (π, 1 − π). By increasing returns,
u′i(·) > 0 and u
′′
i (·) > 0. The lottery described in the proposition gives the following
expected utilities:
EUA = λ · uA(1) + (1 − λ) · uA(π
B).
EUB = λ · uB(0) + (1 − λ) · uB(1 − π
B).
Follow the procedure in the proof of Claim 2 to see that some lottery on (1, 0) and
(πB, 1 − πB) : uA(π
B) = max{γA − cA − zA, 0} Pareto-dominates all other lotteries
47
that meet the constraints outlined in the first part of this proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3 for both states. 
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the first part, proceed as in the proof of Proposition 4 but substitute the
payoffs from bargaining γi − ci for the payoffs from the expected settlement π
0
i in
determining the probabilities (λ, 1 − λ).
To prove the second part, note that if there are no allocations (πA, 1 − πA) and
(πB, 1−πB) such that ui(π
j
i ) ≥ γi−ci−zi for i 6= j, which is the case for small enough
zi in costly bargaining, at least one state i ∈ {A, B} reneges upon an unfavorable
award. Since there is no allocation (π, 1 − π) that both states i = A, B prefer to the
bargaining process Γ, and at least one state i ∈ A, B initiates the bargaining process
Γ upon an unfavorable award, both states cannot recognize the arbitration tribunal.

Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the first part, examine the first part of Proposition 1. To prove the second
part, begin with i = A. It must be that uA(π
B) ≥ γA− cA−zA. As γA− cA increases,
uA(π
B) must increase as well. Now consider i = B. As γB − cB increases, at some
point γB ≥ cB, so inefficient compromise occurs. To prove the third part, let
i = A, B and use the previous part of this proof. To prove the fourth part, note
that when arbitration is possible, λ · ui(π
A
i ) + (1 − λ) · ui(π
B
i ) ≥ γA − cA. As the
right side increases, the left side must increase as well. Now note that πji must fulfill
ui(π
j
i ) ≥ γi−ci−zi. Thus π
j
i is increasing in γi−ci. When arbitration is not possible,
an increase in the expected payoff from bargaining increases γi−ci−zi, so arbitration
remains impossible. 
Proposition 7
Consider the first part. Under ui, γi, excessive bargaining costs occurs when
(cA, cB) exceeds a certain threshold. Under ũi, γ̃i, we have γ̃i > γi so that this
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threshold is larger for both elements of (c̃A, c̃B).
Consider the second part. Under ui, γi, costly bargaining occurs when (cA, cB)
is below a certain threshold. Under ũi, γ̃i, we have γ̃i > γi so that this threshold is
larger for both elements of (c̃A, c̃B).
Consider the third part. Under ui, γi, the smallest share π
j
i acceptable to state i
is given by ui(π
j
i ) = γi − ci − zi. Under ũi, γ̃i, it must be that ũi(π̃
j
i ) = γ̃i − ci − zi. If


















γi − ci − zi
γ̃i − ci − zi
⇒ ui(π̃
j
i ) > γi − ci − zi,
so πji < π̃
j
i . 
Proof of Proposition 8
To prove the first part, note that commitment capacity zi is not necessary to imple-
ment a lottery on allocations (1, 0) and (0, 1). To prove the second part, note that
an increase in commitment capacity zA reduces the minimal acceptable share π
B to
state A upon an unfavorable award. By Proposition 3, this must be part of optimal
arbitration. To prove the third part, proceed as in the previous part. To prove the
fourth part, note first that for sufficiently low zi, interstate arbitration is not possible.
As zi increases, by the first part of Proposition 5, more asymmetric allocations
are possible. By Proposition 5, this also enables a Pareto-improvement in payoffs,
which occurs in optimal arbitration. 
Proof of Proposition 9
To prove the first part, note that if interstate arbitration occurs, it must be that the
resulting allocation is either (1, 0) or (0, 1). Thus, the expected payoff from bargaining
is already negative. To prove the second part, adapt the proof of Proposition 3 to see
that the expected payoff to both states can be increased by choosing more asymmetric
ex post allocations.
Proof of Proposition 10
For state i to recognize the arbitration tribunal, it must obtain a higher expected
payoff from arbitration than playing the equilibrium of the dispute game. If the
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equilibrium outcome is a settlement, this value determines the minimal payoff that
state i must expect. 
Proof of Proposition 11
First note that since the focus is on optimal arbitration, the ex ante constraints
outlined in Proposition 5 always hold. Consider sufficiency. Since arbitration is
optimal, it increases the payoff to both states when the condition holds. Thus, they
recognize the arbitration tribunal. Since the cost of reneging exceeds the benefit of
reneging, neither state reneges in equilibrium. Consider necessity. If states recognize
the arbitration tribunal but the conditions do not hold, Proposition 5 does not hold
in costly bargaining, a contradiction. 
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Figure 2.2. Payoffs in the presence of increasing returns as a function of the share









Figure 2.3. A mutually profitably lottery in the presence of increasing returns.
For any share πi of state i = A, B, the payoff from a lottery πi ·ui(1)+ (1−πi) ·ui(0),
represented by a point on the dashed line, is strictly higher than the payoff ui(πi)















Figure 2.4. The effect of a credible threat to bargain by state B on the likelihood
of a compromise award. If neither state i = A, B is willing to initiate the bargaining
process Γ, the arbitration award is either (1, 0) or (0, 1). If state B obtains payoff
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Preventive Care: Increasing Returns, Domestic
Institutions, and International Regulation
1 Introduction
As national economies have become increasingly integrated to the world market, the
importance of international regulatory cooperation has increased dramatically.1 Pol-
icymakers in such major economies as the European Union and the United States
work vigorously to ensure that international regulation serves the interests of domes-
tic producers and consumers, but cooperation to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade
and investment without compromising the quality of regulation has proven difficult.
Recent theoretical and empirical research correctly underscores the intensely political
nature of international regulation, as even the most technical regulatory issues often
have far-reaching distributional consequences.2
Given the salience of international regulation, the determinants of success and
failure in regulatory cooperation are of paramount importance. Why does regulatory
cooperation prompt ambitious and enduring harmonization to the benefit of all parties
in some circumstances, while giving rise to nothing but bargaining failure in others?
Although it is now well known that canonical cooperation problems such as distri-
butional conflict and incentives to free ride complicate international regulation,3 the
conditions under which such problems occur and present an insurmountable obstacle
to international regulation remain elusive.
The record of transatlantic cooperation on chemical testing requirements in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is illustrative.
Worth two trillion dollars in annual production and with potentially detrimental con-
1Sykes 1995; Vogel 1995.
2Abbott and Snidal 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Vogel 1995, 1997.
3Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
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sequences for human health and the environment, the chemical industry is subject to
regulation on both sides of the Atlantic.4 Since the Carter administration first took
chemical testing to the OECD in 1977, the parties have made substantial progress
on some issues, such as the mutual acceptance of data, while achieving few results in
others, such as notification procedures to avoid duplicative testing.
In this paper, I develop an institutional model to explain success and failure in
international regulation. Holding domestic policy preferences constant, I argue, the
likelihood of success decreases when the parties have previously adopted mutually
incompatible domestic regulatory institutions. Incompatibility implies that at least
one of the parties must adjust domestically for regulatory cooperation to succeed,
which is costly because domestic regulatory institutions are “sticky” due to sunk
costs and increasing returns.5 Consequently, the incentive to retain one’s current
institutions presents an obstacle to concessions in negotiations. The most important
empirical implication of the model is that international regulation is mostly likely
to succeed when the parties bargain over new issues in which domestic regulatory
institutions are nascent.
I find that states can prevent the development of future incompatibilities through
regulatory cooperation. If states intervene early to harmonize regulations and co-
ordinate the development of domestic regulatory institutions, they benefit in two
ways. First, low adjustment costs facilitate bargaining. Second, the coordinated
development of domestic regulatory institutions creates a beneficial lock-in that re-
duces the incentive to deviate in the future. The very reason for bargaining failure
in less conducive circumstances, high adjustment costs, entrenches the achievements
of early regulatory cooperation. For example, if both foreign and domestic produc-
ers adjust their production processes in accordance with an international standard,
the government cannot opportunistically protect the domestic producers from import
competition by imposing another standard cum non-tariff barrier to trade, because
the change also hurts domestic producers. Consequently, I label such intervention by
the governments “preventive care.”
The analysis has important broader implications. Theoretically, it contributes to
international cooperation theory by providing a general causal mechanism through
which domestic institutions shape outcomes. The model has a dynamic aspect, as
the central theoretical prediction relates the timing of harmonization to the likelihood
of long-term success. The findings qualify the notion that “path dependencies” pose
4“The Right Chemistry.” OECD Observer 266, March 2008.
5Arthur 1989; David 1994; Pierson 2000a.
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a challenge to institutional design.6 In the model, preventive care is a strategic
decision by states to use institutional “stickiness” as a means to achieve self-enforcing
international regulation.
Empirically, the model has an important and counterintuitive implication: states
can sometimes sidestep enforcement problems without dispute resolution or monitor-
ing mechanisms. Preventive care removes the incentive to defect, so states need not
prepare for opportunism in the future. This finding could explain, for instance, why
epistemic communities of scientists and experts are sometimes essential to interna-
tional cooperation and irrelevant in other times.7 The theory predicts that epistemic
communities are central when a lock-in of domestic institutional incompatibilities has
not occurred, so that technical collaboration is enough to entrench initial harmoniza-
tion.
To assess the plausibility of the theory, I conduct a comprehensive case study
of international chemical regulation in the OECD. Based on an extensive survey
of primary and secondary sources together with 25 of elite interviews, I show that
variation in the cost of adjusting incompatible domestic regulatory institutions had a
strong effect on success and failure. I also find that success creates a virtuous circle
of deeper cooperation, which corroborates the self-enforcing nature of the preventive
care.
2 The Politics of International Regulation
Regulation is an essential mechanism of international governance. If states and other
international actors are to achieve collectively desirable outcomes under interdepen-
dence, they must set and enforce rules and guidelines for acceptable behavior.8 The
concept of regulation subsumes a variety of important rules ranging from purely tech-
nical compatibility standards to health, environmental, and labor standards.9 Accord-
ing to the OECD, for example, “[r]egulation is broadly defined as imposition of rules
by government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify
the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector.”10 International
6Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Pierson 2000b.
7Downs 2000; Haas 1990, 1992; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997.
8Keohane 1984.
9Abbott and Snidal 2001; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drezner 2001; Schmidt
and Verle 1998.
10“Glossary of Statistical Terms.” OECD March 17, 2002.
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regulation is potentially useful when these rules have international repercussions.
Empirically, the importance of international regulation is apparent. All modern
societies engage in extensive regulation of virtually all areas of economic and social ac-
tivity.11 Contrary to the expectations that economic globalization prompts pervasive
deregulation, states have responded to external economic pressures through changes
in domestic standards and ambitious regulatory cooperation.12 As Braithwaite and
Drahos show, influential business interests invest heavily in shaping the regulatory en-
vironment, which underscores the centrality of regulation in trade and investment.13
Similarly, other non-governmental organizations and the public are increasingly par-
ticipating in the formulation of international regulations and standards.14
Recent empirical research highlights the pervasive political conflict that surrounds
international regulation. In multilateral trade negotiations, for example, states have
failed to significantly reduce non-tariff barriers to trade despite immense mutual
gains.15 Similarly, financial standards in the banking sector have provoked a bit-
ter conflict among states with different financial institutions and banking systems.16
Perhaps most surprisingly, even purely technical standards set by the International
Organization for Standardization often prompt political conflict among the partic-
ipants.17 These and other disputes have inter alia led the European Commission
to adopt an aggressive strategy for promoting European regulations and standards
elsewhere in the world.18
The tangible consequences of domestic and international regulation are of stag-
gering magnitude. In an analysis of price data from OECD countries, Bradford iden-
tifies price distortions due to non-tariff barriers to trade in the magnitude of 50%
in Germany and Japan.19 He also shows that removing these distortions in Japan
alone would produce more global economic growth than the entire Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations. To be sure, only some of these distortions arise
from domestic regulations, but the magnitude of the problem suggests that much can
be gained through harmonization. Equally significant is the high cost of regulatory
11Moran 2002.
12Drezner 2007; Vogel 1995.
13Braithwaite and Drahos 2000.
14Raustiala 1997; Tarrow 2001.
15Henson and Loader 2001; Sykes 1995.
16Oatley and Nabors 1998.
17Mattli and Büthe 2003.
18De Bièvre 2006; Vogel 2003.
19Bradford 2003.
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failure in issues such as fisheries conservation and global warming.20
In light of its political importance, international regulation can be fruitfully viewed
through the lens of international cooperation theory.21 From this perspective, the
central analytical question concerns the optimal design of formal international insti-
tutions in response to an international cooperation problem. If states understand
that unilateral policy formation is collectively undesirable and recognize specific ob-
stacles to improved efficiency, they can engineer the appropriate “rules of the game”
by designing international institutions.22
In international regulation, two cooperation problems often loom large.23 First,
distributional conflict occurs when states disagree on the appropriate policy. On the
one hand, domestic policy preferences differ. If the public is concerned with the health
consequences of chemical use, for example, it is likely that a state supports stringent
international standards.24 Other states could see such standards as excessively costly
and cumbersome. On the other hand, states often hesitate to engage in major policy
reformulation due to high adjustment costs. Even if two states have similar views
on appropriate international regulations, historical differences in domestic regulatory
institutions can complicate bargaining.25
Second, states must enforce international compliance with international regula-
tions.26 A state can sometimes benefit by deviating from regulatory standards if they
carry high domestic costs. The government can also build political support by pro-
tecting domestic producers from foreign competition.27 If states agree on coordinating
their health standards for agricultural products, a state could profitably deviate by
imposing a standard that is less costly for domestic than foreign producers.28 The
magnitude of the enforcement problem ranges from negligible in simple coordination
problems, such as technical compatibility standards, to major in issues that distort
trade in key products, such as agricultural goods.29
20DeSombre 2005; Stern 2006.




25Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985.
26States must also enforce domestic compliance by private actors, but the model in
this paper does not provide insight into this problem. I focus on ensuring that states
engaged in regulatory cooperation do not defect.
27Grossman and Helpman 1994.
28Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 2001.
29Henson and Loader 2001.
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3 Conditions for Success in International Regula-
tion
I have characterized international regulation as a cooperation problem. In interna-
tional cooperation theory, such problems are largely treated as exogenous. States take
the international cooperation problem as given and design institutions to mitigate the
detrimental consequences of unilateral policy formation. This analytical move allows
tractable formulation of analytical statements on institutional design, but it has re-
cently drawn fire from scholars who emphasize the importance of path dependence
and evolutionary institutional change.30 If states design international institutions in
complex circumstances and under incomplete information, the critics argue, no rea-
son exists to assume that the design is ex post optimal. Although states do their
best to address the relevant concerns, the likelihood of failure is so high that traits
of rationality should be difficult to find. Moreover, the sticky and path-dependent
nature of institutions implies that they might survive for extended periods of time
despite obvious inefficiencies. Indeed, scholars of rational institutional design have
recently focused attention on flexibility provisions that allow institutional adaptation
to changing circumstances.31
I engage this literature directly by modeling the endogenous origins of coopera-
tion problems in international regulation. Although a dynamic perspective qualifies
some theoretical results in the extant literature, the path- dependent nature of in-
ternational institutions does not warrant the conclusion that strategic factors are of
secondary importance in international regulation. Instead, states can sometimes use
path dependencies to prevent future trouble through timely intervention.
3.1 The Origins of Distributional Conflict and Enforcement
Problems in International Regulation
To conduct the theoretical analysis, I first identify the endogenous aspects of the
cooperation problem. The analysis is specific to international regulation, because
in other issue areas the nature of endogeneity could be very different. I consider
an element of the international cooperation problem endogenous when the relevant
policymakers could have directly manipulated it in the past. Notably, this definition
excludes the distant past.
30Crouch and Farrell 2004; March and Olsen 1998; Pierson 2000b.
31Koremenos 2001; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
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In international regulation, the most salient endogenous elements are the domestic
regulatory institutions, which I define as the “humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction” on the regulated domain.32 States have developed elaborate in-
stitutional arrangements to generate and implement politically optimal regulations.
These institutions include substantive and procedural legislation, interagency rela-
tions, informal expectations on appropriate behavior, and the role of interest groups
in the process. They have an endogenous component because a state can shape them
by enacting legislation. Although a government makes such legislative decisions under
constraints, it always has some leeway – otherwise the concept of governance would
be essentially meaningless.
The relevance of domestic regulatory institutions is embodied in the possibility
of mutual incompatibility. If harmonization requires that domestic regulatory in-
stitutions operate in certain ways, a state that has previously adopted institutions
incapable of doing so must adjust. For example, if an international regulation requires
that governments share data provided by private companies, a stringent statute on
the confidentiality of business information is incompatible with it.33 This complicates
the negotiations unless all parties agree that governments should not share data.
Incompatibilities complicate international regulatory cooperation in two ways.
First, they create or amplify distributional conflict. When incompatibilities prevent
effective international regulation so that harmonization is necessary, at least one state
must incur adjustment costs. Given that domestic institutions are subject to increas-
ing returns, commonly due to learning effects, and often involve substantial sunk
costs, the cost of adjusting can be high.34 International negotiations on regulation
can be thorny when the bargaining parties insist on retaining their domestic institu-
tional arrangements.35 On the other hand, without genuine incompatibilities, minor
technical adjustments are enough for effective international regulation.
An illustrative example is the harmonization of measurement systems in late me-
dieval Europe.36 To increase the volume of economic exchange, polities such as city
leagues and city states had to reduce the number of wildly divergent local mea-
32North 1990, 3. In many cases, a regulation per se is an element of the institutional
environment. This overlap does not affect the logic of the analysis.
33This problem is central to the case of chemical testing requirements that I analyze
below.
34Pierson 2000a.
35Martinez-Diaz 2005. To be sure, states can seek a compromise through bargaining
techniques such as issue linkage (Sebenius 1983).
36Spruyt 2001.
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surement systems. These measurement systems were formal or informal regulations
underpinned by domestic regulatory institutions that govern and facilitate economic
exchange. The decrease in transaction costs would have boosted economic growth
and innovation, but each polity had an incentive to retain its domestic measurement
system to avoid imposing adjustment costs on local merchants and customers. Con-
vergence therefore took centuries.
Second, a subtler consequence is that when an enforcement problem is already
present, incompatibility amplifies it. The more incompatible the domestic regulatory
institutions are, the less experience and information regulators have on the relevant
foreign institutional arrangements. Game theorists have shown that such lack of
information impedes the enforcement of collectively optimal behavior.37 If the reg-
ulators cannot distinguish a necessary emergency measure under extreme domestic
hardship from opportunism, it is difficult to sustain ambitious cooperation.38 For ex-
ample, an American trade specialist is probably more skilled in investigating alleged
protectionist measures in Canada or Great Britain than in China or Mongolia.
Consider finally the nature of international regulation in the absence of incompat-
ibilities. In this case, ceteris paribus, the adjustment costs are lower and a potential
agreement is easier to enforce than in the presence of incompatibilities. States should
be able to create more effective international regulations without incurring excessive
bargaining costs. Indeed, some empirical evidence exists for such tendencies. For ex-
ample, research by Zacher and Sutton shows that states were able to set an essentially
uniform international standard on the domestic regulation of shipping, despite chronic
fears that the whole industry would “drown in a sea of red tape” in the absence of
coordination.39 Although the negotiations involved dozens of major shipping states,
they produced an effective and enforceable agreement because the gains from har-
monization were high enough relative to the minor cost of harmonization. Without
incompatibilities, major domestic adjustments were unnecessary.
3.2 The Logic of Preventive Care
I now turn to the strategic implications of endogenous domestic regulatory institu-
tions. If states engage in regulatory cooperation in a given issue area at time t, they
can modify the cooperation problem that they face at time t + 1. Most importantly,
37Abreu 1988; Green and Porter 1984.
38Downs and Rocke 1995.
39Zacher and Sutton 1996.
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I show that the challenge of removing detrimental incompatibilities is less formidable
when states choose to cooperate early.
This logic of preventive care can be summarized as follows. If the demand for inter-
national regulation emerges against a backdrop of incompatible domestic regulatory
institutions and adjustment costs are high, cooperation is hampered by distributional
conflict and enforcement problems. Had the states recognized the problem before
the lock-in of domestic regulatory institutions, they could have bargained over the
distribution of substantially lower adjustment costs. Through timely intervention to
coordinate the development of domestic regulatory institutions, states can prevent the
emergence of distributional conflict and enforcement problems. If such coordination
is possible and not too costly, the negotiations produce cost-effective international
regulations. Appendix A presents a simple game-theoretic model that formalizes the
most important insights of the theory.
The medical metaphor of preventive care is appropriate. In conventional cooper-
ation theory, the problem is fixed. This assumption corresponds to a medical treat-
ment plan when a patient has sought expert advice on to a health problem. If the
doctor finds a health problem, he or she must prescribe a treatment to cure it. How-
ever, sometimes healthy individuals schedule a routine examination or seek advice on
healthy diet or exercise. If the doctor finds no pressing health problems but identifies
risk factors, such as obesity or smoking, he or she can suggest that the patient change
behavior to prevent future illness.
When should states choose preventive care? To begin with, prevention must be
feasible. If states do not recognize future demand for harmonization or a risk of in-
compatibilities, they cannot engage in preventive care. For example, it was impossible
for the Founding Fathers to design the U.S. Constitution in light of international reg-
ulation in the 21th century. Similarly, the domestic institutions must be malleable.
Although these institutions are always endogenous in principle, they could be shaped
by historical developments that render timely intervention too costly or impossible.
For example, Vogel documents fundamental differences in American and European
approaches to environmental regulation that have emerged as a response to major
exogenous shocks.40 These differences set stringent constraints on institutional devel-
opment.
In addition to feasibility, states must have a genuine incentive to engage in interna-
tional regulation. On the one hand, the absence of low adjustment costs is irrelevant
if states are in fundamental disagreement over the appropriate regulation. In the case
40Vogel 2003.
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of genetically modified organisms, it is improbable that a clean “institutional slate”
would prompt full harmonization in light of diverging perceptions of risk and the po-
sitions of the agricultural lobbies.41 On the other hand, the gains from harmonization
must be large enough. If international regulation produces few benefits, states have
little incentive to prevent future incompatibilities. For example, harmonizing regula-
tions on non-tradables with little foreign direct investment does not boost economic
growth.
Yet another disincentive to engage in international regulation is power asymmetry.
If one of the states has enough market power to impose its domestic regulation on
other states, it does not desire cooperation.42
If the feasibility conditions are met, prevention creates significant gains for states.
Most importantly, the absence of domestic institutional lock-in implies that states can
remove any nascent incompatibilities through simple coordination and information
exchange. With low adjustment costs, reaching a compromise is easy and does not
require costly bargaining at the highest political level. The negotiations can focus
on maximizing the size of the pie instead of zero-sum distributional bargaining.43
For example, if states engage in negotiations on regulating a new industry that is
relatively unaffected by past institutional choices, the design of domestic regulatory
institutions is unlikely to carry high adjustment costs.
Moreover, preventive care is self-enforcing. In addition to mitigating distributional
conflict, it provides a solution to the enforcement problem. If states successfully co-
ordinate the development of domestic regulatory institutions, any future deviations
are subject to high adjustment costs due to increasing returns and sunk costs. Con-
sequently, future distributional conflict in the issue area is unlikely to occur and the
likelihood of enforcement problems is lower. For example, the development of the
European internal market makes it difficult for member states to clandestinely im-
pose non-tariff barriers to trade. The European regulatory institutions are sufficiently
harmonized that any significant deviations are easily observable and subject to high
adjustment costs.
Two disadvantages of preventive care should be noted. First, preventive care is
difficult if states do not understand the nature of the regulatory problem or flexible
tools to achieve compatibility are not available. If they must prepare for all possi-
ble problems in the future, the cost of designing redundant regulations could exceed
41Raustiala and Victor 2004, 296.
42Krasner 1991.
43Fisher and Ury 1983; Young 1989.
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the expected adjustment costs in the future. Second, preventive care could some-
times suppress competition among regulatory solutions. If states coordinate domestic
product standards, for instance, the market cannot “pick the winner.”
3.3 Empirical Implications
Preventive care has important empirical implications. The first implication is that
international cooperation takes the form of technical collaboration between regulators,
not high-level political officials.44 According to the logic of preventive care, states
have little reason to invest political capital in negotiations when adjustment costs
are low and the preferences regarding different solutions are weak. If the bargaining
parties understand that the collective incentive to achieve harmonization overrides the
individual incentive to retain pre-existing domestic institutions, it is most important
to ensure technical effectiveness, so the negotiations are harmonious. Even issue
areas that contain the seeds of distributional conflict sometimes see impressive and
self-enforcing cooperation by regulators through simple coordination and exchange
of information, while high-profile negotiations in the same issue area collapse due to
fundamental distributional conflict or anticipated enforcement problems.
This finding has an interesting corollary with regard to “epistemic communities”
in international cooperation.45 According to the theory of epistemic communities, a
community of scientific or other elites with a shared understanding of the problem at
hand can be a tremendous force in promoting successful international cooperation.
The logic of preventive care implies a more cautious statement: epistemic communities
are successful when adjustment costs are sufficiently low. When a cognitive elite
forms in an issue area with little institutional deadweight, it can give international
cooperation a strong push. But if adjustment costs are high, policymakers do not
assign sufficient weight on scientific evidence to break the negotiation deadlock. The
conditional nature of this statement could explain why empirical evidence on epistemic
communities supports neither the claim that they are generally effective nor the claim
that they irrelevant.46
Another important implication pertains to institutional design. If the precon-
ditions for preventive care are met, states need not design intrusive dispute reso-
44Slaughter 2004.
45Dimitrov 2006; Haas 1990, 1992; Haas and Haas 1995.
46Downs 2000; Haas and Haas 1995.
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lution or monitoring mechanisms.47 The self-enforcing nature of prevention allows
effective international regulation without costly bargaining over the design of strong
international institutions. Instead, states design institutions to maximize technical
effectiveness and create an environment conducive to rapid transmission of techni-
cal information between regulators. According to the theory, such institutions are
enough to ensure long-term cooperative efforts without explicit enforcement mech-
anisms. For example, the theory implies that some seemingly toothless regulatory
initiatives in the OECD could have far-reaching consequences for international regu-
lation. Even though the OECD cannot enforce these initiatives, incentives to deviate
disappear over time because the cost of readjusting the relevant domestic regulatory
institutions grows.
When should these implications hold? If the most important precondition for
preventive care is the absence of domestic institutional lock-in, it most likely applies to
new issue areas in which states are not constrained by pre-existing domestic regulatory
institutions. For instance, it should be difficult for states to adjust domestic regulatory
institutions for international aviation now, given that they have gradually evolved on
the basis of pre-existing institutions.48 On the other hand, setting new international
standards on issues such as nanotechnology should be easier as long as differences in
the broad contours of regulatory philosophies do not stand in the way.
Another important determinant of prevention is the presence of transnational
actors with accurate information and incentives to promote harmonization. In in-
ternational regulation, such transnational actors usually belong to the business com-
munity.49 Given that one of the most important driving forces behind international
regulation is the need to reduce barriers to trade and investment, transnational com-
panies and international business organizations are in a unique position to facilitate
the exchange of information and alert states as to potential future incompatibilities.
Indeed, Vogel finds that transatlantic efforts to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade
have been enthusiastically welcomed by transnational companies that have invested
on both sides of the Atlantic.50
47Empirically, Koremenos 2007 finds that the design of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms is systematically related to the nature of the cooperation problem.
48Richards 2001.
49Braithwaite and Drahos 2000.
50Vogel 1997.
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4 The Internationalization of Chemical Regulation
The chemical industry is among the most important sectors of any modern economy.
The annual value of the 70, 000 chemicals produced by the industry is approximately
two trillion dollars, and few sectors in the world economy are not somehow dependent
on chemicals.51 Despite rapid growth in developing countries, OECD members still
produce three quarters of the annual value, and the European Union and the United
States are the most important political actors that regulate the chemical industry.
The industry is dominated by large transnational companies engaging in extensive
foreign direct investment.52
The political-economic salience of the chemical industry is boosted by the regula-
tory challenge of governing the environmental, health, and safety impact of chemical
production and consumption.53 The complex composition of modern chemicals im-
plies that both the potential consequences and the cost of obtaining information on
them through testing are high. Moreover, the strong international dimension of the
chemical industry implies that any regulation risks raising non-tariff barriers to trade
and investment.54 Such barriers are often an unwanted consequence of regulatory
divergence, but the deliberate use of chemical regulation as a protectionist measure
is a real possibility.55
I focus on chemical testing requirements for three reasons.56 First, the intrinsic im-
portance of the industry and the dilemma of regulation imply that the stakes are high
and any significant variation in outcomes is unlikely to be explained by coincidence.
Second, chemical testing entails genuine potential for international cooperation. For
example, the OECD estimates that the direct cost savings from mutual acceptance of
data alone amount to 60 million dollars annually.57 If the general cost-benefit struc-
ture of regulation holds, the indirect savings are much higher.58 Finally, the variation
within the issue area and over time is significant and puzzling, as the two stylized
patterns that I now introduce indicate.
First, international cooperation on chemical testing requirements was prompted
51“The Right Chemistry.” OECD Observer 266, March 2008.
52Interviews at the ACC; CEFIC; OECD. All acronyms are defined in Appendix
B.
53Prakash 2000.
54Biles 1983; Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Selin 2007.
55Biles 1983; Interviews at the ACC, U.S. DC.




by the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, the first comprehensive
national legislation on chemical testing requirements.59 The United States took the
issue to the OECD while the European Community finally managed to forge an
internal compromise on its own legislation, known as the “Sixth Amendment.”60 The
OECD negotiations focused on two issues, the mutual acceptance of data (MAD)
and the mutual acceptance of notification (MAN). The parties quickly reached an
agreement on MAD, which continues to underpin much international cooperation on
chemical testing requirements, but the negotiations on MAN produced an awkward
compromise that was soon discarded by the Reagan administration.61
Second, the pattern of international cooperation over time is puzzling. After the
initial negotiations in the OECD, the coming two decades saw a gradual expansion
of regulatory collaboration. This collaboration was largely technical and the primary
obstacles to progress were not political, some minor disagreements on burden sharing
notwithstanding.62 Towards the end of the 1990’s, however, the pressures in the Eu-
ropean Union accumulated to adopt a significantly more stringent regulatory scheme
for existing chemicals.63 The Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) met intense resistance by the United States
and the chemical industry, but ultimately the European Union did pass the legislation
that required data on some 30, 000 chemicals in the market. Why did international
cooperation take the form of technical collaboration and exhibit gradual evolution,
only to be swept away by an abrupt shift in the European Union but not in the United
States or other OECD countries?
4.1 Research Design
I conduct a comparative analysis within an issue area and over time. This setting
is ideal for a plausibility probe of the theory, as it combines the necessary variation
with substantive features that the theory should be able to explain. The usual caveat
applies: a case study is not a test of the theory. Nevertheless, the case allows a
thorough assessment of its plausibility and generates ideas for further theoretical
development and systematic empirical testing.
59Biles 1983; Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985.
60Wilkinson 1980.
61Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Interviews at the ACC; OECD; U.S. EPA;
U.S. DC; DG Enterprise.
62“EPA Waves Stick in the U.S.-EU Dispute.” Chemical Week April 3, 1996.
63Selin 2007.
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I consider three dependent variables of interest. First, the form of international
cooperation refers to the distinction between high-level political interaction and low-
level technical collaboration. Second, the consolidation of international cooperation
indicates the extent to which international cooperation is self-enforcing and grows
stronger over time without explicit enforcement provisions. Finally, the forum of in-
ternational cooperation captures the institutional environment in which states choose
to cooperate.
The most important independent variable is lock-in of domestic regulatory institu-
tions, which predicts technical form and forum, and consolidation. Another variable
of interest is indifference, which indicates the extent to which the parties have an in-
terest in any particular solution in the absence of lock-in. The impact of indifference
on the dependent variables is exactly the opposite of lock-in. Finally, I verify that
gains from harmonization were present. Without such gains, the feasibility conditions
for preventive care would fail to hold. Table 1 summarizes the relationship between
the independent and dependent variables.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
I analyze the case in three phases. In the first phase, which covers approximately
years 1976-1981, I concentrate on comparing the OECD negotiations on MAD and
MAN. The discussion focuses mostly on the international process, but I also refer to
bargaining within the European Community, which proves to be crucial. In the second
phase, I consider the long period of technical collaboration between years 1981 and
1998. Most of the events during this period relate to the extension of international
cooperation from new to existing chemicals produced in high volume.64 I also refer
to events after 1998 to the extent that they are directly relevant. The third stage
involves the period between 1998 and 2008, and focuses on the impact of REACH on
international cooperation.
The sources of information that I use are threefold. First, I use secondary sources
to form a picture of the overall process. In particular, I have analyzed all relevant
articles of the leading industry newspaper, Chemical Week, between 1976 and 2008.
Second, I use primary sources such as OECD publications and official regulations
by the United States and the European Union. Finally, and most importantly, I
have conducted 25 elite interviews with regulators and industry representatives in
the United States, the European Union, and the OECD. Appendix B describes the
64Interviews at the ACC; OECD; U.S. EPA.
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interviews.
4.2 Harmony and Discord in the OECD, 1976-1981
In 1976, the U.S. Congress adopted the TSCA in response to increasing alarm among
the domestic population on the detrimental consequences of chemicals.65 As Vogel
argues, the TSCA was indicative of a broader wave of regulation that took place
against the backdrop of a series of highly visible failures to protect human health and
the environment.66 It was also a first step towards a regime of chemical regulation
and only required that companies provide test data on new chemicals prior to man-
ufacturing, a practice known as premanufacturing notification.67 The narrow focus
left existing chemicals in the market unregulated and dramatically reduced the cost
of compliance to the industry.
Although the TSCA also covered imported chemicals, it left the Carter administra-
tion with an international economic problem. In an era of rapid internationalization
and stiff competition from aggressive European producers,68 it was imperative to push
for international standards based on the TSCA to create a first-mover advantage for
the American chemical industry.69 Reflecting this sentiment, Biles writes that “eco-
nomic considerations – in particular the avoidance (or minimization) of non-tariff
barriers to trade – constitute the principal force behind virtually all ... multilat-
eral efforts.”70 Consequently, the Carter administration requested that international
negotiations in the OECD be initiated.
The TSCA posed major problems for the European Community.71 The European
chemical producers, accusing the United States of unilateralist policies, complained
that the TSCA was incomprehensible and discriminatory. The Europeans had nego-
tiated on a common regulatory regime since 1974 when “the Commission proposed
the introduction of more stringent marketing controls over dangerous substances,”72
but fundamental disagreement among major member states – Germany and Great




69Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Kenis and Schneider 1987.
70Biles 1983, 55.
71Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Kenis and Schneider 1987.
72Wilkinson 1980, 470.
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Britain in particular – had prevented a compromise.73 The dispute escalated to a
point at which France threatened to implement a national policy despite the threat
to the internal market, and it was the external pressure created by the TSCA that
prompted an agreement on the Sixth Amendment. The agreement was only possible,
however, on terms that were incompatible with the TSCA in important ways. For
example, the Sixth Amendment requires premarketing, as opposed to premanufactur-
ing, data and imposes a mandatory set of specific tests on all new chemicals, whereas
the TSCA adopts a more flexible approach.74
The OECD negotiations, which began in 1977, focused on two particularly im-
portant issues. The politically most salient and, as Biles puts it, “perhaps the most
controversial” aspect of the negotiations was the imposition of a common, minimum
set of required tests for MAN.75 This requirement was promoted by the European
Community, as it was fully compatible with the Sixth Amendment, while the United
States expressed concern over incompatibilities with the more flexible TSCA.76 After
years of intense negotiations, the OECD Chemicals Group found a mutually accept-
able compromise in 1980.77 The compromise proved to be short-lived, however, as
the Reagan administration rewarded intense lobbying by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association – the predecessor of the ACC – by refusing to endorse the OECD Council
Decision on MAN in 1981.78
Another issue of major interest was the MAD, which comprised guidelines for
Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) and chemical testing. In this issue, the United
States had a first-mover advantage in that it had already established its own guide-
lines.79 The OECD agreed on developing compatible, although not identical, guide-
lines. In consequence, the OECD Council adopted a Decision that data generated
according to these guidelines would have to be accepted by other member states and
recommended that the member states voluntarily adopt these guidelines for national
use.80
73Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985.
74Biles 1983; Wilkinson 1980. Interviews at the ACC; OECD; U.S. EPA.
75Biles 1983, 52.
76“Acceptance of MPD Rules Might Be a Boomerang.” Chemical Week July 15,
1981.
77“OECD Moves to Share Test Data.” Chemical Week October 29, 1980; Biles
1983; Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985.
78“U.S. Will Oppose Mandatory New-Chemical Tests.” Chemical Week August 5,
1981.
79Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
80Biles 1983; OECD 1981.
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This trajectory can be summarized in as follows. The proximate cause of intensive
international cooperation was the TSCA, an ambitious regulation driven by purely
domestic factors that prompted a coordinated European response in the form of the
Sixth Amendment. The Carter administration took the issue to the OECD, which
launched negotiations on MAN and MAD. The former issue was politically contro-
versial and the negotiations failed to produce lasting results, while the member states
resolved the latter issue smoothly.
4.3 The Period of Consolidation, 1981-1998
The OECD Council Decision on MAD was an important milestone. Although the
failure to agree on MAN exposed the constraints under which OECD governments
operated,81 the successful resolution of issues surrounding MAD was seen by the par-
ties as an important step towards a flexible international regulatory regime.82 The
Sixth Amendment also proved to be a remarkable success in the European Commu-
nity.83
The next major effort for regulatory cooperation in the OECD resulted from
the creeping recognition that the focus on new chemicals had left most chemicals
unregulated. Against the backdrop of increased concern over chemicals, elevated by
major disasters such as the explosion of a Union Carbide subsidiary pesticide plant
in Bhopal, India, the OECD member states agreed to develop and share test data on
1, 000 high-production volume (HPV) chemicals in March 1987.84 The intent was to
use MAD as a basis for an international “screening information dataset” on existing
chemicals for which no data are available.85 The OECD also applied its “polluter
pays” principle and required that the industry cover the expenses.
Initially, three issues reduced the effectiveness of the program. First, the pro-
gram laid heavy emphasis on chemical exposure, which differs across countries and
thus forms a difficult basis for cooperation.86 An OECD official remarked that this
choice “slowed down the program terribly.”87 Second, the program failed to involve
the chemical industry. Although the industry had recognized the necessity of proac-
81Biles 1983; Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985.
82“A Step Closer on Toxic Testing.” Chemical Week August 24, 1983.
83Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Kenis and Schneider 1987.
84“Test-data Sharing Goes Global.” Chemical Week March 25, 1987.
85“OECD Moves to Fill Risk Data Gap.” Chemical Week February 7, 1990.
86“Pilot Project Advances Global Testing Rules.” Chemical Week May 24, 1995.
87Interview at the OECD.
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tive participation and established the International Council of Chemical Associations
(ICCA) in 1989, the original design emphasized government sponsorship and did not
facilitate voluntary test data provision.88 Finally, the United States and the European
Union disagreed on burden sharing.89
The OECD program proved its robustness when the pressure to acquire the test
data mounted. In 1997, the American environmental advocacy group Environmental
Defense Fund published its famous Toxic Ignorance report, which suggested that
“even the most basic toxicity testing results cannot be found in the public record for
nearly 75% of the top-volume chemicals in commercial use.”90 In part as a response
to this alarming finding, Vice President Al Gore announced the Chemicals Right-to-
Know Initiative and the ACC established its voluntary HPV Challenge Program.91
Internationally, the ICCA also announced its HPV Initiative in conjunction with
the HPV Challenge. These efforts have led to a significant increase in the number of
submissions. The OECD reports that by the end of 2004, “close to 500 HPV chemicals
had agreed OECD assessments.”92 The interviews indicate that the cautiously positive
sentiment is shared by officials and the industry.93
In summary, the OECD member states expanded international cooperation on
chemical regulation to the provision of test data on HPV chemicals over a period of
almost two decades. Collaboration in the OECD on HPV chemicals built on MAD
and previously acquired institutional capabilities, but faults in the original design
and implementation of the program reduced its effectiveness for almost ten years.
Responding to increased urgency in 1997 and 1998, the OECD and the chemical
industry were able to correct past failures. In consequence, the OECD has been able
to develop a dataset of hundreds of HPV chemicals.
88Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
89“EPA Waves Stick in U.S.-EU Dispute.” Chemical Week April 4, 1996.
90EDF 1997.
91“Vice President Gore Announces Program to Close Gap in Pub-
lic’s Right-to-Know about Potentially Harmful Chemicals.” The White
House, Office of the Vice President October 9, 1998; “High-Production
Volume (HPV) Challenge.” American Chemistry Council. Available at
http://www.americanchemistry.com/S ACC/sec policyissues.asp?CID=431&DID=1492.
92OECD 2005.
93Interviews at the ACC; CEFIC; DG Enterprise; DG Environment; OECD; U.S.
EPA.
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4.4 Worlds Apart, 1998-2008
Towards the end of the 1990’s, pressures to reform European chemical regulation
mounted. Following the publication of Toxic Ignorance, the European Environmen-
tal Agency and the United Nations Environment Programme conducted a similar
assessment for chemicals used in Europe, titled Chemicals in the European Environ-
ment.94 The final report validated the fears that little information was available on
existing chemicals, and gave the proponents of more stringent regulation a powerful
argument. An increasingly powerful coalition of environmentalists, “green” member
states, and DG Environment in the European Commission, pushed the regulatory
reform forward.95
The policy formation process gained salience in 2001 when the European Com-
mission published its White Paper on a Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy.96
The proposal received both support and criticism, but for present purposes the most
noteworthy reactions were those from the chemical industry and the United States.
Although the supporters of REACH argued that it would contribute to the Euro-
pean internal market by simplifying and unifying existing legislation, the industry
expressed anger over the plan to regulate some 30, 000 existing chemicals at the cost
of billions of dollars to the industry.97 The director of CEFIC, Alain Perroy, char-
acterized REACH as “the biggest single issue the European chemical industry has
had to face for the past few decades.”98 The Bush administration also coordinated a
campaign with the industry to shape REACH through multiple channels.99 REACH
finally entered into force in December 2007. The legislation requires that the 30, 000
existing chemicals subject to testing requirements be registered over an 11-year pe-
riod, with the stringency of the tests required increasing with the annual production
volume.
The long-term impact of REACH on international cooperation unfolds only over
time, but the increased workload on European regulators has already reduced the
European Union’s participation in the OECD. Moreover, the relevance of the OECD
for the European Union has decreased, as REACH does not maintain the distinction
between new and existing chemicals.100 For other OECD Member States, some as-
94EEA and UNEP 1999.
95Selin 2007.
96European Commission 2001.
97Interviews at the ACC; CEFIC.
98“Industry Sees Red on EU White Paper.” Chemical Week July 17, 2002.
99U.S. House of Representatives 2004.
100Interviews at DG Environment; OECD.
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pects of REACH also pose issues of incompatibility. For example, to reduce the cost
of testing, product chemistry is excluded from the use of GLP. According to an EPA
official, this decision “shocked” the U.S. regulators.101
REACH has also attracted some interest outside the European Union.102 Many
non-OECD countries, particularly in Asia, have yet to develop comprehensive regu-
latory regimes for chemicals, and for them REACH is an opportunity to learn more
about different institutional designs. If REACH proves to be a success, it is possible
that a “race to the top”103 occurs as other governments move to harmonize their sys-
tems with the global “gold standard.” The test data that REACH requires are also
public, so other countries can use it as a basis for risk management without cost.
The most important impact of REACH, however, is uncertainty. All interviewees
viewed its impact as a subject surrounded by major uncertainty that covers multiple
dimensions.104 Regarding the regulatory dimensions, it is unclear how useful the data
generated by REACH ultimately are and whether the institutional design proves to be
effective. These factors are important for other states as they continue to adjust their
chemical regulations. On the economic side, the direct cost of REACH to the industry
is itself a major source of uncertainty, and even less is known about the broader
economic implications on trade and investment. Possible future scenarios include
positive evolution towards a worldwide agreement on chemical testing if REACH
proves as expedient as its promoters claim, the isolation of the European Union due
to an excessively burdensome and ineffective regulatory system, and regulatory rivalry
between the European Union and the United States.
4.5 Analysis
The results are summarized in Figure 3.1. I proceed temporally.
[FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Analytically, the OECD negotiations on MAD and MAN can be seen as two games
of international regulation. In both games, the players are the European Community
101Interview at the U.S. EPA.
102Interviews at DG Environment; OECD; U.S. EPA.
103Vogel 1995.
104Interviews at AmCham EU; DG Environment; DG Enterprise; OECD; TBDA;
U.S. DC; U.S. EPA.
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and the United States who try to coordinate their domestic standards on chemical
testing. If the theory that I have developed in this paper is valid, the divergent
outcomes of the negotiations on MAN and MAD should follow from the values of the
independent variables accompanied by a plausible causal mechanism.
To begin with, the presence of substantial gains from harmonization is apparent
in both games.105 Already in the 1970’s, the value of international trade in chemicals
had reached hundred of billions of dollars and the dominance of the United States and
the European Community was even more pronounced than today.106 In the absence of
an agreement on MAD, all tests that the industry conducts to fulfill the requirements
of either regulatory regime would have to be duplicated to secure market access.
Such duplication distorts the market, diverts resources from productive investment,
and increases the burden on regulators. Without MAN, one set of tests for either
regulatory regime is not necessarily sufficient to guarantee market access for the other
regime.
The two negotiations differ substantially in terms of domestic institutional lock-
in. The negotiations on MAD centered on an issue for which only the United States
had already established the required domestic institutions in the form of GLP and
chemical testing guidelines.107 As other OECD member states had little domestic
institutional deadweight, they simply adopted the OECD guidelines that were made
compatible with the American guidelines. No statutory changes were necessary by
either player. The interviewees emphasized the importance of having a “clean slate”
or an “empty table” in the negotiations.108 The Europeans incurred no adjustment
costs by adopting a regime compatible with the U.S. GLP. To the contrary, the ne-
gotiations on MAD involved incompatible standards, such as the difference between
premanufacturing and premarketing notification, that were already written in the rel-
evant statutes. The domestic origins and pioneer position of the TSCA guaranteed
that the U.S. legislators could not fully consider the problem of international com-
patibility down the road, which left the negotiators with the extraordinary challenge
of reaching an agreement despite the high cost of changing existing legislation.
The pattern of preferences, reflected by the presence and absence of indifference
on MAD and MAN respectively, is similar. In the negotiations on MAD, both parties
agreed on the desirability of guidelines that reflect good scientific practice. The lack of
105Interviews at the ACC; CEFIC; DG Environment; DG Enterprise; OECD; TABD;
U.S. EPA; U.S. DC.
106Biles 1983.
107Interviews at the U.S. EPA; OECD.
108Interviews at the OECD; U.S. DC; U.S. EPA; OECD.
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any past experience in the European Community implied that the adoption of guide-
lines in line with the U.S. guidelines was acceptable, while the United States obviously
had no reason to resist the development of OECD guidelines that closely reflect its
domestic approach. In stark contrast, the negotiations on MAN involved difficult
questions such as the appropriate scope of the minimum premarket dataset. Whereas
the TSCA allowed the U.S. EPA substantial flexibility and case-by-case decisionmak-
ing, the Sixth Amendment required such a dataset. Similarly, international notifi-
cation would have required sharing confidential business information, which posed a
particularly hard problem because it would have been difficult to prevent its diffusion,
especially in those European countries with corporatist regulatory regimes.
Put together, the two negotiations represent two analytical extremes. The nego-
tiations on MAD involved a setting without domestic institutional incompatibilities
and less intense preferences. This setup, the theory predicts, should have created
an opportunity for preventive care. The negotiations on MAN were burdened with
a combination of domestic institutional incompatibilities with very high adjustment
costs and strong preferences reflecting different regulatory philosophies and societal
preferences. The interviews clearly indicate that both lock-in and absence of indif-
ference had a role to play, which solves the problem of observational indeterminacy
resulting from simultaneous variation in the values of two independent variables.109
The form of international cooperation corroborates the predictions of the theory.
The negotiations on MAD focused on streamlining the technical components of GLP
and chemical testing guidelines, while the negotiations on MAN involved highly salient
political bargaining and, ultimately, a dramatic reversal of the U.S. position by the
Reagan administration. Tellingly, a leading expert on the negotiations remarked
in personal communication that scientific collaboration on MAD “had the effect of
creating ... an international ’epistemic community’ on these matters.” Such degree
of collaboration was not achieved on MAN, as the OECD Council could not pass
a Decision without the United States. Interviewees confirmed that cooperation on
issues related to MAN was, and continues to be, easier and less politically loaded
than on MAD.110
Contrary to the theory, the forum of international cooperation was the OECD in
both issues. As Kenis and Schneider argue, an important reason was the dominant
position of the United States in the organization and the limited role of the European
109King, Keohane and Verba 1994.
110Interviews at the ACC; OECD; U.S. EPA; U.S. DC.
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Commission.111 Many interviewees were puzzled by the question of alternative fora,
as the OECD was seen as the “only game in town” due to the composition of its
membership and its technical capabilities.112 A plausible interpretation is that the
political aspect made the OECD appropriate for negotiations on MAN while the
technical capabilities increased the attractiveness of the OECD for negotiations on
MAD, but the tight connection between the two issues prevents a direct verification
of this conjecture. Nevertheless, it seems that increasing returns at the international
level were an important determinant to use the OECD.113
The second stage of the game is most useful for the analysis of consolidation. The
negotiations on MAN never succeeded in the first place, so the question of consolida-
tion is moot, but the theory is applicable to the role of MAD in OECD cooperation.
Specifically, the theory predicts that MAD should provide a basis for self-enforcing
international cooperation on related issues in the future. To investigate the validity
of this prediction, the analysis should focus on two elements. First, international co-
operation after MAD should build on previous domestic and international structures
to a great extent. This element is present if the values of form and forum remain un-
changed as a result of a deliberate decision. Second, international cooperation should
grow stronger over time despite potential enforcement problems.
The evidence offers strong support for consolidation. To cooperate on existing
chemicals in the OECD was not a politically contentious decision, and the major
member states of the OECD rapidly agreed on international burden sharing.114 For
conducting the tests, an agreement on MAD based on GLP and chemical testing
guidelines was essential. One interviewee at the OECD remarked that “the GLP
and test guidelines are the cornerstone of everything we do in the OECD,” while
another OECD official said that “structures and practices traveled.” Interviewees at
the OECD and the member countries also saw cooperation on existing chemicals as
a natural extension of cooperation on new chemicals.115
The role of enforcement problems as an obstacle to cooperation was relatively
minor and, tellingly, lost importance over time without specific action to enforce co-
operation. The OECD did establish a compliance program for the GLP,116 but the
interviewees agreed that the need to cross-validate compliance through joint inspec-
111Kenis and Schneider 1987.
112Interviews at DG Enterprise; OECD; U.S. EPA.
113Interview at DG Environment.
114“Test-data Sharing Goes Global.” Chemical Week March 25, 1987.
115Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
116Diderich 2007.
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tions has decreased over time.117 One interviewee also remarked that the transparent
nature of the principles made it relatively easy to detect any problems with data
provided by foreign laboratories.118 A more serious problem than deliberate defection
was initial ignorance among authorities and regulators.119
To be sure, the political environment for international cooperation was conducive
with respect to lock-in and indifference as well. Neither the United States nor the
European Union had comprehensive legislation on existing chemicals, so statutory
changes were not necessary to collaborate on existing chemicals. Only two minor
exceptions qualify this claim. First, the TSCA does contain limited provisions that
grant the EPA authority to investigate existing chemicals,120 but these provisions were
rarely put to use and they did not impede international cooperation in the OECD.
Second, the European Union passed its Regulation on Existing Substances in 1993,121
which fed the conflict over burden sharing as the European regulators had to focus
on chemicals that contradicted the OECD priorities.122
To characterize the United States and the European Union as indifferent with
respect to chemical regulation would be somewhat inappropriate, but the mutual un-
derstanding on the need to provide test data on existing chemicals in the 1980’s and
the 1990’s is theoretically equivalent to indifference. Although it would have been
hard to reach an agreement on risk management per se, the parties did not disagree
on the need to provide screening information or focusing on HPV chemicals.123 Com-
bined with the absence of domestic lock-in, this consensus was essential for successful
cooperation.124
Most recently, the policy formation process that led to the enactment of REACH
offers a sobering example of the limits of international cooperation. In theoretical
terms, REACH resulted from a structural shift in European preferences on chemical
regulation.125 Unlike the United States, which reacted to Toxic Ignorance by simply
accelerating its voluntary initiatives, the demands for mandatory chemical testing
grew stronger in the European Union. REACH thus allows an ideal assessment of a
contraposition to the theory, given that indifference does not apply.
117Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
118Interview at the U.S. EPA.
119Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
120Biles 1983.
121Selin 2007.
122“EPA Waves Stick in U.S.-EU Dispute.” Chemical Week April 4, 1996.
123Interview at the OECD.
124“Test-data Sharing Goes Global.” Chemical Week March 25, 1987.
125Vogel 2003; Interview at DG Environment.
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Although the absence of indifference was the major driver behind the conflict
over REACH, domestic lock-in in the United States also had an important role. To
enact REACH, the pro-regulation coalition had to overcome resistance by powerful
business interests and concern with European competitiveness. Similarly, to reform
the TSCA a hypothetical U.S. pro-regulation coalition would have had to surmount
obstacles such as the decidedly anti-regulation coalition in the U.S. Congress and
Senate and, from the year 2000 on, the Bush administration’s staunch resistance to
chemical regulation. Domestic lock-in in the United States gave the already powerful
anti-regulation coalition the upper hand.
Curiously, some interviewees also suggested that past cooperation in the OECD fa-
cilitated the implementation of REACH. An OECD official hesitantly acknowledged
that international cooperation made the European Commission “comfortable” with
the idea of mandatory chemical testing requirements, and the public alarm over chem-
icals that resulted from Toxic Ignorance and Chemicals in the European Environment
was directly related to the initial problems with the OECD program on existing chem-
icals. These events imply that previous cooperation can also sow the seeds of future
conflict, although not deliberately. The evidence suggests that the European Com-
mission was uncertain as to the costs and benefits of chemical regulation in the first
part of the 1990’s, but cooperation in the OECD suggested that a working regulatory
scheme was possible. Thus, consolidation can also have side effects that complicate
international cooperation in the future.
The transatlantic conflict over REACH changed the form of international co-
operation. Although the interviewees confirmed that the European regulators did
voluntarily consult with the U.S. EPA and the OECD on the design of REACH, the
Bush administration engaged in high level political bargaining with individual mem-
ber states and the European Commission.126 The high stakes and the absence of
common interest tilted the balance towards politicization, reversing the long pattern
of technical collaboration in the OECD. Similarly, the OECD lost its importance as
the forum of international cooperation. The Bush administration directly targeted
the European Union and key member states, with the purpose of shaping the legisla-
tive process in Brussels.
126U.S. House of Representatives 2004. Interviews at the OECD; U.S. EPA.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed an institutionalist model of international regulation.
The analysis focuses on a key problem, domestic institutional incompatibilities that
increase adjustment costs and therefore decrease the likelihood of achieving a mu-
tually acceptable compromise. Domestic institutions are endogenous over time, and
incompatibilities result from a lock-in due to increasing returns and sunk costs. If
states correctly perceive the possibility of future incompatibilities, however, they can
intervene by coordinating domestic institutional development to avoid the detrimen-
tal lock-in of incompatibilities. Such preventive care facilitates bargaining through
lower adjustment costs and results in self-enforcing international cooperation, as a
lock-in of mutually compatible domestic regulatory institutions occurs.
I have applied the model to international cooperation on chemical regulation, with
particular focus on transatlantic interactions in the OECD. It provides a detailed and
plausible account of the negotiations over three decades, explaining startling variation
within a seemingly technical issue area. Empirically, the model provides an analyti-
cal basis for understanding the relationships between such key factors as preferences,
adjustment costs, increasing returns, and domestic institutions.127 It allows a dy-
namic analytical interpretation of a historical narrative, in which the outcome of past
strategic interactions influences the parameters of the game in the present
To conclude, I would like to elaborate on the broader theoretical implications of
the analysis. Perhaps the most salient theoretical dispute among scholars that share
an institutional approach to political economy has recently been the extent to which
institutions are rationally designed in a world of bounded rationality, transaction
costs, and path dependencies.128 In this paper, I have combined elements of both
schools by showing how states, and by direct extension other actors, behave strategi-
cally upon anticipation of an institutional lock-in. This formulation allows strategic
behavior without adopting a view of the political economy as a static equilibrium. If
similar mechanisms are to be found elsewhere, an institutionalist synthesis is needed.
127Arthur 1989; Frieden and Martin 2002; Milner 1997; Pierson 2000a.
128Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; March and Olsen 1998; Pierson 2000a,b.
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Appendix A: The Formal Model
The model can be formalized as a two-period game. In the first period, players A
and B choose a domestic regulatory institution. Without loss of generality, label A’s
choice α and B’s choice either α or β, depending on compatibility with A’s choice.
In the second period, they bargain on adopting an international regulation. If the
domestic institutions are compatible {α, α}, the second-period game is on the left in
Figure 3.2. If the domestic institutions are incompatible {α, β}, the second-period
game is on the right in Figure 3.2. In both games, 1 > θ > 0, and the pure-strategy
equilibrium strategies are underlined. The payoff θ reflects the gains from harmoniza-
tion and the penalty −1 reflects the adjustment cost.
[FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
The game has two variants. In “preventive care,” player B sees the choice set {α, β}
in the first period. It is easy to verify that in the unique equilibrium, B chooses α
in the first period and both players choose α in the second period, which yields the
first-best payoffs (θ, θ). In “incompatibility,” player B sees the choice set {γ, δ}, and
the probability that γ = α is exactly 1
2
. Regardless of B’s strategy, then, the players
play the game on the left with probability 1
2
and obtain the first-best payoffs (θ, θ).
With probability 1
2
, the domestic institutions are incompatible and the players obtain
the second-best payoffs (0, 0).
“Incompatibility” also has two subcases. If θ > 1
2
, it follows that 2θ − 1 > 0, so
there is scope for compromise if one player compensates the other by offering θ − 1
in exchange for its standard. If θ ≤ 1
2
, it is the case that 2θ − 1 ≤ 0, which implies
that the adjustment costs preclude harmonization even if utility is transferable.
Appendix B: The Interviews
I interviewed 25 officials and industry representatives in April and May 2008. The
sites were the American Chamber of Commerce in the European Union (AmCham
EU), the American Chemistry Council (ACC), the European Council of Chemical
Associations (CEFIC), the Directorate General Environment (DG Environment) and
the Directorate General Enterprise (DG Enterprise) of the European Commission, the
OECD Department of Chemical Safety, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD),
the Chemicals Team at the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Depart-
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ment of Commerce (U.S. DC), and the Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics and
the Office of Compliance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA).
All interviews were anonymous, but four of the interviews had two persons in the
room.
The choice of interviewees was affected by three factors. First, I chose key officials
and industry representatives to obtain information on specific events and develop-
ments. Second, I interviewed other persons based on the information obtained from
previous interviews, thus expanding the network. Third, I chose some interviewees
randomly to obtain a more balanced account.
The interviews were open-ended and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. The ques-
tionnaire varied somewhat across interviews, but I structured the questions around
four core themes. First, I asked general questions about international cooperation on
chemical regulation. Second, I asked about international cooperation in the OECD
on new chemicals, with particular focus on MAD and MAN. Third, I asked about
international cooperation in the OECD on existing chemicals. Finally, I asked about




Dependent Variable Independent Variable
Technical form Absence of lock-in
Indifference
Political form Presence of lock-in
No indifference
Technical forum Absence of lock-in
Indifference
Political forum Presence of lock-in
No indifference
Consolidation Absence of lock-in
Indifference
No consolidation Presence of lock-in
No indifference





Scenario Harmony and Discord Consolidation Worlds Apart
MAD Absence of lock-in → Presence of lock-in
Indifference → No indifference
⇒ Technical form ⇒ Consolidation ⇒ Political form
⇒ Political forum
MAN Presence of lock-in →
Indifference →
⇒ Technical form ⇒ No consolidation
Figure 3.1. A summary of the results.
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α β
α θ, θ 0,−1
β −1, 0 −1,−1
α β
α θ, θ − 1 0, 0
β −1,−1 θ − 1, θ
Figure 3.2. Two games of international regulation.
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A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Issue Linkage and
Delegation in Multilateral Negotiations
1 Introduction
According to international cooperation theory, states resort to such bargaining tech-
niques as issue linkage and delegation if they cannot otherwise reach a mutually
acceptable compromise in international negotiations. Through issue linkage, they
exchange concessions across issue areas and thus expand the bargaining space.1 By
delegating authority to a legitimate international body, they commit to an uncertain
legal settlement and generate a “focal point” for policy coordination.2
This functionalist model of voluntary international cooperation is based on the
critical assumption that issue linkage and delegation as bargaining techniques are
consensual decisions, which ensures that they cannot reduce the payoff relative to
the status quo for any state. That mutual consent is a necessary condition for issue
linkage or delegation is certainly innocuous when two states bargain, for Ego cannot
force Alter to engage in linkage bargaining or delegate sovereignty.3 But it is un-
1Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Leebron 2002; Sebenius 1983; Stein 1980;
Tollison and Willett 1979. Another use of the term “issue linkage” in the literature
is interdependence of two issue areas (Leebron 2002; Limão 2005). In this article, I
only focus on issue linkage as a bargaining technique.
2Allee and Huth 2006; Bradley and Kelley 2008; Garrett and Weingast 1993;
Schelling 1960, 57.
3This does not imply that any given issue linkage or decision to delegate could not
reduce the payoff to some state upon implementation (Sebenius 1983). However, a
sovereign state that expects to lose can simply refuse to link issues or delegate unless
explicit coercion is possible.
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clear whether this logic is applicable to multilateral cooperation. Are issue linkage
and delegation unambiguously beneficial bargaining techniques if they can shape the
fortunes of third parties, as is the case in multilateral cooperation? Or can the mere
opportunity to use these seemingly innocuous bargaining techniques cause rather than
prevent collective-action failure in a multilateral context?
Given the difficulties that multilateral negotiations over such issues of paramount
importance as trade liberalization, global warming, and financial regulation involve,
this question merits a thorough examination. Should states encourage unconditional
and pervasive use of issue linkage and delegation in multilateral negotiations, or is it
sometimes expedient to deliberately proscribe – as opposed to simply refrain from –
using these bargaining techniques?
Unfortunately, the extant literature on multilateral cooperation does not examine
this possibility systematically.4 Gruber comes closest to addressing this possibility
in his analysis of international institutionalization as a form of power politics: some
states collude to impose their will on other states by manipulating the status quo
through the design of international institutions.5 But distributional conflict is not
equivalent to a collective-action failure. In Gruber’s model, those states that design
international institutions to impose their will on others gain from doing so. It remains
unclear whether the option to use issue linkage and delegation could reduce the payoff
to all parties, including the mighty and the powerful, in multilateral cooperation.
To investigate this possibility, I construct a game-theoretic model of international
policy coordination under complete information. My key assumption is that full
coordination is necessary to solve the problem at hand effectively, so that states have
a real incentive to enter the negotiations. To maximize the scope of the analysis, I
make minimal assumptions regarding the set of feasible policies and the preferences
that different actors have.
The major contribution of the analysis is a full characterization of the conditions
4Martin 1992 and Ruggie 1992 study “multilateralism” as an alternative to “bilat-
eralism.” Crump and Glendon 2003 and Zartman 1994 examine the “complexity” of
multilateral negotiations. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1998 and Gilligan 2004 focus
on the “broader-deeper” tradeoff in multilateral cooperation. Kahler 1992 examines
the difference between multilateral collective action with “large and small numbers”
of parties. Sebenius 1983 studies the “negotiation arithmetic” of adding and sub-
tracting issues and parties in international negotiations. For a summary of the role
of the “number” of states in international cooperation theory, see Koremenos, Lip-
son and Snidal 2001. These works do not address the possible inefficiencies that the
availability of issue linkage and delegation induces.
5Gruber 2000.
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under which the mere opportunity to link issues or delegate decision-making power
reduce the payoff from policy coordination to every state. I first show that when issue
linkage and delegation require a consensus decision by all states, they are innocuous;
and if there is exactly one coalition of states that can link issues or delegate decision-
making power, this option unambiguously works to their advantage. To the contrary,
if different coalitions can use issue linkage or delegation to increase their influence
and opportunistically impose their preference on other states, the outcome of the
international negotiations can be unambiguously worse than without these options.
When this is so, all states prefer to ban issue linkage and delegation.
What drives this result is a perverse and paradoxical consequence of the commit-
ment capacity that issue linkage and delegation create. When states can use issue
linkage or delegation to lock in a favorable policy, they enter the multilateral negotia-
tions with a credible threat not to coordinate policies with others unless their preferred
policy is chosen. If multiple coalitions have the opportunity to use such “committal
tactics,”6 they adopt rigid bargaining positions that prevent full coordination. In
equilibrium, these “rivaling blocs” cannot back down out of fear that others use issue
linkage or delegation to dominate the negotiations, despite empty promises not to
do so. Issue linkage and delegation give rise to an endogenous Prisoner’s Dilemma,
creating international collective-action problems where they previously did not exist.
The occurrence of such problems is systematically related to the nature of the
international cooperation problem, and I derive empirical predictions regarding the
preferences of different states over international institutional designs that facilitate
or impede issue linkage and delegation. Which states desire “cross-cutting” interna-
tional institutions that facilitate issue linkage and “strong” international committees
that can issue binding decisions? I base these predictions on analytical results that
reveal the conditions under which different states cannot possibly gain from issue
linkage or delegation. These states, I maintain, should actively resist issue linkage
and delegation.
Three predictions emerge. First, hegemonic states and their allies have a strong in-
centive to prevent issue linkage and delegation in issue areas that they dominate. Since
they secure full coordination to their ideal policy anyway, they can but lose through
issue linkage and delegation. Second, issue areas in which the incentive to coordinate
policies dominates the incentive to promote one’s preferred policy are characterized
by a unanimous agreement to ban issue linkage or delegation. This agreement can
be difficult to enforce, however, since it is easy to dominate the negotiations through
6Young 1989, 361.
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issue linkage or delegation when others are willing to adopt any policy as long as full
coordination ensues. Finally, states that have no credible claim to hegemony endorse
issue linkage and delegation as ways to form a counterhegemonic coalition or achieve
greater policy coordination.
The implications of the analysis for international cooperation and institutions are
significant. The functionalist logic of conventional cooperation theory, best exempli-
fied by the seminal work of Keohane and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal,7 system-
atically fails to hold in multilateral cooperation. States have a collective incentive
to deliberately adopt rigid negotiation procedures and constrain international coop-
eration through issue linkage or delegation, whether multilateral negotiations carry
high transaction costs or not. The rationale for rigidity and constraints on the forms
of international cooperation is strictly strategic. In bilateral cooperation, it is true,
the only reason not to use various bargaining techniques are the transaction costs
that states incur. But in multilateral cooperation, seemingly innocuous bargaining
techniques create opportunistic incentives that cause a collective-action failure.
To substantiate these claims, I proceed as follows. In section 2, I present the
game-theoretic model of international policy coordination. In section 3, I introduce
issue linkage and delegation. Section 4 presents the key result of this paper. In
section 5, I derive the empirical predictions regarding the preferences of different
states over international institutional designs that facilitate or impede issue linkage
and delegation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Multilateral Policy Coordination
States engage in international negotiations over policy coordination when they ex-
pect a payoff from coordinated policies. For example, a global telecommunications
standard is more expedient than multiple incompatible regional standards; global co-
operation is necessary to prevent the collapse of oceanic fisheries when incentives to
free ride are present; and trade liberalization is most effective when it is genuinely
multilateral. In such circumstances, states must agree on a common course of action
to maximize the gains from cooperation.
Sometimes states fail to coordinate policies due to distributional conflict. On the
one hand, they may fail to coordinate policies. On the other hand, they may “water
down” the agreement and settle on an ineffective compromise. In both cases, issue
7Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
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linkage and delegation are potentially beneficial, because they expand the bargaining
space and therefore facilitate policy coordination. By issue linkage, I refer to a unan-
imous decision by a group of states to condition the choice of policies on behavior
in another issue area.8 By delegation, I refer to a unanimous decision by a group
of states to authorize an international body or committee to issue a binding policy
decision for them.9
2.1 The Model
Le N = {1, ..., n} be the set of states and assume n ≥ 2, so that the model subsumes
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The positive weight wi of state i represents the
payoff to other states from coordinating policies with it in the relevant issue area. For
example, in economic issues the gross domestic product is a plausible proxy for the
weight of a state. The United States has a high weight in most issue areas, Botswana
only in some. Normalize the weights such that
∑
wi = 1.
A policy t belongs to a finite set T that comprises all available alternatives. The
ideal point of state i is one of the policies, tmaxi ∈ T
max ⊂ T . If states i and j have a
common ideal point, they agree on what the best policy is. For example, the member
states of the European Union could share a common preference if they negotiate with
the United States on establishing a standard on genetically modified organisms.10
The strategy of state i is simply a policy si ∈ Si = T . All states choose policies
simultaneously. Each state i has a preference for full coordination to its ideal point
tmaxi , but this is not necessarily possible. The utility representation of state i captures
the potential schism between coordination and distribution:
Ui(si, s−i) = gi(W
si) · ui(si). (1)
Here, W si is the aggregate weight of all players that choose policy si. It determines
the value of the gains from coordination. The value of the policy to state i is ui. I
assume gi is strictly increasing such that gi(0) = 0 and ui is non-negative, so that
coordination never hurts a state.
This model is general. It covers a wide range of international cooperation problems
in which states desire policy coordination, so the results do not depend on stringent
8Sebenius 1983; Stein 1980.
9Bradley and Kelley 2008.
10Young 2003.
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assumptions regarding preferences and the set of available policies. I require, however,
that the marginal value of coordination does not diminish:
Assumption 1 (marginal value of coordination). For any state i and any λ ∈ (0, 1),
λ · gi(1) > gi(λ).
This assumption indicates that any state i finds full coordination to any policy with
some probability λ preferable to partial coordination in a coalition of weight λ. An
international telecommunications standard is clearly most useful when it is global. A
universal agreement to prevent the collapse of oceanic fisheries is much more valuable
than an agreement that leaves some states outside it. Without this assumption, it is
possible that states do not even desire full coordination. Consequently, they have no
incentive to participate in the multilateral negotiations. I omit this trivial possibility,
because it does not pose an international cooperation problem.11
2.2 Solution Concepts
To solve the model, it is necessary to specify a bargaining protocol. The standard
solution concept in non-cooperative game theory, the Nash equilibrium, is not suit-
able for modeling negotiations because it precludes pre-game communication.12 For
example, it permits full coordination to a policy even if all states agree that there
is a superior, self-enforcing alternative. In reality, it seems plausible that one of the
states simply propose this alternative be adopted.
One solution to this problem is to construct an elaborate bargaining structure,
but the results from conventional bargaining models depend on the details and are
unnecessarily complex for present purposes.13 To avoid this problem, I adopt the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.14 The formal definition
11Specifically, if full coordination by all states to a common policy is not necessary
to solve the international cooperation problem, one can simply focus on the problem
of coordinating policies among those states that do benefit from full coordination
among themselves.
12The Nash equilibrium also prohibits binding commitments. I maintain this re-
striction.
13In an insightful analysis, Gilligan 2004 uses a simple bargaining model to question
the logic of broader-deeper tradeoff in multilateral cooperation.
14Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston 1987. A drawback of the coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium is that it does not exist for some games that admit Nash equilibria. In
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is relegated to the Appendix, but the intuition is straightforward. Write sC for the
policies chosen by coalition C and tC if they adopt a common policy:
Definition 1. A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a commonly known proba-
bility distribution15 over strategy vectors {s1N , ..., s
k
N} such that for any ex post policy
vector sjN , there is no coalition C with a profitable and self-enforcing deviation sC .
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria are essentially international agreements that no coali-
tion of states can credibly threaten to upset. Even though France could not cred-
ibly threaten to unilaterally prevent the reform of European agricultural policies,
this threat might be credible if other states join the cause. The reform proposal is
then a Nash equilibrium but not coalition-proof and hence an implausible outcome
of multilateral negotiations. In bilateral cooperation, coalition-proofness excludes the
implausible possibility that states fail to adopt a common policy that they both prefer
to unilateral policies.
States can choose the policy randomly, which is useful because states can se-
cure full coordination without deciding with certainty whose preferred policy will be
adopted.16 For example, both the United States and the European Union probably
prefer that their domestic telecommunications standards be adopted globally with
some probability to no international telecommunications standard at all. Figure 4.1
illustrates a simple bilateral model in which both states stand to benefit from random
selection.
[FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
Consider now those international negotiations that could pose an international co-
operation problem. Under complete information, inefficiency must result from a com-
mitment problem:
Definition 2. A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is efficient if and only if no prob-
ability distribution on a set of strategy vectors is a weak ex ante Pareto-improvement
the present context, the structure of payoffs is such that non-existence is unlikely.
Throughout, I assume that at least one coalition-proof Nash equilibrium exists.
15Throughout, the set of probability distributions contains degenerate probability
distributions that choose a strategy vector deterministically.
16Formally, I assume the players have access to a public randomization device.
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over it.17
This is the conventional definition of Pareto-efficiency when random selection is per-
missible but players cannot commit to policies. Without commitment capacity, it
must be that no coalition has an ex post incentive to deviate, regardless of the out-
come of a possible random selection process.
Given that the marginal value of coordination does not decrease, it is easy to show
that efficiency requires full coordination:
Claim 1. All efficient coalition-proof Nash equilibria prompt ex post full coordi-
nation to a common policy tN = (t, ..., t).
This finding presents a necessary condition for success in multilateral negotiations:
did the states ultimately choose a common policy or not? If not, Assumption 1
ensures that they could improve on the outcome of the negotiations through random
selection of a fully coordinated policy when adequate commitment capacity is avail-
able. Figure 4.2 illustrates.
[FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
To see whether policy coordination poses an international cooperation problem, I
conduct an equilibrium analysis. The equilibria of the game are the possible outcomes
of the international negotiations. If all equilibria of the game are efficient, states do
not face an international cooperation problem, as the negotiations must produce an
efficient outcome. Otherwise all states could potentially benefit from appropriate
institutional designs to solve the problem. Interestingly, it turns out that potential
cooperation problems in in bilateral and multilateral cooperation are not qualitatively
different, so the causes of inefficient issue linkage and delegation in the multilateral
context must lie elsewhere.
Consider first the possibility of pure coordination:
Equilibrium 1 (pure coordination). Suppose that for any common policy tN and
17The possibility of multiple equilibria, some of which are efficient while others are
not, can be safely ignored because deviations by the grand coalition are permitted.
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coalition C, there is no profitable deviation to a common policy tC such that gi(wC) ·
ui(tC) ≥ gi(1) · ui(tN) for all i ∈ C. Then all equilibria of the game are probability
distributions on efficient common policies.
In pure coordination games, all states assign high priority to coordination relative
to distribution. When the returns to full coordination are high but the distribu-
tional consequences of different policies are negligible, states can credibly commit to
any common policy. Perhaps the best example is a simple standardization problem,
such as the adoption of a common calendar.18 Another condition that increases the
likelihood of pure coordination is the absence of large groups of states with similar
preferences. The coalitions that could have a collective incentive to deviate from a
common policy are small, which increases the cost of deviation. The threat by a small
coalition to deviate is not credible; somewhat paradoxically, a fragmented preference
landscape increases the likelihood of pure coordination.
An alternative form of full coordination is hegemony:
Equilibrium 2 (hegemony). Suppose there is a unique ideal point tmax for which a
coalition C exists such that gi(wC) · ui(t
max) ≥ gi(1) · ui(t) for all t and i ∈ C. Fix
sC = t
max for largest such coalition C. Unless there is another coalition D such that
gi(wD) · ui(tD) ≥ gi(1) · ui(t
max) for some i ∈ D and tD 6= t
max, and no subcoalition
E ⊆ D such that gi(wC∪E) · ui(t
max) ≥ gi(wD) · ui(tD) for all i ∈ E, the unique and
efficient equilibrium of the game is full coordination to tN = t
max.
When states that share an ideal point are alone in the position to credibly threaten
withdrawal from a common policy, they are also in the position to force full coordi-
nation to their ideal point. Other states, who value coordination over distribution,
submit to ensure full coordination. Hegemony is most likely when exactly one large
group of states that share an ideal point is present, perhaps because the currently
hegemonic state belongs to it. It is also most likely when the members of this group
have intense preferences while other states are relatively indifferent between different
policies.
Both pure coordination and hegemony ultimately result in the choice of an ideal
point, but empirically it is more common in multilateral negotiations that states com-
18Stein 1982, 314. Mattli and Büthe 2003 provide extensive empirical evidence
that international standard setting in a global economy is not generally a simple
coordination problem.
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promise on the choice of a common policy:
Equilibrium 3 (compromise). Suppose there exists a common policy tN that is
not an ideal point such that gi(1) · ui(tN) > gi(wC) · ui(t) for all coalitions C, at least
one state i ∈ C, and all policies t. Then all probability distributions over such policies
are coalition-proof Nash equilibria. These equilibria can be efficient or inefficient.
Compromise policies are not ideal points, so no state obtains its maximum payoff.
The compromise is efficient if there is no other choice of policies that would make all
bargaining parties better off, and inefficient otherwise.19 For example, a multilateral
trade agreement is efficient if any conceivable change in tariff levels or permissible
trade policies leaves at least one state worse off. It is inefficient if there is a better
agreement, such as universally lower tariff levels, but this policy is vulnerable to a
deviation by a regional trading bloc.20 States must then“water down”the multilateral
trade agreement to implement it.
Finally, the archetypal international cooperation problem is coordination failure:
Equilibrium 4 (coordination failure). Suppose there are separate policies {tC1 , ..., tCk}
for coalitions {C1, ..., Ck} such that there is no profitable deviation for any coalition
D ⊆ N and all i ∈ D. Then (tC1 , ..., tCk) is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in
which coordination failure occurs. Efficient equilibria can also exist.
When states have intense preferences and multiple coalitions can credibly threaten to
withdraw from a common policy, states fail to coordinate policies. They form “rival-
ing blocs” and dissipate the surplus from policy coordination. By Assumption 1, all
states prefer choosing a common policy randomly instead, but they cannot credibly
commit to not reneging if their preferred outcome is not chosen.
These equilibria, summarized in Table 4.1, are straightforward extensions of those
found in canonical two-player games, such as the Battle of the Sexes. The equi-
librium analysis therefore suggests that if qualitative differences exist between the
19Importantly, this implies that these equilibria are not inefficient in the set of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria, as at least one state prefers each one of them to effi-
cient compromise. They are inefficient, however, in the set of possible outcomes when
binding commitments are possible and therefore pose an international cooperation
problem. If the efficient compromise is chosen, there is instead nothing states can do
to improve everyone’s payoff.
20Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003.
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strategic logic of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, they must be caused by more
fundamental mechanisms of strategic interaction than the nature of the cooperation
problem.
[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
3 Issue Linkage and Delegation
I now turn to the impact of issue linkage and delegation. As conventional cooperation
theory tells us, these techniques have potential to prevent coordination failure or
inefficient compromise in international negotiations. The conditions under which issue
linkage and delegation are unproblematic no-regret bargaining techniques, however,
remain poorly understood.
3.1 Who Can Link Issues and Delegate?
For both issue linkage and delegation, the first question to ask is who can use them. In
multilateral negotiations, it is not clear that all states have access to such bargaining
techniques. Consider first issue linkage. Some states could interact regularly across
different issue areas, which creates scope for linkage bargaining, while others rarely
have any reasons to negotiate at all. Some states could be institutionally constrained
in the presence of domestic “veto players” that can prevent concessions in different
issue areas, while others could easily exchange concessions across issue areas.21
This applies to delegation as well. Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development can request that the relevant committee design a common
policy, while other states could lack the institutional structure necessary to generate
such decision-making power. More generally, some states could possess commitment
capacity for legally binding decisions by an international committee, perhaps through
a reputational or domestic institutional mechanism, while others lack such capacity.22
Formally, I assume that only exogenously given “bargaining groups” can use issue
linkage or delegation:
Definition 3. To use issue linkage or delegation, state i must be a member of
21See Tsebelis 2002 for veto-player theory.
22Chayes and Chayes 1993; Downs and Jones 2002; Martin 2000.
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some exogenously given, non-singleton bargaining group B.
This definition is simpler to use than a more complex formulation according to which
each state i can link issues or delegate at a cost.
Substantively, bargaining groups comprise states that simply happen to interact
in another area simultaneously and possess the capacity to bargain across issues (is-
sue linkage) or have the capacity to authorize an international committee to choose
a policy (delegation). The definition does not imply that the members of a bargain-
ing group have common interests; it is enough that they could potentially link issues
or delegate decision-making power. I allow for the existence of multiple bargaining
groups. To simplify the analysis without loss of essential insight, however, I assume
that no state i belongs to multiple bargaining groups:
Assumption 2. Each state i can be a member of at most one bargaining group
B.
It is useful to now classify bargaining groups according to their number and form:
Definition 4. A bargaining group B is unique if there are no other bargaining
groups and competitive otherwise. If the unique bargaining group is the grand
coalition N , it is universal.
These definitions are central to the results that I present below. When a unique
bargaining group exists, its members need not consider the strategic implications of
issue linkage or delegation. Competitive bargaining groups, on the other hand, must
not forget that other states are present that can also use issue linkage or delegation.
Throughout, I do not differentiate between bargaining groups that can use issue
linkage or delegation. Each bargaining group could also have multiple feasible is-
sue linkages or opportunities to delegate. It turns out that such considerations are
irrelevant for the analytical results, so I omit the formalization.
3.2 Issue Linkage and Delegation Defined
I am now in the position to introduce the mechanics of issue linkage and delegation.
Following Sebenius, I submit that issues are “linked when they are simultaneously
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discussed for joint settlement.”23 If states fail to reach an agreement on a single is-
sue, they can negotiate an agreement that spans two or more issue areas, so that the
adoption of a common policy in either issue area depends on the adoption of another
common policy in the other issue area. If states have the possibility to form linkages,
they can expand the bargaining space for mutual advantage. Formally:
Definition 5. An issue linkage is a unanimous pre-game decision by a bargaining
group B to adopt (possibly random) policies sB in the policy coordination game and
policies yB in another game ΓB. If any state i in bargaining group B deviates from
these policies, all states in both games revert to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
that would have been played without the issue linkage.
This definition highlights two issues. First, issue linkage is a unanimous pre-game
decision. If the members of a bargaining group choose to link issues, other states
know it under complete information. If any member of the bargaining group refuses
to link issues, others cannot force it to do so. Second, the states deliberately condition
policies in the two games on each other.24 If any member of the bargaining group
fails to honor the issue linkage in one issue area, others can also deviate. The issue
linkage must therefore be incentive-compatible to have an effect.
Consider next delegation. In general, the concept refers to“a grant of authority by
two or more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions.”25 In
the context of negotiations, the purpose of delegation is to allow an international“com-
mittee” select a common policy for the delegating states.26 This stands in contrast
to delegation for purposes of adjudication, that is, to enforce existing international
agreements. I do not consider this possibility, because it is not directly relevant to
the problem of policy coordination in international negotiations. Examples of interna-
tional delegation include authorizing the European Commission to prepare an energy
policy for the member states, ad hoc voluntary arbitration at the Permanent Court
of International Arbitration, and the preparation of a common bargaining position in
23Sebenius 1983, 287. See also Davis 2004; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001;
Leebron 2002; Stein 1980.
24This is in contrast to another use of the term“issue linkage”in the literature, which
refers to the possibility that two issue areas are somehow interdependent (Leebron
2002; Limão 2005).
25Bradley and Kelley 2008, 2.
26See Farrell and Saloner 1988; Hawkins et al. 2006; Johns 2007; Koremenos, Lipson
and Snidal 2001.
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multilateral trade negotiations by consulting legal experts on the relevant provisions
of an existing regional trade agreement.
Under complete information, delegation can serve two purposes in international
negotiations. The first is to generate a “focal point.”27 If states can choose among
multiple policies, as in the model above, they can “fix” a focal policy by asking an
impartial and legitimate international committee to choose a policy for them. This
possibility is already captured in the model, because I allow random selection. How-
ever, states can go beyond mere recommendations through a commitment to a binding
decision by an international committee. This is the definition that I use:
Definition 6. Delegation is a unanimous, binding pre-game decision by a bar-
gaining group B to adopt (possibly random) policies sB in the policy coordination
game.
This definition formalizes the “strong” form of international delegation. Instead of
seeking recommendations, states announce a binding commitment to the decision
made by the international committee. It can be useful when there are effective com-
mon policies that states fail to adopt because some coalitions have an incentive to
deviate.
The assumption that issue linkage and delegation are pre-game decisions is plau-
sible. If a bargaining group has the opportunity to use issue linkage or delegation,
there is no reason why it could not do so before the multilateral negotiations. Since
such pre-game decisions endow the members of a bargaining group with commitment
capacity, the option to do so is unambiguously in their interest.
Consider now the nature of the augmented game. For any bargaining group B,
both issue linkage and delegation permit a credible pre-game commitment to a prob-
ability distribution over some policy vectors {sjB}j. The following observation thus
simplifies the analysis:
Claim 3. In equilibrium, issue linkage and delegation are equivalent to a credi-
ble pre-game commitment to a probability distribution over policy vectors {sjB}j.
The set of available policy vectors {sjB}j to which states can commit, might be inter
alia determined by the strength of the international committee for delegation or the
set of available issue linkages. States can perhaps credibly commit to liberalizing
27Schelling 1960, 57; Garrett and Weingast 1993.
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trade or increasing their development aid, but a credible commitment to initiate an
interstate conflict with a major power could be difficult to enforce.
Given that both issue linkage and delegation are pre-game decisions, focus should
be restricted on subgame-perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibria. The extensive form
of the game is now as follows:
1. All state i that belong to some bargaining group B announce simultaneously
a probability distribution over available policy vectors {sjB}j. If all members
of a bargaining group B announce an identical probability distribution, it is a
credible pre-game commitment.
2. Randomization occurs and the ex post policies {s∗i }i of all states i that belong
to some bargaining group B with a credible pre-game commitment are fixed.
3. All states j that have not made a credible commitment choose policies simulta-
neously, taking the credible commitments {s∗i }i as given.
Both issue linkage and delegation are unanimous decisions, so two conditions must
hold for all bargaining groups that link issues or delegate. First, no member of such
a bargaining group should have an individual incentive to veto the decision. Second,
there should be no other issue linkage or delegation opportunity that improves the
payoff to all members of a bargaining group.
4 Results
With the mechanics of issue linkage and delegation intact, it is possible to examine
their impact on international negotiations. I begin with the case of bilateral coopera-
tion and then proceed to investigate the complications that multilateral cooperation
raises.
4.1 Unproblematic Issue Linkage and Delegation
In bilateral cooperation, the logic of conventional cooperation theory holds:
Proposition 1. In bilateral cooperation, the option to link issues or delegate decision-
making power cannot reduce the payoff to either state.
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This result is firmly grounded in conventional cooperation theory. States cannot
link issues or delegate decision-making power unilaterally, so issue linkage and del-
egation depend on mutual consent. When mutual consent is required, either state
can simply refuse to use these bargaining techniques if it expects to lose. While any
given issue linkage or decision to delegate could hurt both states, the option value
is unambiguously non-negative. The functionalist logic of conventional cooperation
theory holds because sovereign states can “exit” bargains that harm them.28
The unproblematic nature of issue linkage and delegation in bilateral cooperation
has a counterpart in multilateral cooperation. If there is a unique bargaining group, it
is never hurt by the opportunity to link issues or delegation. If the bargaining group
is universal, this opportunity cannot hurt any of the bargaining parties:
Proposition 2. In multilateral cooperation, the option to link issues or delegate
decision-making power by a unique bargaining group cannot reduce the payoff to its
members. If this bargaining group is universal, this option cannot reduce the payoff
to any state.
In the case of a unique bargaining group, issue linkage and delegation have no com-
plex strategic implications. They simply allow a bargaining group to credibly commit
to a common policy. If any member of the bargaining group expects to lose, it can
refuse to use the option. And if the bargaining group is universal, each state has
a veto over issue linkage and delegation, so issue linkage and delegation are all but
unproblematic, exactly as conventional cooperation theory predicts. Again, any given
issue linkage or decision to delegate is potentially harmful, but then the losers can
simply prevent its implementation.
A universal bargaining group that used issue linkage efficiently can be found in the
multilateral negotiations on the United Nations Law of the Sea. Sebenius writes that
the developed and developing countries disagreed on the provisions that establish the
ground rules for mining operations.29 On the one hand, developing countries preferred
high fees for mining operations while developed countries, which had greater oppor-
tunities to mine the seabed, preferred a flexible system of generally low fees. On the
other hand, the developing countries insisted on long-term, interest-free loans to the
International Seabed Authority, while the developed countries preferred a commercial
financial mechanism. In isolation, these two issues were essentially single-dimensional
28For the concept of exit, see Hirschman 1970.
29Sebenius 1983, 293-294.
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bargaining games with multiple players and bifurcated preferences. Through a uni-
versal issue linkage, approved by the bargaining parties, they reached a mutually
acceptable compromise. By successfully closing these multiyear negotiations, they
established the foundation for the law of the sea.
The European Union offers an insightful example of an often unique bargaining
group in multilateral negotiations. Internally, the agenda-setting and implementation
capacities of the European Commission enable delegation by a universal bargaining
group.30 In many key issue areas, such as economic policy in the internal market
or environmental and health regulation, the member states can seek to resolve their
disagreements by delegating decision-making power to the Commission. A good ex-
ample of a major policy initiative that would have hardly possible without the input
of the Commission is the “climate package” negotiated in 2008, which legally binds
the member states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by one fifth by the year
2020.31
Externally, delegation to the European Commission increases the bargaining power
of the Europeans. Mattli and Büthe provide compelling empirical evidence that in
international standard setting, a key issue area in a global economy, the centralized
mechanisms for European standardization have given the European Union a compet-
itive edge over the United States and other countries.32 By resolving their disputes
internally and credibly committing to a unionwide standard, which covers the largest
common market in the world, they entice other states to adopt the European stan-
dards out of fear of losing market share.
4.2 Problematic Issue Linkage and Delegation
When bargaining groups are competitive, issue linkage and delegation can cause in-
efficiencies:
Proposition 3. Fix a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game without bar-
gaining groups.
1. There exists a subgame-perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that reduces
the payoff to all states only if the original coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
30Pollack 1997, 121-128.
31For the central role of the European Commission, see “Commission Unveils Plans
to Cut Emissions by 20 Percent.” Der Spiegel International January 23, 2008.
32Mattli and Büthe 2003.
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and all weak Pareto-improvements to it through issue linkage or delegation are
not self-enforcing, because for each of them there is some coalition C that can
profitably deviate through issue linkage or delegation such that the profitability
of this deviation sC depends on sN\C .
2. All equilibria of the game reduce the payoff to all states if the above condition
holds for all coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the game and policy vectors not
Pareto-dominated by them.
This is the central result of the paper. When the multilateral policy coordination game
has an equilibrium without bargaining groups, opportunities to link issues or delegate
can only cause inefficiency if multiple bargaining groups try to use them to enhance
their influence. These bargaining groups engage in competition to entice other states
to adopt their preferred policies, and they cannot abandon their rigid bargaining
positions out of fear that they lose this competition over bargaining influence. If this
competition “destroys” all existing coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the game and
all attempts to improve upon them through using issue linkage or delegation, the
resulting equilibrium must be strictly worse for all involved states.
The result highlights the fundamental importance of opportunistic gains from is-
sue linkage or delegation. A necessary condition for inefficiency is that the original
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and any attempts to improve upon it through is-
sue linkage or delegation are vulnerable to an opportunistic deviation through issue
linkage or delegation that forces other states to adjust their policies. A sufficient con-
dition for inefficiency is that this is vulnerability applies to all coalition-proof Nash
equilibria of the original game.
Why cannot the competitive bargaining groups avoid this tragic outcome, despite
an obvious need to do so? The obstacle is the prospect of opportunistic gain, which is
only possible because both issue linkage and delegation create commitment capacity.
If the competitive bargaining groups agree not to use issue linkage or delegation, one
of them can deviate by announcing a credible commitment to their preferred policy,
which other states then choose to reap the gains from policy coordination.
The contest for bargaining power in the multilateral negotiations thus gives rise
to an endogenous Prisoner’s Dilemma. The commitment capacity created by issue
linkage or delegation paradoxically destroys both the original equilibria of the game
and all attempts to improve upon them. Proposition 3 shows that this fundamen-
tal problem is the only possible causal mechanism that can create an unambiguously
harmful outcome in the multilateral negotiations. Figure 4.3 illustrates.
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[FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
Clear examples of competitive bargaining groups that made opportunistic use of issue
linkage and delegation can be found from multilateral trade negotiations. Beginning
with issue linkage, Narlikar investigates developing country bargaining tactics when
the United States first brought the service sector to the agenda of the GATT in the
1980’s.33 The European Community had established an issue linkage between services
and agriculture “to divert attention away from, or at least facilitate trade-offs on [the
latter].” This issue linkage gave rise to a common transatlantic policy that services
were to be liberalized in the negotiations. Although the majority of developing coun-
tries were willing to compromise and initiate negotiations on services, the Group of
10 refused to consider this possibility and precluded “[a]ny possibility of finding a
middle ground with the other developing countries.” The resulting deadlock impeded
progress in the negotiations and forced the developing countries to fundamentally
rethink their bargaining tactics.
Mansfield and Reinhardt show that states have formed preferential trading agree-
ments to increase their bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations.34 They
argue that, inter alia, these agreements “may increase leverage by accumulating mar-
ket power of individual members, giving them greater ability to influence their terms
of trade and to negotiate favorable settlements with outsiders.” In my model, the
agreements correspond to a credible commitment to a common policy. The compet-
itive and opportunistic nature of these agreements is clear in the words of the U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who is quoted by Mansfield and Reinhardt
saying “I firmly believe that a process of ... competitive liberalization will enhance
our ability to get Doha done.”35 Unfortunately, the dismal record of the Doha round
shows how other states have also adopted inflexible positions and the negotiations
have failed to produce a bargain.
Proposition 3 is in striking contrast to the logic of conventional cooperation
theory. Unlike bilateral negotiations, multilateral negotiations involve coalition for-
mation. If this process of coalition formation involves competition over influence in
the multilateral negotiations, it gives rise to negative externalities that hurt other
33Narlikar 2003, 69-82.
34Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003.
35Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003, 838. Originally in Washington Post November
20, 2002.
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states. Issue linkage and delegation do not require mutual consent, and the existence
of opportunistic incentives pits competitive bargaining groups against each other in a
collectively detrimental fashion. Multilateral negotiations that were to be a problem
of coordination and distribution turn into a Prisoner’s Dilemma that hurts everyone
involved.
The result is more fundamental than related findings in the extant literature.
Sebenius shows that an issue linkage can destroy the “zone of agreement,” but he
does not analyze the strategic implications of the issue.36 As I have shown above,
without multilateral strategic interaction, states can simply choose not to implement
the detrimental issue linkage. Gruber analyzes a simple three-player model to show
that international institutionalization in general can harm third parties, but his model
does not permit an outcome in which all states are hurt.37 While power politics can
be troubling for normative reasons, the outcome is not inefficient per se because at
least the most powerful states gain. Proposition 3 shows that everyone can lose
when issue linkage or delegation create opportunistic incentives.
To summarize, these findings provide a strictly strategic rationale for the lim-
ited scope and consensual decision-making rules in multilateral negotiations.38 The
conventional wisdom emphasizes the transaction costs of complex multilateral nego-
tiations,39 but the analysis above shows that states can have a collective incentive to
limit interactions to a single issue area and discourage delegation even when these
costs are negligible.
5 Higher-Order Distributional Conflict in Institu-
tional Design
Given the generality of the model, a full comparative statics analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper. Since I have provided a detailed analytical characterization
of the conditions under which issue linkage and delegation cause inefficiency, it is
nevertheless possible to generate empirical predictions on the politics of international
36Sebenius 1983. Keohane 1984, 92 also notes that a functional regime should
preclude “destructive linkages or bargains,” but he does not define or analyze the
concept.
37Gruber 2000. See also Stein 1980, 65-74.
38See Maggi and Morelli 2006 for an analysis of decision-making rules in the context
of collective-action problems.
39Crump and Glendon 2003; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 787.
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institutional design to facilitate issue linkage and delegation.40
5.1 International Institutions, Issue Linkage, and Delegation
If issue linkage and delegation are sometimes problematic in multilateral cooperation,
it is of interest to examine how different states view institutional designs that facilitate
or impede them. Are some states more willing to invest in international institutions
that facilitate issue linkage and delegation? Do other states have incentives to actively
resist such institutions?
To conduct the analysis, I assume that cases requiring international negotiation
in an issue area share certain common features. For instance, I assume that if a state
is hegemonic in one case, it is likely to be hegemonic in other cases in that issue area
as well. As the European domination of the politics of international standard setting
shows, this is not an implausible assumption. Building on this assumption, I ask
which institutional designs a particular state, such as the hegemon, prefers when it
faces a typical international cooperation problem in a given issue area.
To begin with, consider the reasons why certain international institutions facili-
tate issue linkage. The possibility of a strategic issue linkage to enable compromise
hinges on establishing connections between unrelated issue areas.41 Consequently,
if such linkages carry transaction costs,42 international institutions that reduce the
cost of bargaining across issue areas encourage strategic linkages in multilateral co-
operation.43 Such institutions are aptly labeled “cross-cutting” because they permit
bargains without substantive basis.
In contrast, some institutions actually impede the use of issue linkage. If an inter-
national institution focuses on the technical and managerial aspects of international
cooperation, it increases the cost of cross-issue bargaining among the parties. Such
institutions are best characterized as “isolated” because they limit the scope of mul-
tilateral negotiations to the issue at hand. To be sure, such an institution does not
prevent some parties from bargaining on a linkage or using side payments in other
fora. But isolation should ceteris paribus increase the cost of strategic issue linkages.44
40Keohane 1984, 91-92; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 784-787.
41Leebron 2002.
42North 1990; Williamson 1975.
43Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
44Snidal 1996, 127 attacks the claim that formal institutions have no role in inter-
national cooperation because any outcome that they bring about could be in princi-
ple implemented without them: “[i]nstitutions matter because they provide a stable
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The distributional conflict over issue linkage concerns the choice between cross-
cutting and isolated forms of international institutionalization. In delegation to a
committee, a corresponding distributional conflict emerges over the choice between
“strong” and “weak” international institutions.45 A strong committee has the capabil-
ities to enforce its policy decisions. These capabilities could vary from explicit sanc-
tions to harmful reputational consequences. In the context of the model, a strong
institution corresponds to the case of fully binding delegation studied above. The
European Commission is probably the best example of a strong committee.
A weak committee, on the other hand, lacks the power to enforce its judgments,
which are thus more appropriately seen as recommendations. The United Nations
Codex Alimentarius for sanitary and phytosanitary standards, for example, has rec-
ommended thousands of international standards for common adoption, but compli-
ance has been far from perfect.46 In the model, a weak committee is simply a mech-
anism for randomly generating a non-binding focal point.
5.2 Results
I begin with issue areas in which pure coordination and efficient compromise are typi-
cal international cooperation problems. These issue areas are characterized by strong
incentives to coordinate policies and the absence of a genuine international cooper-
ation problem. It is therefore unsurprising that collective gains are not to be made
through issue linkage or delegation:
Corollary 1. Under pure coordination or efficient compromise, issue linkage or del-
egation cannot increase the payoff to a state without reducing the payoff to another
state.
This result is a straightforward consequence of the efficiency of the international
negotiation outcomes in the absence of issue linkage and delegation. Its implications
are far-reaching. Since the states can always achieve an efficient allocation of gains in
environment for mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide and constrain be-
havior.”
45For the desirability of strong international institutions with enforcement powers
in general, see Chayes and Chayes 1993 and Downs, Rocke and Barsoon 1996.
46Veggeland and Borgen 2005, 683-694 argue that the Codex was essentially a“gen-
tleman’s club” before the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and that after 1995 its recommendations have been“semi-binding”for WTO members.
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the form of a compromise, they have no demand for issue linkage or delegation, but
as I have shown, issue linkage and delegation can reduce the payoff to all of them.
The risk of this detrimental outcome thus creates an incentive to deliberately bar the
use of issue linkage or delegation.
What is more, the potential benefits from opportunistic issue linkage or delegation
to the winners are high. Since coordination is the primary motivation of most states
in these issue areas, as the equilibrium analysis above shows, they are quite sensitive
to the choices of other states. By locking in an ideal point, a bargaining group can
trigger an avalanche that prompts full coordination to its preferred policy. When
the returns to opportunism are large, states find it difficult to prevent collectively
detrimental outcomes.
This result leads to an interesting conjecture regarding the nature of “technical”
issue areas in which politics seem to have a minor role to play. While it is possible
that these issue areas are characterized by a true absence of distributional conflict,47
it is equally plausible that states have deliberately moved to contain distributional
conflict by barring such techniques as issue linkage or delegation that bargaining
groups can use to increase their influence. In the International Telecommunication
Union, an international organization and a bargaining forum for key decisions in
global telecommunications, the role of technical regulators has been conspicuously
prominent despite unusually high political stakes.48 While telecommunications is a
technical issue area, it is quite implausible that major powers such as the United
States and the European Union could not negotiate in explicitly political terms with
support from technical experts and engage in linkage bargaining.
Consider next the incentives of a state that expects to be hegemonic in an issue
area of multilateral policy coordination:
Corollary 2. Under hegemony, issue linkage or delegation cannot increase the payoff
to the hegemonic coalition.
The hegemon obtains its maximum payoff without issue linkage or delegation, so
any change in the outcome of the negotiations goes against its interests. The large
size and intense preferences of the hegemonic coalition, and the lack thereof elsewhere
in the world, imply that straightforward international negotiations without bargaining
techniques produce the first-best payoff for the hegemonic coalition.
47See Vogel 1997.
48Cowhey and Aronson 1991, 310.
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This finding implies that hegemonic states and their close allies with similar policy
preferences have an incentive to actively resist attempts to engage in linkage bargain-
ing or use delegation. As long as the hegemon can divide et impera by preventing
other states from credibly committing to a common counterhegemonic policy, it se-
cures full coordination to its ideal point. If other states resolve their internal disputes
and form a unified front against the hegemon, it is possible that they deviate from
the hegemon’s preferred policy and leave the hegemon without the benefits of policy
coordination.
When is the hegemon subject to a credible counterhegemonic challenge, so that
other states could potentially benefit from issue linkage or delegation?
Corollary 3. Under hegemony, issue linkage or delegation can increase the pay-
off to non-hegemonic states only if the hegemonic coalition is small enough.
The size of the hegemonic coalition determines the extent to which deviation from its
preference dissipates the surplus from policy coordination. If the hegemonic coalition
is small, and only barely able to induce full coordination to its preference, issue linkage
or delegation among the non-hegemonic states can create relatively extensive coordi-
nation to policies that are preferable to the hegemon’s ideal point. If the hegemonic
coalition is overwhelmingly dominant, such as the United States in its interactions in
the aftermath of the Second World War, the non-hegemonic states cannot possibly
improve their payoff even if they credibly commit to a policy.
These two results imply that hegemonic issue areas provoke distributional conflict
over institutional design when the hegemonic coalition is “weak” and only barely able
to achieve full coordination to its ideal point. In such circumstances, the hegemon
must actively resist initiatives by other states to link issues or delegate decision-
making power, perhaps through a system of rewards and punishments. When the
hegemon is overwhelmingly dominant, it need not worry about challenges because
there is no latent counterhegemonic coalition.
Consider finally the inefficient outcomes:
Corollary 4. Under coordination failure or inefficient compromise, issue linkage
or delegation can increase the payoff to all states. If the bargaining group is univer-
sal, it cannot decrease the payoff to any state.
This result shows that the most likely case for mutually advantageous issue linkage
119
or delegation contains the elements of a complex problem of institutional design. On
the one hand, issue linkage and delegation contain the potential for mutual gain and,
even better, this is a no-regret technique as long as the bargaining group is universal.
At the same time, however, individual states could eschew the universal bargaining
group in the hope of imposing their will on the others. The problem of international
institutional design boils down to facilitating universal bargaining groups that reflect
the relative bargaining power of different states, without simultaneously opening the
Pandora’s box of competitive bargaining groups motivated by opportunistic gain and
the resulting tragedies.
To summarize, the analysis of higher-order distributional conflict in international
institutional design generates the following predictions. First, in issue areas in which
coordination is the overwhelming priority, states have a collective incentive to bar
the use of issue linkage and delegation. Little distributional conflict exists, as states
are unanimous on alternative and less costly ways of distributing the surplus from
full policy coordination, but opportunism remains a threat. Second, in issue areas
dominated by a hegemonic state and its allies, the frequency and intensity of dis-
tributional conflict depends on the strength of the hegemonic coalition. When it is
overwhelming, all states agree on the futility of issue linkage or delegation. When
it is vulnerable to challenges by a counterhegemonic coalition, distributional conflict
erupts as the hegemon resists initiatives to link issues or delegate decision-making
power by other states. Third, under coordination failure or inefficient compromise,
all states agree that issue linkage and delegation are useful, especially if they are
universal. At the same time, however, different coalitions have incentives to use issue
linkage or delegation for opportunistic purposes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that the functionalist logic of conventional cooperation
theory does not apply to multilateral cooperation. Specifically, I have shown that
while such bargaining techniques as issue linkage and delegation are innocuous in
bilateral cooperation, they can cause rather than solve collective-action problems in
multilateral cooperation. When issue linkage and delegation do not require consent
by all bargaining parties and different coalitions of states can use them to oppor-
tunistically lock in their preferred policy, the commitment capacity that they create
paradoxically effects an endogenous Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using these analytical re-
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sults, I have derived empirical predictions regarding the preferences that different
states have over international institutional designs in different issue areas.
These findings highlight an important difference between bilateral and multilateral
cooperation. In the bilateral context, any act of cooperation requires mutual consent
by definition. In the multilateral context, an act of cooperation can involve a small
number of states that seek to gain an upper hand in the negotiations with the rest
of the world. If such cooperative efforts are directed against each other, as rivaling
blocs of states compete for influence, the possibility of inefficiency cannot be pre-
cluded. This result shows that the complications of international cooperation extend
well beyond the normatively troubling implications of cooperation among repressive
regimes or the possibility of power politics when international cooperation benefits
some states at the expense of others. Unlike bilateral cooperation, multilateral co-
operation contains the seeds of outcomes that are unambiguously detrimental by any
reasonable normative or positive metric of welfare.
This paper focuses on issue linkage and delegation for reasons of parsimony and
analytical tractability, but the general applicability of the analytical thesis is not
difficult to see. The problem is not the coordination function that both issue linkage
and delegation perform, but the commitment capacity that is necessary to bring about
and enforce the resulting settlement. This commitment capacity, commonly seen as a
necessary condition for peace and prosperity in political theory, creates opportunistic
incentives that result in acts of cooperation that hurt everyone involved. This is
only possible in multilateral cooperation, and any bargaining technique that builds
commitment capacity without universal consensus has the potential to bring about
the collective-action failure.
The analysis opens avenues for future research, theoretical and empirical. The-
oretically, the disconnect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation suggests fruitful
extensions and consequential qualifications to the functionalist core of conventional
cooperation theory. I have limited attention to the problem of policy coordination,
and it is important to examine other issues such as incomplete information and en-
dogenous enforcement in the multilateral context.49 When can one conduct a logically
coherent and empirically plausible analysis of international cooperation and institu-
tions without abandoning the tremendous predictive power of functionalism? Which
multilateral cooperation problems are comprehensible without a higher-order analy-
sis of the potentially detrimental consequences of international cooperation? When
49For promising recent theoretical research, see Barrett 1994; Gilligan 2004.
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should one consider power politics following Krasner and Gruber?50 And most impor-
tantly, when should we open the Pandora’s box of metalevel international cooperation
to avoid inefficiencies caused by international cooperation?
Empirically, the claims that I have made should be subjected to intense scrutiny.
Are certain issue areas, such as multilateral trade negotiations, particularly vulnerable
to opportunism? Are international institutions central to the implementation of issue
linkage and delegation, and how important is the higher-order distributional conflict in
international institutional design? How do states structure multilateral negotiations
to avoid suboptimal outcomes? The model that I have analyzed offers a basis for
examining these questions empirically.




The following definition is based on Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston 1987. In a single-
player game, a strategy vector s∗
1
is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if and only if
it maximizes u1, where u1 is the payoff for the single player.
Let the set of players N be non-singleton and suppose coalition-proof Nash equi-
librium is well-defined for all reduced games with fewer than N players. Then
1. For any game in which the set of players is N , strategy vector s∗N is self-
enforcing if and only if sJ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for any J ( N
when s∗N\J is fixed.
2. For any game in which the set of players is N , strategy vector s∗N is a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium if it is self-enforcing and there is no other self-
enforcing strategy vector s∗∗N such that ui(s
∗∗
N ) > ui(s
∗
N) for all i ∈ N .
To allow random selection, assume the players have access to a public randomization
device.
For the concept of subgame-perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, see the defi-
nition of“Perfect Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium”in Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston
1987, 10.
Claim 1
Suppose not. Then there must be coalitions {A, ...,M} such that tK 6= tL ex post for
all K, L ∈ {A, ...,M} : K 6= L. But by Assumption 1, for all i ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1),
λ · gi(1) · ui(tK) > gi(λ) · ui(tK).
With ui non-negative and gi strictly increasing, it follows that the payoff from ran-
domly selecting any common policy tK with probability equal to weight wK , is a strict
payoff-improvement for any state i that belongs to any coalition L:
∑
K∈{A,...,M}
wK · gi(1) · ui(tK) > gi(wL) · ui(tL),
so the claim follows. 
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Equilibrium Analysis
I find the equilibria presented and conclude the analysis by showing that they exhaust
the set of logically possible equilibria.
First, consider pure coordination. Existence is immediate for some parameter val-
ues, so consider the claim that all equilibria of the game are probability distributions
on efficient common policies. To this end, first suppose there is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium that fails to prompt full coordination. Then consider a deviation by the
grand coalition such that each of the policies tC chosen in equilibrium is selected
randomly with probability wC as a common policy for all i ∈ N . By Assumption 1
and proof of Claim 1, this is a strict Pareto-improvement. But by the definition of
a pure-coordination equilibrium, this deviation is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
and therefore self-enforcing, a contradiction.
The other logical possibility is that in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, probabil-
ity is assigned on an inefficient common policy tN . But reduce this probability to zero
and assign it instead on some efficient lottery. By the definition of a pure-coordination
equilibrium, this deviation is itself a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Second, consider hegemony. It is immediate that sC = t
max. Then consider the
remaining players N \C. By assumption, there is no other policy tN\C such that any
player i ∈ N \ C would not prefer a deviation by N \ C to tmax. But then tmax is a
unique equilibrium, and efficiency follows by noting that it maximizes the payoff to
at least one player because it is an ideal point.
Third, consider compromise. The assumption made covers all logically possible
deviations, so the claim follows. The possibility of efficiency can be seen by considering
a game such that gi(1) · ui(tN) >
∑
j λjgi(wC) · ui(tj) for all coalitions C, states
i ∈ C, policies tj, and probabilities λj. The possibility of inefficiency follows if
gi(1) · ui(tN) <
∑
j λjgi(wC) · ui(tj) for all coalitions C, states i ∈ C, some policies tj,
and some probabilities λj.
Consider finally coordination failure. The assumption made covers all logically
possible deviations.
Does this analysis exhaust the set of logically possible alternatives? Pure coordi-
nation, hegemony, and efficient and inefficient compromise allow full coordination to
any common policy. Coordination failure covers all cases in which a common policy
is not chosen. 
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Claim 3
Delegation is a credible pre-game commitment by definition. In equilibrium, issue
linkage changes the behavior of states if and only if no member of the relevant bar-
gaining group has an incentive to deviate. Thus, an equilibrium issue linkage can be
modeled as a credible pre-game commitment. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium when n = 2 and suppose issue linkage or
delegation reduce the payoff to state i. By Definition 5 and Definition 6, state i
can deviate by refusing to link issues or delegate, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Fix a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and suppose issue linkage or delegation reduces
the payoff to state i ∈ C, where C is the unique bargaining group. By Definition
5 and Definition 6, state i can deviate by refusing to link issues or delegate, a
contradiction. But if C = N . this applies to all states i ∈ N . 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the necessary condition for existence. If there is no profitable deviation sC
from any ex post outcome sjN or from a Pareto-improvement over it, a reduced payoff
to all states is clearly impossible. If there is a profitable deviation sC from some ex
post outcome sjN or from a Pareto-improvement over it achieved through issue linkage
or delegation for some coalition C, but it does not depend on sN\C , then coalition C
can secure their Pareto-improving payoffs regardless of sN\C . Thus, in any subgame-
perfect coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, their payoff cannot decrease relative to the
original coalition-proof Nash equilibrium..
Consider the sufficient condition for equivalence with the set of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria. If this condition holds, no probability distribution on policy vectors
not Pareto-dominated by the original coalition-proof Nash equilibria is a coalition-
proof Nash equilibria. If equilibria exist, they must be Pareto-inferior to all coalition-
proof Nash equilibria. 
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Proof of Corollary 1
Under pure coordination or efficient compromise, the equilibrium without issue linkage
or delegation is efficient. By Definition 2, it cannot be improved upon. 
Proof of Corollary 2
The payoff that the members i of the hegemonic coalition can obtain is gi(1) · ui(1),
which is their maximum payoff from the game. It is therefore not possible that
another coalition-proof Nash equilibrium resulting from issue linkage or delegation
would improve their payoff. 
Proof of Corollary 3
Let C be the hegemonic coalition and suppose wC approaches unity. Then the max-
imum payoff to issue linkage or delegation for any state i /∈ C is gi(wN\C) · ui(si) →
gi(0) · ui(si) = 0. 
Proof of Corollary 4
Consider first coordination failure and inefficient compromise, and suppose issue link-
age or delegation allow a credible pre-game commitment to all ideal points by all
states. Then they can achieve any efficient outcome of the game. If the bargaining




Equilibrium Multiplicity Efficiency Other equilibria?
Full coordination Possibly Yes No
Hegemony No Yes Yes
Efficient compromise Possibly Yes Yes
Inefficient compromise Possibly No Yes
Coordination failure Possibly No Yes






















Figure 4.1. The benefits of random policy selection. The dashed lines represent
the payoffs from random selection of either of the ideal points (x = 0 or x = 1).
States cannot credibly commit to it because if the outcome is unfavorable, both have







Figure 4.2. The continuous line represents the payoff from policy coordination gi(w)
as a function of weight w. The dashed line represents the expected payoff from full
coordination, w · gi(1), with probability w. Since the continuous line is everywhere
above the dashed line, all states prefer full coordination with probability w to par-
tial coordination. It must therefore be the case that in an efficient equilibrium, full



























Figure 4.3. A multilateral policy coordination game with four policies. In the
original coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (upper left), all players obtain a payoff of
3. When issue linkage and delegation are permissible, the augmented coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium (lower right) produces an inferior payoff of 2, as the players are split
between two policies. When either white or black players, but not both, are the only
ones to delegate or link issues, they can credibly commit to their preferred policy (2
or 3); other players follow to avoid coordination failure. This opportunistic incentive
destroys the original coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Both black and white players
commit simultaneously to their preferred policies, and the remaining players are split
depending on which policy they prefer when partial coordination cannot be avoided.
As a result, all players are worse off.
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Chapter 5
The Over- and Undersupply of Enforcement Power
in International Public Good Provision
1 Introduction
If states are to mitigate global warming, combat transnational crime and terrorism,
or protect oceanic fisheries, they must negotiate multilateral agreements for inter-
national public good provision. The modal multilateral agreement is based on the
principle of “issue-specific reciprocity,” which implies that states enforce behavior by
conditioning future cooperation on past compliance in that issue area.1 For example,
among the 152 multilateral environmental agreements that Mitchell has coded, 92
involve public good provision. In this subset, only the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation (1994), which permits trade restrictions, explicitly
authorizes sanctions other than suspension of cooperation.2 All other agreements in
the dataset are based on reciprocity. The most salient multilateral agreements on
international public good provision, such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) or the United
Nations Fisheries Agreement (1982), contain no provisions for such sanctions.
The use of reciprocity as a means to enforce compliance with multilateral agree-
ments for international public good provision is puzzling, because reciprocal punish-
ment inflicts collateral damage on the punishers.3 For example, if states are to enforce
1Keohane 1986.
2Mitchell 2002-2008. This agreement was negotiated simultaneously with the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Steinberg 1997 analyzes the relationship
between trade and the environment in these agreements.
3Mitchell and Keilbach 2001. This is so because a reduction in public good provi-
sion hurts all parties.
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a fisheries agreement through reciprocity, they must punish violations by overfishing,
so that the punishers hurt each other in the process. This raises the problem of
“renegotiation:” states cannot credibly commit to implementing such a severe and
collectively costly punishment.4 Targeted sanctions through issue linkage, such as
trade tariffs, seem a much more effective means to enforce compliance. Each state’s
individual incentive to protect its domestic industries and the possibility of targeting
the tariffs should produce an effective and credible punishment.5
Indeed, the largely dismal history of international public good provision has strength-
ened the calls for sanctions through issue linkage. These proposals are supported by
sound theory, but they have not prompted action by policymakers.6 In this paper,
I investigate the sources of this inaction. Why do policymakers enforce multilat-
eral agreements for international public good provision through reciprocity, instead
of including provisions for sanctions through issue linkage?
I adopt a standard model of international public good provision as a repeated
game in which states can enforce behavior by threatening punishment in the future.
To capture the problem of renegotiation, I require that these threats are supported
by a “deterrent coalition” of parties that stand to gain from punishing the devia-
tor.7 Drawing on Fearon’s seminal work on bargaining and enforcement, I also model
the multilateral negotiations on an international agreement that furnishes the public
goods.8 First, I require that all parties expect gains that exceed possibly small ne-
gotiation costs. Second, I incorporate power politics in the model by assuming that
the provisions of the international agreement are determined by the preferences of
a “winning coalition” to which powerful states belong. I use this model to compare
reciprocal enforcement with sanctions through issue linkage.
The analysis corroborates the expectation that reciprocal agreements suffer from
an undersupply of enforcement power. The punishers’ collective incentive to renego-
tiate agreements that prescribe excessively costly punishment impedes international
public good provision. Issue linkage, on the other hand, produces enforcement power
because states can target punishments and thus avoid the collective cost. Conditional
on reaching an agreement, states can sustain higher levels of public good provision.
4Barrett 2003. In this paper, renegotiation refers to failure to implement a collec-
tively costly punishment. For an analysis of formal renegotiation clauses as flexibility
provisions, see Koremenos 2001.
5See Downs and Rocke 1995.




The analysis yields counterintuitive theoretical results that provide support for
reciprocal enforcement, however. The first central result is that while reciprocity
is a less forceful enforcement mechanism than sanctions through issue linkage, it
constrains exploitation by powerful states. It prompts a relatively equal distribution
of gains, which entices weak states to negotiate. In other words, it permits a credible
commitment by powerful states to a distribution of gains that renders cooperation
lucrative for weak states. The driving force behind this result is the ensuing tradeoff
between increased public good provision and unequal burden sharing. I show that
both increased public good provision and exploitation require additional enforcement
power. By constraining the supply of this power, reciprocity forces powerful states
to choose between public goods and shifting the burden of provision on weak states.
This tradeoff functions as a credible commitment mechanism.
The second central result is that if sanctions through issue linkage are on the table,
limits to power politics disappear. If states have the power and the incentive to hurt
others through targeted sanctions, issue linkage creates an oversupply of enforcement
power. Powerful states need not exchange unequal burden sharing for increased pro-
vision, as increased enforcement power permits the pursuit of both. But weak states
anticipate this problem and refuse to negotiate. Enforcement power cannot be sepa-
rated from power as a vehicle of redistribution, so powerful states endorse reciprocity
as a commitment to mutually profitable cooperation.
The analysis has important theoretical implications. Scholars of international
cooperation have mostly lamented the lack of enforcement power under anarchy, but
power is also a vehicle of redistribution.9 If states are to take steps towards rule-
based international politics, they must simultaneously produce enforcement power
and credibly commit to constraining its use. This is a problem of “constitutional
design,” not a problem of maximizing enforcement power.10 Increased enforcement
power is only desirable to the extent that it cannot be transformed into power for
redistribution. Understanding the complex collective action problems that impede
institutional design is not possible unless the dual role of power is acknowledged11
Empirically, I apply the theory to international public good provision in the con-
temporary world economy. First, developing countries’ bargaining power has steadily
increased. This increase expands the size of the winning coalition necessary for insti-
9Krasner 1991.
10See also Buchanan and Tullock 1962.
11This problem was already discussed in the context of domestic politics by classical
scholars such as Locke 1980.
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tutional design, which limits the role of power as a vehicle of redistribution. Second,
the global and multilateral nature of contemporary international trade has eroded
the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. Consequently, trade could provide an optimal
amount of collective enforcement power for international public good provision as
world market integration proceeds. A smoothly functioning world market and uni-
form world prices reduce states’ ability to“hit hard,” permitting credible commitment
to a more equal distribution of gains.
2 A Model of International Public Good Provision
In this section, I introduce a baseline model with four core elements.12 First, I study
international public good provision as a repeated game. Second, I discuss the con-
straints on equilibria that capture the dual problem of enforcement and renegotiation.
Third, I add a costly bargaining stage. Finally, I consider the role of power politics.
Throughout, I use a hypothetical international agreement to reduce emissions of a
transboundary air pollutant, such as carbon dioxide, as an illustration. The model
characterizes a reciprocal agreement, according to which states condition future pub-
lic good provision on present behavior. It does not contain provisions for sanctions
through issue linkage, which I analyze in the following section by augmenting the
model.
2.1 International Public Good Provision as a Repeated Game
International public goods are produced individually and consumed collectively by
states.13 Individual states incur the production cost but cannot prevent others from
consuming the good, which creates a free-rider problem.14 Scholars of international
politics argue that the problem is particularly hard in international cooperation be-
cause no centralized authority exists to deter free riding.15 Hegemonic provision
notwithstanding, states must design multilateral institutions to enforce cooperation.16
12See the Appendix for a full formalization.
13Conybeare 1984.
14Olson 1965.
15Oye 1986. Indeed, this paper sheds light on the reasons why states refrain from
building collective enforcement power.
16Kindleberger 1986; Sandler 2004.
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Examples of international public goods range from global and regional infrastructure
to preserving biodiversity and mitigating global warming.17
The problem of international public good provision can be formalized as a repeated
game. Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of states that repeatedly engage in public good
provision. Each state i chooses a level of public good provision qti ∈ [0,∞) for each
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where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor. Since the game is stationary, I drop
the superscript t throughout.
This standard model of international public good provision captures two central
features of the strategic problem. First, benefits are a function of aggregate provision
but each state incurs an individual cost. This is why states have an incentive to free
ride. Second, marginal benefits are decreasing but marginal costs are increasing. The
demand for additional public good provision is highest when the shortage is acute,
and each state is most willing to increase international public good provision when it
does not require diversion of substantial resources from domestic consumption. For
example, low levels of air pollution only cause inconvenience while high levels set
ecosystems and human health under great stress. States are also often willing to
collect the low-hanging fruit of improved production efficiency to reduce air pollution
but hesitant to risk slower economic growth or higher levels of unemployment through
extensive regulation.
Consider two benchmarks for the analysis.18 First, in the unique Nash equilibrium
qN of the stage game, each state matches individual marginal costs with individual
marginal benefits. Having set b′i(
∑




i ), where q
N
i is close to zero, in the
Nash equilibrium states free ride by providing few public goods. This ensures that
the game has the structure of a Prisoners’ Dilemma, as is conventional in interna-
tional cooperation theory. Second, in the unique collective optimum qK of the stage
17Sandler 2004; Stern 2006.
18Helm and Sprinz 2000.
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i ). In public good provision, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal,
which creates a collective action problem. Figure 5.1 illustrates.
[FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]
2.2 Enforcement and Renegotiation
An international agreement for public good provision must be self-enforcing.19 On
the one hand, states must threaten severe enough punishment upon deviation to deter
free riding by any individual state. On the other hand, the punishers must credibly
commit to implementing the threatened punishment. Consider the two conditions in
turn.
First, states can enforce higher levels of public good provision in repeated inter-
action only if they credibly deter free riding by threatening sufficiently severe pun-
ishment in the future. In the context of international public good provision, such
punishment can be thought of as a “penal code.”20 Suppose state i violates the in-
ternational agreement by providing fewer public goods than it should. Then other
states perceive the violation and punish the defector by also providing fewer pub-
lic goods. The defector can restore cooperation by complying with the punishment
through a higher level of public good provision, but any deviation during the punish-
ment restarts it.21 If any other player j 6= i defects during the punishment period, it
is punished.
Definition 1. An agreement is a collection of n-coordinate vectors {q∗, q1, ..., qn}
and the following transition rule:
1. At time t = 0, begin playing q∗ until some player i deviates.
2. If qi 6= q̂i at time t, where q̂i is the prescribed action at time t, play q
i for T
periods from time t + 1.
19Axelrod and Keohane 1985.
20Abreu 1988.
21To reduce notation, the length of the punishment period T is constant across
players. This assumption is empirically plausible, as international agreements rarely
contain enforcement provisions tailored for individual states. The assumption is not
necessary to derive the analytical results.
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3. If no player j deviates from qij during these T periods, begin playing q
∗ until
some player k deviates.
To save space, I abuse notation by writing q∗ instead of {q∗, q1, ..., qn} when there is
no danger of confusion.











































Equation (3) ensures that no state has incentive to defect. Equation (4) ensures that
no state has an incentive to deviate from the penal code. Consider the example of
transboundary air pollution. An international agreement supported by a penal code
would prescribe a certain upper bound for emissions. If any party to the agreement
defected by emitting more, the agreement would (partially) suspend cooperation until
the deviator had compensated the other states by providing more than its share of
the public good. If the cost of suspension was sufficiently high, defection would not
be profitable.
Second, if states are to credibly threaten punishment, they must be willing to
implement it, or a potential defector simply calls the bluff. This problem of renegoti-
ation is severe in international public good provision, because punishing a deviator by
temporarily suspending cooperation inevitably hurts third parties. Such punishment
is only credible if states have no incentive to “forgive” a defection by immediately
renegotiating the agreement to restore cooperation.
In the context of transboundary air pollution, the problem can be illustrated as
follows. Suppose states sign an international agreement supported by a penal code,
but three months later one of the states increases its emissions. The agreement
requires that cooperation be suspended for six months to punish the defector. The
other parties now face a dilemma. If they ignore the deviation, the agreement is not
credible. If they suspend cooperation, they cause damage to each other by increasing
their emissions.
How should the collective incentive to restore cooperation be formalized?22 Sup-
22In general, scholars have proposed various definitions of renegotiation-proofness.
Following Barrett 1994, my definition is closest to that proposed by (Farrell and
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pose the states consider a punishment prescribed by an international agreement. Does
a sufficiently powerful coalition of states form to defend the punishment against calls
to renegotiate?
Definition 2. An agreement q∗ is renegotiation-proof if, upon deviation by any
state i, each member k 6= i of an exogenous deterrent coalition Di prefers the penal
code qi to restoring cooperation q∗.










This definition implies that upon defection, some states with enough bargaining power
should have an incentive to implement the specified punishment.23 In inequality (5),
the left-hand side represents their payoff during the punishment period, while the
right-hand side represents their payoff during cooperation. If the left-hand side is
higher, they have no incentive to ignore the deviation.
This definition is fairly general and does not depend on the identity of the deterrent
coalition. The advantage of this approach is that it applies regardless of the specific
decision-making rules, formal or informal.24 If any state can veto the punishment,
for example, one can simply assume that almost all states must be in the deterrent
coalition. Substantively, it seems plausible that the deterrent coalition should include
major actors such as the United States and the European Union unless they are being
punished. For example, if China defects, renegotiation-proofness might require a tacit
transatlantic agreement on suspending cooperation. If either the United States or the
European Union suffer from the punishment, perhaps due to high vulnerability to
air pollution, they cannot credibly threaten to increase their emissions sufficiently to
punish China.
Maskin 1989).
23Each deterrent coalition is exogenous, so that its members are irreplaceable “veto
players” (Tsebelis 2002), for analytical tractability. Endogenous deterrent coalitions
do not compromise the analytical results below, because renegotiation-proofness ul-
timately constrains the deterrent coalition that results from any coalition-formation
process.
24Maggi and Morelli 2006.
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2.3 Costly Bargaining
If states are to cooperate on international public good provision, they must first ne-
gotiate a multilateral agreement. As Fearon forcefully argues, the bargaining stage
interacts with enforcement.25 Moreover, Chayes and Chayes investigate salient multi-
lateral negotiations and find that they often span multiple years and involve hundreds
of meetings, which suggests that the negotiations were not trivial.26
The purpose of an international agreement is to codify the rules of interaction.
These rules often concern dispute resolution mechanisms, monitoring, and sanc-
tions.27 By formalizing the rules, states reduce uncertainty and transaction costs.28
As Morrow argues, international agreements promote stable expectations and help
states form“common conjectures” regarding the consequences of compliance and non-
compliance.29 Common conjectures are necessary to sustain cooperation because the
deterrent effect of penal codes is based on expectations. In principle, states could
establish international cooperation informally, but the process is highly precarious.
International agreements are costly to negotiate. States incur at least two sorts of
costs. First, transaction costs refer to concrete expenditures such as assigning lawyers
and diplomats to preparatory work. These costs can be substantial when negotiations
last multiple years and require extensive legal and technical expertise.30 Second,
states must expend political capital to strike acceptable bargains with other states
and domestic interest groups.31 The political survival of a government depends on
skillfully balancing interest groups’ demands, which is a tall order for an international
agreement with substantial economic or political consequences.
Costly negotiation has an important implication for international cooperation:
states engage in negotiations only if they expect gains that exceed the negotiation
costs. For example, the Third World coalition operating under the auspices of the
G77 has in multiple instances refused to negotiate because developing countries fear
that their voice will not be heard.32 Many developing countries have limited financial
and administrative capacity that they cannot waste in negotiations that are unlikely
to produce concrete benefits.
25Fearon 1998; see also Blaydes 2004.
26Chayes and Chayes 1995.
27Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001.
28Abbott and Snidal 2000.
29Morrow 2002.




Costly negotiation can be formalized as follows:
Definition 3. For each state i, fix a strictly positive negotiation cost zi. An agree-
ment q∗ is negotiable if each state i’s individual gain exceeds the negotiation cost zi.
Negotiability is particularly important in international public good provision. If some
states opt out, they can free ride on provision by others. This is troubling because
such agreements are inefficient and unlikely to gain political acceptance. If full par-
ticipation is impossible, the prospects for effective public good provision are dim.33









−i) ≥ (1 − δ) · zi. (6)
Now suppose the collective optimum qK cannot be enforced. If an agreement q∗ is
a subgame-perfect, renegotiation-proof, and negotiable equilibrium, it is a plausible
outcome because states are willing to incur the bargaining cost and the resulting path
of play is self-enforcing. For analytical clarity, it is useful to single out a maximal




i for all i, that maximizes utility ui(q
∗)
subject to the three constraints outlined above.
A focus on this “utilitarian” solution is useful for three reasons. First, it conveys
strong intuition on the tradeoffs that states face in international public good provision.
Second, it is normatively appealing because it maximizes social welfare. Finally, it is a
strict upper bound for equilibrium public good provision. In the case of transboundary
air pollution, a maximal feasible agreement would minimize loss of human life, harm
to ecosystems, and detrimental economic consequences subject to the constraints
introduced above.
2.4 Power Politics
Consider finally the role of power politics in international cooperation.34 On the one
hand, states can use power to enforce behavior. For example, a powerful coalition of
industrialized states can threaten to hurt a developing country that refuses to reduce
33If some states are deemed irrelevant for international public good provision, one
can simply remove them from the set of players and proceed without any loss of




air pollution. On the other hand, states can use power to redistribute the cost of
international public good provision. The coalition of industrialized states could also
shift the burden of provision on developing countries by refusing to provide financial
and technological assistance.
To model power politics in multilateral cooperation, two aspects of power should
be addressed. First, sovereign states can exit international agreements.35 The exit
option is a de facto standard, because explicit coercion is rarely feasible in interna-
tional cooperation, and a de jure standard in a system of sovereign states. It is an
important determinant of individual bargaining power because it specifies the mini-
mum payoff that a state must accept, and shields it against exploitation by enabling
a credible threat of reversion to status quo. This aspect of power is incorporated in
the model because each state can choose to deviate permanently.36
Another central aspect of power in multilateral cooperation is coalition forma-
tion.37 If many states are involved in the negotiations, it is unlikely that any individ-
ual state wields sufficient power to unilaterally dictate the terms of the agreement.
Instead, states seek allies and form coalitions to promote common interests. This
process often takes the form of informal bargaining among powerful states that ul-
timately present a “take it or leave it” offer to other negotiators.38 Consequently,
powerful states try to find an agreement that maximizes their payoff subject to the
exit options that weak states have.
To formalize these aspects of power politics, assume throughout that each state is
either “weak” or “powerful:”
Definition 4. Let the exogenous coalition C ⊂ N be the winning coalition and
let Di ⊂ C for all i. States i ∈ C are powerful. States i /∈ C are weak.
Define now the effect of power politics on an international agreement for public good
provision:
Definition 5. The winning agreement {qC , q1, ..., qn} is Pareto-efficient for pow-
erful states in the set of subgame-perfect and renegotiation-proof agreements such
that ui(q
C) ≥ ui(q
F ) for all i ∈ C.
35Keohane 1984.





The “winning coalition” comprises all states that have bargaining power.39 These
states are powerful and have a say in the negotiations, so the resulting “winning
agreement” is an international agreement that reflects their interests. The winning
agreement must be on the Pareto-frontier for the members of the winning coalition, be-
cause otherwise they could improve their payoff by negotiating another international
agreement. A simplifying assumption is that the members of a deterrent coalition
are members of the winning coalition. This is substantively plausible because the
determinants of bargaining and renegotiation power are most likely highly correlated.
The example of transboundary air pollution is again illustrative. Suppose that the
United States, the European Union, and Japan form the winning coalition. A winning
agreement reflects the interests of these three actors, who only consider the interests
of the rest of the world to prevent the latter’s exit. For example, the representatives
of these three states could bargain informally and then present a “take it or leave it”
proposal in the formal negotiations to other states. As long as this proposal does not
directly hurt the rest of the world, they have no reason to turn it down. Thus, these
states have bargaining power only through the threat of exit.40
This modeling technique has two elements worth elaboration. First, the member-
ship of the winning coalition is unidentified. It seems plausible that major powers
with substantial capabilities should belong to it, but I have chosen the most general
approach to ensure that the results do not depend on ad hoc assumptions regarding
the covariates of power.41 For empirical applications, such assumptions are necessary
to identify the winning coalition, but the theoretical results do not depend on the
specific sources of power. Inter alia, the winning coalition could be the United States
and its closest allies in the aftermath of the Second World War, a supermajority in
the European Union, or any combination of major and minor powers. Its membership
could depend on formal decision-making rules, but in most international applications
de facto bargaining power is more relevant.42
Second, the distinction between the winning coalition and the rest of the world
is a stark one. It might be more plausible to assume that bargaining power varies
continuously across all states, and some of them have very little of it, but the simple
39The winning coalition is exogenous for analytical tractability. The analysis can be
extended by endogenizing the coalition-formation process, because the results below
can be derived from equilibrium behavior after the winning coalition has formed.
40See Hirschman 1970.
41Baldwin 1979 discusses the difficulties involved with estimating power.
42See Maggi and Morelli 2006.
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formulation allows precise and tractable analytical results.43 Empirically, an illu-
minating example is the Green Room of the multilateral GATT/WTO trade nego-
tiations.44 In the Green Room, major powers have negotiated the key provisions of
multilateral trade agreements and then presented them to the rest of the world, which
has infuriated weak states in the developing world.45
3 Reciprocity, Sanctions, and Power Politics
I now compare two strategies for multilateral cooperation: reciprocity and sanctions.
Recall that in a reciprocal agreement, states condition future public good provision
on past compliance with the agreement. To the contrary, if states permit sanctions
through issue linkage, they institutionalize a collective response to non-compliance
that is potentially much stronger than simple reciprocity. The analysis yields the
central analytical results of this paper. On the one hand, a “strong” international
agreement that permits sanctions allows greater public good provision than a “weak”
international agreement based on reciprocity. However, weak states refuse to partic-
ipate in negotiations when sanctions are on the table because strong international
agreements allow extensive redistribution.
3.1 Reciprocity
The modal international agreement involves issue-specific reciprocity, or reciprocity
for brevity. A reciprocal agreement embodies two central standards: “mutual gain”
and “contingency.”46 Both standards reflect the preconditions for cooperation in an
“anarchic” system of sovereign states.47 States sign agreements that benefit all parties
and enforce them by reciprocity, which can be defined as conditioning future coopera-
tion on past compliance with mutually set rules.48 For example, in a typical bilateral
43See Krasner 1991. Gilligan 2004 uses a similar technique but assumes that a
single proposer is chosen randomly.
44Steinberg 2002.
45Narlikar 2003. Recently, the increased bargaining power of key developing coun-
tries has changed the nature of multilateral trade negotiations, as the failure to reach
an agreement in the Doha Round illustrates.
46Keohane 1986.
47Oye 1986.
48Mitchell and Keilbach 2001.
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trade agreement both parties commit to reducing tariffs conditional on compliance
with the rules of the agreement, but the agreement does not permit the use of force
to punish non-compliance.
The principle also applies to multilateral agreements on international public good
provision. For example, in the dataset provided by Mitchell on 152 multilateral en-
vironmental agreements, 92 observations involve public good provision, but only the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (1994) explicitly autho-
rizes trade sanctions. States simply condition future public good provision on past
compliance.49 In these and other multilateral agreements, by far the most common
punitive consequence is the reciprocal suspension of cooperation. This is so to the
extent that in most cases, provisions for dispute resolution are absent or voluntary.50
Finally, the evidence does not support the existence of tacit issue linkages. For in-
stance, studies of international trade restrictions as a means to enforce environmental
protection consistently emphasize the weakness of the linkage.51
The extension of reciprocity from bilateral to multilateral cooperation is surpris-
ing. As Axelrod and Keohane write, multilateral cooperation is difficult to enforce
if punishments cannot be targeted, a problem that is always present in international
public good provision.52 This is the essence of renegotiation: punishments that are
too costly for the punishers are not credible.
To understand the relationship between reciprocity and renegotiation in interna-
tional public good provision, suppose that states sign and ratify the maximal feasible
agreement qF or the winning agreement qC under reciprocity:
Proposition 1. In the maximal feasible agreement qF and in the winning agree-
ment qC ,
1. Equation (3) or equation (4) is binding with equality for some states i, k;
2. Equation (5) is binding with equality for some states i, k.
These findings are central to understanding multilateral cooperation under reciprocity.
They convey the problem of balancing between severe punishments and renegotiation-
proofness, which sets an upper bound for the severity of these punishments. First, if
states are to maximize social welfare or the payoff to the powerful states, they must
49Mitchell 2002-2008.
50Boockmann and Thurner 2006.
51Biermann 2001; Esty 2001; Steinberg 1997.
52Axelrod and Keohane 1985.
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choose the most severe punishment possible. If defectors are not subjected to the
most severe punishment, states can always marginally increase international public
good provision without violating renegotiation-proofness. In the maximal feasible
agreement, they do so for all states. In the winning agreement, the powerful states
impose additional demands on weak states.
Second, if renegotiation is not relevant for punishing any state, they can always
increase the severity of punishments and thus increase each state’s public good provi-
sion. They can choose a more severe punishment without undermining its credibility
because even the new punishment is preferable for a deterrent coalition. The maximal
feasible agreement and the winning agreement are thus always on knife’s edge. If it
was not for renegotiation under reciprocity, states could increase public good provi-
sion. Consequently, reciprocal agreements suffer from an undersupply of enforcement
power.
Reciprocity hinders the pursuit of efficiency by constraining the supply of enforce-
ment power, but how does it interact with power politics? By focusing on powerful
states’ interests, as opposed to assuming the existence of a benevolent social planner,
the nature of the tradeoff changes. In a maximal feasible agreement, states maximize
their collective payoff. In a winning agreement, powerful states can also improve their
payoff by choosing their preferred level and shifting the burden of provision to weak
states. However, this shift is limited by reciprocity:
Proposition 2. Consider a winning agreement qC in which the powerful states





i by weak states i /∈ C is maximal subject to subgame-perfection
and renegotiation-proofness.
Proposition 2 conveys important intuition. The ability of powerful states to ex-
ploit weak states by shifting the burden of international public good provision on
them is constrained by reciprocity. They cannot secure abundant supply and free
ride on provision by the weak states only. This tradeoff can be severe because rene-
gotiation prevents drastic punishments, such as a permanent and total suspension of
cooperation upon deviation. These punishments are necessary because exploitation
maximizes the incentive to deviate.
As a specific illustration, consider public good provision qCi in the winning agree-
ment by any state i for which subgame-perfection or renegotiation-proofness is binding
in the maximal feasible agreement qF :
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Proposition 3. If subgame-perfection (3 or 4) or renegotiation-proofness (5) is
binding with equality in the maximal feasible agreement qF for states i, k, one of
the following must hold:
1. The aggregate level of public good provision
∑
qCj in the winning agreement is
lower than the aggregate level of public good provision
∑
qFj in the maximal
feasible agreement.
2. The level of public good provision by state i is lower in the winning agreement
(qCi ) than in the maximal feasible agreement (q
F
i ).
When public good provision by a weak state is barely enforceable in the maximal
feasible agreement, the powerful states must choose between reducing public good
provision or limiting exploitation of that weak state.
If reciprocity limits the use of power, as these propositions show, why do powerful
states endorse the principle? One would expect powerful states to vigorously promote
international institutions and principles that permit unconstrained use of power. To
promote their interests, powerful states should initiate multilateral negotiations that
permit strong sanctioning mechanisms without expectation of reciprocity. By cir-
cumventing the problem of renegotiation, they could ostensibly impose an unequal
distribution of gains. The analysis yields an important result:
Proposition 4. Any winning agreement is negotiable under reciprocity for some
negotiation costs z = (z1, ..., zn).
Multilateral agreements for international public good provision always produce non-
negligible gains for all participants under reciprocity. Although weak states expect
that powerful states dominate the negotiations, they never fully discount the ben-
efits. If the powerful states attempt to exploit them by demanding unreasonable
levels of provision, they can simply defect. Under reciprocity, the powerful states
cannot carry out a punishment that would leave the defector worse off than without
any cooperation at all, so any international agreement for public good provision that
does not produce gains for all signatories is unenforceable. While reciprocity rules
out explicit coercion, it also dictates a relatively equal distribution of gains because
it precludes exploitative international agreements that are not negotiable. In other
words, reciprocity prevents the oversupply of enforcement power.
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In the case of transboundary air pollution, a reciprocal agreement rarely achieves
the collective optimum. Renegotiation sets an upper bound for the severity of pun-
ishment, so states cannot credibly commit to optimal emissions reductions. However,
the reciprocal agreement also ensures that weak states who do not belong to the
winning coalition have an incentive to incur the cost of entering the negotiations. Al-
though they have little say in the actual negotiations, the undersupply of enforcement
power helps them avoid excessively stringent requirements and possibly even secure
financial and technological assistance. If they expect a reciprocal agreement and the
negotiation cost is not prohibitive, their payoff from designing the agreement is posi-
tive. For powerful states, reciprocity is essentially a commitment device.53 Powerful
states cannot generally commit to not using power, so they must find other means of
enticing weak states to negotiate. By endorsing reciprocity, they constrain the supply
of enforcement power, which limits redistribution.
This raises the question how powerful states can credibly commit to reciprocity. To
be sure, promises of reciprocity are incredible in many contexts in which overt power
politics prevail. However, both theoretical and empirical reasons exist to expect this
is often not the case. Theoretically, powerful states can benefit from a reputation
for keeping promises when coercion is costly, so that it is better to secure voluntary
cooperation by weak states.54 For example, Keohane gives multiple examples of
“diffuse reciprocity” as a means to sustain cooperation in international politics.55
Empirically, a good example of a major issue area in which powerful states have
refrained from coercion despite their inability to design optimal institutions is in-
ternational environmental politics. As Najam argues, negotiations over global envi-
ronmental institutions have made only slow progress over the last three decades.56
Despite strong political pressure to achieve results, powerful industrialized countries
have kept their promise to continue negotiating on reciprocal terms and refrained
from applying extensive sanctions.57 Instead of imposing their preferred policies on
developing countries, industrialized countries have over time acknowledged underde-
velopment as a cause of environmental degradation; recognized national sovereignty
as a key principle of natural resource management; and accepted stringent constraints
on the trade-environment linkage.58 These concessions show that even powerful indus-
53See Schelling 1960 for commitment problems.
54See Sartori 2002 for modeling reputations in repeated games.
55Keohane 1986. See also Tomz 2007.
56Najam 2005.
57Rowland 1973; Williams 1993.
58Ivanova 2007; Miller 1995; Steinberg 1997; Williams 2005.
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trialized countries have preferred limited voluntary cooperation to explicit coercion.
3.2 Sanctions
The weak enforcement of reciprocal agreements has prompted a substantial literature
on sanctions through issue linkage for enforcement purposes. The central proposi-
tion of this literature is that issue linkages can provide additional enforcement power
and resolve the problem of renegotiation by enabling targeted punishments.59 If mul-
tilateral public good provision is linked to bilateral cooperation, states can enforce
behavior by threatening to suspend bilateral as opposed to multilateral cooperation.
This suspension does not prompt renegotiation, because it produces no collateral
damage.
The concept of sanctions here differs from that in the broad empirical literature on
economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy against adversaries in two ways.60 First,
while the literature emphasizes the incredibility and ineffectiveness of sanctions that
a state actually has imposed, I focus on threats that states use to deter free riding
and rarely if ever actually have to implement.61 Indeed, this focus is empirically
warranted. For example, Drezner finds that “significant number of coercion attempts
end at the threat stage, before sanctions are imposed. These cases yield significantly
larger concessions when compared to instances in which sanctions are imposed ...
[e]conomic coercion is a more useful tool than the conventional wisdom believes.”62
Second, I require that the sanctions be self-enforcing in that the sender benefits
from imposing them. In the empirical literature on economic sanctions, they often
carry domestic political and economic costs for the sender. Here, I exclude such
sanctions exactly because they are not credible. Instead, I focus on self-enforcing
sanctions such as trade restrictions that domestic interest groups desire.63
To analyze the impact of sanctions on international public good provision, I aug-
ment the model by adding pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemmas for each pair of states. In
this setting, states simultaneously negotiate bilateral and multilateral cooperation
subject to restrictions that I introduce below. Formally, each state i also chooses a
59Abrego et al. 2001; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Barrett 2003; Leebron 2002;
Limão 2005; Lohmann 1997.
60Baldwin 1986; Drezner 2000, 2003; Martin 1993.
61See Schelling 1960.
62Drezner 2003, 645.
63For models of politically motivated protectionism, see Downs and Rocke 1995;
Grossman and Helpman 1994.
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bilateral action sij ∈ {C, D} for each other state j 6= i. The payoff from the stage
game is given by the conventional 2 × 2 matrix:64
[FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]
Here, βi > αi > 0 > γi for all i. The Nash equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
(sNij , s
N




ji ) = (C, C). The one-stage
payoff from the augmented game is
ũi(qi, q−i, si, s−i) = bi(
∑




where vij(sij, sji) is the payoff from the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The pairwise Prisoner’s
Dilemmas are payoff-independent for analytical simplicity, which is a weak assumption
regarding the consequences of coordinated sanctions.65
In the context of transboundary air pollution, these bilateral Prisoner’s Dilemmas
could represent bilateral trade relations. States could include a provision that permits
the imposition of trade restrictions on a range of goods and services if a state increases
its emissions beyond the level prescribed in the agreement. In such a situation, other
states impose restrictions depending on domestic consequences and the defector is to
comply with them to restore cooperation. These targeted punishments do not hurt
third parties, which removes the problem of renegotiation.
Sanctions through issue linkage are most effective when they provide “slack en-
forcement power.”66 Slack enforcement power is present when states can sustain op-
timal cooperation in another issue area without linkages.67 States can then “transfer”
some enforcement power from that other issue area by threatening simultaneous pun-
ishment across issues upon deviation. For example, if a reciprocal punishment through
reduced public good provision does not deter deviation, states could threaten trade
sanctions. If the threat is credible, the linkage contains slack enforcement power in
the form of trade sanctions. The amount of slack enforcement power depends on the
most severe trade sanction that the punisher can credibly threaten to implement.
An agreement with sanctions through issue linkage is a vector (q∗, s∗) supported
by a T -period penal code (qi, si) for each state i. Subgame-perfection, renegotiation-
64In a working paper, I consider Prisoner’s Dilemmas in continuous strategies. All
results continue to hold.
65Drezner 2000.
66Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Lohmann 1997.
67See the Appendix for a formalization.
152
proofness, and negotiability extend trivially to a linked agreement. I assume through-
out that slack enforcement power is present for each pair in bilateral cooperation, so
that states can sustain the collective optimum sKij using the renegotiation-proof pun-
ishments (C, D) and (D, C).68 Issue linkages sometimes provide enforcement power
without this assumption, but the analysis of such situations requires a considerably
more complex model.69
For present purposes, slack enforcement power is particularly important because
punishment in a pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemma does not cause collective damage. Issue
linkages should be doubly effective when renegotiation is a concern. This is indeed
the case:
Proposition 5. Let qF be the maximal feasible agreement under reciprocity. With
sanctions through issue linkage, there exists a welfare-increasing, subgame-perfect,
and renegotiation-proof agreement q∗ such that q∗i > q
F
i for all i.
Proposition 5 underscores the qualitative difference between bilateral and multilat-
eral enforcement. Bilateral enforcement never prompts the question of renegotiation,
so it holds potential for boosting international public good provision. If states suc-
cessfully include trade sanctions in the agreement on transboundary air pollution, for
example, they can reduce their collective emissions to their collective advantage.
What about the bargaining stage? To analyze sanctions in the context of power
politics, the concept of winning agreement requires elaboration. Recall that it con-
strains the set of equilibria to those that are Pareto-dominant for the winning coali-
tion. How should one apply it to bilateral cooperation in pairwise Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas? I assume that they are unaffected on the equilibrium path, because the winning
coalition has neither a common interest nor a channel of influence to manipulate any
particular pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemma. The winning coalition can authorize bilat-
eral punishments by manipulating the penal code si for any i ∈ N , but it cannot
manipulate the vector s∗ = sK that determines the nature of bilateral cooperation.
While this assumption is not necessarily appropriate in all contexts, it is plausible in
multilateral negotiations. Equally important, it restricts the use of power and thus
presents a least likely case for power politics.
For example, in the case of transboundary air pollution these limitations imply
that the multilateral negotiations cannot shape the bilateral trading arrangements
68See van Damme 1989 for a thorough analysis.
69See Limão 2005.
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between the states. No member of the winning coalition has an incentive to use
its bargaining power to help another member to exploit its trade partners, so it is
not plausible that they would propose a pervasive reformulation of bilateral trading
relationships completely irrelevant to the problem of transboundary air pollution. The
winning coalition can, however, propose that collective sanctions be allowed to enforce
international public good provision. By Proposition 5, all members of the winning
coalition benefit from increased enforcement power, so it seems plausible that they
use their bargaining power as a coalition to incorporate sanctions in the international
agreement.
The following result emphasizes the fundamental importance of power politics in
linked negotiations:
Proposition 6. Suppose that the collective optimum (qK , sK) is a subgame-perfect
and renegotiation-proof agreement. If any slack enforcement power remains, the col-
lective optimum is not a winning agreement.
Proposition 6 implies that sanctions resurrect power politics. A winning coali-
tion never leaves a profitable opportunity to redistribute gains underutilized, so it is
not satisfied with the collective optimum. Powerful states use the enforcement power
provided by sanctions to impose a stringent requirement on weak states. Issue link-
ages remove the problem of renegotiation that characterizes reciprocal agreements,
but they also permit exploitation of the weak by the strong.
The implications of sanctions for negotiability are predictable. If powerful states
can create sufficient enforcement power, they no longer have to accept mutual gain.
They use the threat of bilateral punishment to extract the surplus from cooperation.
However, weak states anticipate this and refuse to negotiate:
Proposition 7. If an agreement with sanctions through issue linkage creates enough
slack enforcement power, the winning agreement is not negotiable.
Proposition 7 tells that sanctions must be limited to avoid the oversupply of en-
forcement power. If weak states suspect that issue linkages for strong sanctions are
on the table, they refuse to negotiate. Unless powerful states can somehow commit
to precluding too strong sanctions or simply coerce the weak states to cooperate,
international public good provision fails.
Proposition 7 provides an explanation for the absence of sanctions in multilat-
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eral agreements for international public good provision. If sanctions are permissible,
the winning coalition is no longer constrained by the problem of renegotiation. Con-
sequently, it can use its bargaining power to propose an agreement that is barely
acceptable to the rest of the world. If the cost of entering the negotiations is high,
however, these states refuse to participate in the negotiations and instead play the
one-stage Nash equilibrium. It is only through a commitment to limit their collec-
tive enforcement power that the members of the winning coalition can initiate the
multilateral negotiations.
4 Discussion
A reciprocal agreement with weak enforcement provisions is vulnerable to renego-
tiation and cannot achieve the optimal level of international public good provision.
Surprisingly, however, this undersupply of enforcement power also permits a credible
commitment to a division of gains that is acceptable for weak states. While sanctions
through issue linkage increase enforcement power, they also resurrect power politics.
Collective enforcement power is indivisible from power as a vehicle of redistribution,
so weak states refuse to enter the negotiations in the first place. This finding provides
a theoretical explanation for the absence of sanctions in multilateral agreements for
international public good provision. In designing an international agreement to re-
duce transboundary air pollution, for example, a credible commitment to reciprocity
implies that weak states outside the winning coalition expect non-negligible benefits
from international cooperation. If an explicit or implicit threat of sanctions is present,
however, many of them might prefer the status quo to costly negotiations and minimal
gains in the future.
I have not explicitly modeled the mechanism that permits a credible commitment
to reciprocity in general. The results depend on the assumption that commitment to
reciprocity is ceteris paribus easier to establish than a commitment to eschew power
politics under any circumstances. One possible avenue for future research is to em-
bed the model in a systemic framework of international cooperation, and infer the
conditions for “diffuse reciprocity” as a means to sustain issue-specific reciprocity in
international public good provision.70 While the present analysis is fully rationalist,
another interesting possibility is to link the strategic mechanism to the normative
foundations of international order. If diffuse reciprocity is a central norm underpin-
70Keohane 1986.
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ning the international order, the present analysis provides a complementary rationalist
account of the material gains that states obtain when they endorse it. It is indeed
plausible that a combination of rationalist and normative elements form the basis for
reciprocity in international cooperation.
An alternative strategy for powerful states is to coerce public good provision.
For example, they could unilaterally impose trade sanctions against weak states. If
the cost of coercion is sufficiently low, this is a plausible possibility. If coercion is
costly relative to the benefits from cooperation, however, powerful states stand to
gain from voluntary participation by weak states. Importantly, these two models
of international public good provision have different observational implications. If
powerful states coerce public good provision, they need not even design international
agreements, but the observed level of public good provision should be high. The
analysis in this paper predicts that states design weak reciprocal agreements, and the
level of public good provision is inefficiently low. As discussed above, international
environmental politics is a good example of an issue area in which the model of this
paper has substantial explanatory power.
The broader implications for institutional design are a topic for future research,
but certain guidelines are readily observable. Most importantly, when states design
international institutions they should ensure that these institutions are not vulnerable
to power politics. Indeed, power asymmetries often impede the functioning of interna-
tional institutions and thus hurt all parties because weak states refuse to participate
seriously.71 A promising possibility for future theoretical and empirical research is to
investigate the mechanisms that permit mutually profitable cooperation despite the
risk of exploitation in an institutionalized environment. Equally important, an exit
option itself is insufficient to prevent cooperation failure. Even if opt-out or flexibil-
ity provisions prevent negative payoff from an international agreement, the expected
payoff could be so small for weak states that they refuse to negotiate in the first place.
A useful point of comparison in the study of domestic politics is the problem of
constitutional design.72 A domestic society must simultaneously solve two problems:
how can the government enforce public good provision and uphold order without
exploiting its monopoly of violence? The solution is apparently a complex set of con-
stitutional institutions that limit the use of state power to specific instances. The
model above is a parsimonious account of a similar problem in international politics,
so the study of constitutional design could offer important cues for understanding in-
71See Streck 2001.
72Buchanan and Tullock 1962.
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ternational cooperation as well. On the one hand, domestic societies may have found
commitment mechanisms that are presently unavailable in international politics. On
the other hand, it is also possible that the gains from international public good pro-
vision continue to be lower in international politics, so that powerful states are not
willing to pay the price of commitment mechanisms stronger than reciprocity.
Finally, the model has an interesting connection to Fearon’s seminal analysis of
“bargaining and enforcement” in international cooperation.73 While his model im-
plies that states sometimes bargain harder if they expect a large shadow of future
because the stakes are higher, my analysis suggests that collective enforcement power
is indivisible from power as a vehicle of redistribution. Both models link distribu-
tional concerns to the enforcement problem, but the substantive implications differ.
Fearon’s analysis predicts that enforceable agreements complicate bargaining because
the stakes are higher, while this paper suggests that enforcement power per se can be
an obstacle to bargaining.
4.1 International Public Good Provision in the Contempo-
rary World Economy
Empirically, the theory is applicable to international public good provision in the
contemporary world economy. Understanding the consequences of power politics is
crucial, because increased economic and environmental interdependence has prompted
a surge in the demand for international public goods. If states are to combat transna-
tional terrorism and crime, shift energy production from fossil fuels to clean energy,
improve the infrastructure for international economic exchange, and constrain the un-
sustainable use of natural resources, they need to increase the supply of public goods
as well. The payoff from constraining power politics to promote serious negotiations
on international public good provision is high.
According to the theory, two recent changes in the world economy warrant opti-
mism. First, the drastic increase in the bargaining power of developing countries such
as China and India has mitigated the problem of global power asymmetries. Although
practically all developing countries suffered from chronic internal and external vulner-
ability for most of the 20th century,74 rapidly industrializing developing countries are
now asserting their rights in international politics more vigorously than ever. Many




global power balance has grown more even.
Applying the model, the size of the winning coalition should consequently grow.
The returns to exploitation and redistribution decrease and the importance of effi-
cient public good provision increases.75 If the increased power of developing countries
implies that they are no longer vulnerable to exploitation and can successfully defend
their interests, their incentive to engage in serious institutional design for interna-
tional public good provision should increase. This change could remove an important
impediment to overhauling the system of international institutions for public good
provision.
Second, the changing nature of international trade is shaping the universe of avail-
able issue linkages. Trade sanctions are a prominent form of issue linkage, but accord-
ing to the model the substantial damage they can cause has limited their applicability.
However, if the benefits that targeted trade tariffs yield are decreasing, and the cor-
responding costs are increasing, the maximum punishment that states can credibly
threaten is decreasing as well. This constrains the use of power for redistribution
and thus enhances the supply of international public goods. In particular, the appar-
ent contradiction between trade sanctions and liberalization disappears if states have
little reason to use trade sanctions for protectionist purposes.
Has such change occurred? To begin with, the political economy of international
trade has historically been characterized by strong incentives to protect domestic
industries from competition.76 In the period of mercantilism, states engaged in a
zero-sum game of maximizing exports and minimizing imports. More generally, gov-
ernments have pursued their political aims by preventing foreign competition and
subsidizing important domestic producers.77 Importantly, international trade has also
had a strong bilateral element. High transaction costs and the absence of smoothly
functioning world markets for goods and services have underscored the specificity of
trade relations. For example, even a powerful state such as Great Britain in the 19th
century found it difficult to find alternatives to American imports during the 1807-
1809 embargo.78 In this strategic environment, states had the incentive and power to
hurt others by raising targeted tariffs against their products.
Recent changes in the world economy have undermined these incentives. As Mil-
ner writes, “[o]ne of the most salient changes in the world economy since 1980 has
75See also Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.
76Kindleberger, 1986; Milner, 1999.
77Alt and Gilligan 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994.
78Frankel 1982.
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been the move toward freer trade among countries across the globe.”79 Even uni-
lateral liberalization seems to be the preferred strategy of many states because the
cost of economic isolation has grown. Most importantly for present purposes, the
attractiveness of targeted tariffs has declined. If states operate in a global market
with relatively uniform prices, targeted tariffs produce little political gain. For ex-
ample, if the United States was to raise tariffs against Chinese textiles, production
would shift to countries like India and Mexico. Yang et al. show that U.S. sanctions
on Chinese goods in place have mostly hurt both parties.80 States still benefit from
tariffs across the board, such as the Bush steel tariff, but such tariffs provide no slack
enforcement power because they produce collateral damage. This effect is amplified
by the multilateral nature of the trade regime, which limits the use of trade sanctions
by the most-favored nation treatment.
These changes in the logic of international trade mitigate the oversupply of en-
forcement power. When targeted tariffs produce less political benefits, powerful states
cannot use issue linkage for redistribution. For example, it is difficult to permit ex-
tensive trade sanctions for enforcing reductions in transboundary air pollution when
bilateral protectionism is lucrative. As the attractiveness of bilateral trade tariffs
decreases, weak states should be increasingly willing to negotiate on such provisions
in an international agreement. Simply put, they have less reason to fear that trade
sanctions provide powerful states with a credible threat that permits a redistribu-
tion of gains and losses. Ideally, states would strike a balance between the over- and
undersupply of enforcement power.
The preceding discussion has a straightforward conclusion: recent changes in the
world economy increase the supply of international public goods. This conclusion
goes against the infamous “race to the bottom” hypothesis and warrants cautious
optimism.81 These changes also imply that in the future, most states will be more
willing to engage in serious institutional design despite high transaction costs because
they expect not to bear a disproportionate burden.
79Milner 1999.
80Yang et al. 2004.
81See also Drezner 2001; Vogel 1995.
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5 Conclusion
The elusive concept of power is central to international cooperation theory in two
ways. First, enforcement power is necessary to deter opportunism and free riding.82
Second, power politics is a common consequence of distributional conflict.83 While
bargaining power has been central to the study of international conflict, its role in
international cooperation has received less attention.
The contribution of this paper is a theoretical account of the tradeoff between the
over- and undersupply of enforcement power in the multilateral context of interna-
tional public good provision. If states are to enforce adequate public good provision,
they need to secure sufficient enforcement power while constraining its use as a vehicle
of redistribution. If powerful states cannot credibly commit to such a constraint, weak
states have every reason to anticipate minimal gains from cooperation. Consequently,
they refuse to negotiate. The theory explains why issue linkages that produce slack
enforcement power are relatively rare in international public good provision: weak
states hesitate to provide powerful states with an opportunity to use power for redis-
tribution. The reason for suboptimal levels of international public good provision is
not lack of enforcement power but its dual role as a vehicle of redistribution.
The broader theoretical implications of the analysis pertain to questions of insti-
tutional design. Unlike conventional cooperation theory, the analysis suggests that
states need to solve a complex problem of “constitutional” design: how to increase the
supply of enforcement power while constraining its use? If this problem is empirically
relevant, its primary implication is that powerful states must entice weak states to
participate in negotiations through a credible commitment to an acceptable division
of gains. Importantly, the role of power in bargaining cannot be separated from the
role of power in enforcement. This indivisibility of power produces the paradoxical
outcome in which powerful states are hurt by their excessive power.
Empirically, the theory is most readily applicable to multilateral negotiations with
substantial power asymmetries. If a focal winning coalition is recognizable, one can
investigate provisions that pertain to safeguards and compensation mechanisms. Ac-
cording to the theory, such provisions are necessary to engage weak and vulnerable
states in the negotiations. They could take the form of financial assistance, technol-
ogy transfer, issue linkage as a side payment, and economic “hostages” that create a




Finally, the paper has direct implications for the contemporary undersupply of in-
ternational public goods. With the increased bargaining power of rapidly industrial-
izing countries and structural changes in international trade, the role of power politics
in multilateral negotiations is diminishing. Consequently, states can achieve greater
participation and secure mutually profitable agreements on international public good





The characterization of an agreement is given by Definition 1. Subgame-perfection,
renegotiation-proofness, and negotiability are defined in the main text.
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Let X denote the set of subgame-perfect and renegotiation-proof agreements. A







where {q∗, q1, ..., qn} ∈ X. Throughout, it is assumed that qFi < q
K
i for all i.







where {q∗, q1, ..., qn} ∈ X, ui(q
∗) ≥ ui(q
F ) for all i ∈ C, λi : 1 > λi > 0 for all i ∈ C,
and
∑
i∈C λi = 1. Throughout, it is assumed that ui(q
C) > ui(q
F ) for at least one
i ∈ C.
Equilibria with Sanctions through Issue Linkage
With sanctions through issue linkage, an agreement is a collection of 2n-coordinate
vectors denoted by
{
(q∗, s∗), (q1, s1), ..., (qn, sn)
}
,
and the following transition rule:
1. At t = 0, begin playing (q∗, s∗) until some player i deviates.
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2. If player i plays (qi, si) 6= (q̂i, ŝi) at time t, where (q̂i, ŝi) is the prescribed action,
play (qi, si) for T periods from time t + 1.
3. If no player j deviates from (qij, s
i
j) during these T periods, begin playing q
∗
until some player k deviates.
Finally, fix s∗ = sK = (C, ..., C) and shij = s
∗
ij = (C, C) for h 6= i, j.
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Renegotiation-proofness is defined as follows: for all i and k ∈ Di,
ũk(q
i, si) ≥ ũk(q
∗, s∗).
Negotiability is defined as
ũi(q
∗, s∗) − ũi(q
N , s∗) ≥ (1 − δ) · zi
for all i ∈ N .
To enable collective enforcement, it is assumed that the tuple (αi, βi, γi) is such
that the renegotiation-proof pairwise punishments (C, D) can be enforced for all i.
Slack enforcement power is then measured as the non-negative scalar
−(n − 1) · min
{




δt · (αi − γi),−γi − δ








t · (αi − γi)). The second element is the payoff from
defection during punishment (−γi) less the continuation of punishment by one period
(δT ·(αi−γi)). The negation of this minimum, which is negative by construction, multi-
plied by (n−1) is therefore the additional damage that sanctions through issue linkage
permit with n− 1 punishers when sK must be enforced. In any subgame-perfect and
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renegotiation-proof agreement {(q∗, s∗), (q1, s1), ..., (qn, sn)}, slack enforcement power
remains when the optimal deviation for any state i ∈ N reduces its payoff from the
repeated game.
Proof of Proposition 1




i }, and write E = N when q̂i = q
F and E = N \ C when q̂i = q
C .
To prove the first part, suppose towards a contradiction that neither (3) nor (4)
are binding with equality for any i, k. Consider another equilibrium path q∗ such that
q∗i = q̂i + ε for all i ∈ E, where ε is a strictly positive but small enough scalar, and
q∗i = q̂i for all i /∈ E. Increase q
i
j by ǫ for all i, j ∈ N , where ǫ is a strictly positive
but small enough scalar. Examine (3) and (4) to observe that both equations remain
nonbinding when (ε, ǫ) is chosen appropriately. Furthermore, if the ratio ǫ
ε
is large
enough, (5) is not violated.










F ). Note that ui(q
C)
is strictly increasing in qCj for j ∈ E, so ui(q
∗) > ui(q
C) for i ∈ C . Thus, qF is not the
maximal feasible agreement and qC is not the winning agreement, a contradiction.
To prove the second part, suppose towards a contradiction that (5) is not binding
with inequality for any i, k. Now consider another equilibrium path q∗ such that
q∗i = q̂i + ε for all i ∈ E, where ε is a strictly positive but small enough scalar, and
q∗i = q̂i for all i /∈ E. Increase q
i
j by ǫ for all i, j ∈ N , where ǫ is a strictly positive but
small enough scalar. Examine (3) and (4) to observe that both equations hold when
(ε, ǫ) is chosen appropriately. If the ratio ǫ
ε
is large enough, (5) is not violated.










F ). Note that ui(q
C)
is strictly increasing in qCj for j ∈ E, so ui(q
∗) > ui(q
C) for i ∈ C . Thus, qF is not the
maximal feasible agreement and qC is not the winning agreement, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a winning agreement {qC , q1, ..., qn} and suppose towards a contradiction




i by weak states i /∈ C
can be increased without changing the pattern of public good provision {qCj }j∈C by
powerful states j ∈ C.
For all j ∈ C, the per-period payoff uj(q
C) is independent of qCi for any i /∈









without changes in {qCj }j∈C is a strict Pareto-improvement for all states j ∈ C, which
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contradicts the notion that qC is the equilibrium path for the winning agreement.




i is the highest attainable level of public good
provision by weak states. 
Proof of Proposition 3








i for state i as specified
in Proposition 3. Write the binding renegotiation-proofness condition for states i, k
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where Q is the set of subgame-perfect and renegotiation-proof penal codes given qF




























By the definition of the winning agreement qC , the benefits from cooperation are
larger for all powerful states l ∈ C:
bl(
∑
qCj ) − cl(q
C
l ) ≥ bl(
∑






qCj ) − ck(q
C
k ) ≥ bk(
∑
qFj ) − ck(q
F





When qi is by definition the most severe subgame-perfect and renegotiation-proof
punishment available to enforce qF for state i, and uj(q
C) ≥ uj(q
F ) for all pow-
erful states j ∈ Di ⊂ C, no penal code for state i exists that is subgame-perfect,
renegotiation-proof, and more severe than qi. But the gain from deviation is strictly
larger to state i, so qC is not in equilibrium, a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
For i ∈ C, ui(q
C) ≥ ui(q
F ) > ui(q
N) implies that (6) holds when zi → 0. Suppose
towards a contradiction that there exists a winning agreement {qC , q1, ..., qn} such
that ui(q
C) ≤ ui(q
N) for some i /∈ C. Given that qFj > q
N





qNj . Given that ui(q
C) ≤ ui(q
N), it must be that qCi > q
N
i .
It follows that deviation from qCi to some other qi is strictly profitable if punishment
is not forthcoming.




j ≥ 0. For subgame-perfection
to hold, it must be that ui(q
i) < ui(q
C) when deviation from qCi is strictly profitable.
But ui(q
C) ≤ ui(q
N) implies that ui(q
i) < ui(q
C) ≤ ui(q
N). With qNj close to zero for
all j, state i can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to ui(q
N) by permanently deviating
to qNi . Thus ui(q
C) is not in equilibrium, which implies that any winning agreement
qC must produce a strictly positive payoff from negotiations ui(q
C) − ui(q
N) for all
states i. It suffices that
(1 − δ) · zi < ui(q
C) − ui(q
N)
holds for all i to ensure negotiability, which I have shown to be always attainable as
zi → 0 for all i. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Let q∗i = q
F
i + ε for all i, where ε is a strictly positive but small scalar. Leave
{sK , q1, ..., qn} as they are but set (siji, s
i
ij) = (D, C) for all i, j. Since both (3)
and (4) hold under reciprocity, with slack enforcement power as formalized in this
Appendix and sufficiently small ε, state i has no incentive to deviate.
Now recall that the collective optimum qK cannot be achieved in equilibrium, so
qFi < q
K







implies that the equilibrium path q∗ indeed increases welfare over qF . 
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider {qK , q1, ..., qn}. Set qCi = q
K
i + ε, where ε is a strictly positive but small
scalar, for all i /∈ C. Set qCi = q
K
i for all i ∈ C. Leave {q
1, ..., qn} as they are and
note that because qK is not enforceable under reciprocity, it must be the case that
(siji, s
i
ij) = (D, C). With slack enforcement power remaining at {q
K , q1, ..., qn} and ε
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sufficiently small, state i has no incentive to deviate.
Now note that with qCi = q
K




i for all i /∈ C, we have
∑
λiũi(q
C , sK) >
∑
λiũi(q
K , sK) because b is strictly increasing. Thus, qK is not a
winning agreement. 
Proof of Proposition 7
With enough slack enforcement power, one can set δ · ũi(q
i, si) < K for any finite
real number K. Since (siji, s
i
ij) = (D, C) is assumed to be subgame-perfect and
renegotiation-proof, it is therefore possible to choose a strictly negative δ · ũi(q
i, si)
with any value. But then for any i and finite qCi , state i has no incentive to deviate
as long as | δ · ũi(q
i, si) | is large enough. Thus, one can choose any finite qCi . By
convexity of c, it immediately follows that ũi(q
C) < ũi(q
N). But then for any z > 0,

















Figure 5.1. The thick concave curve represents collective benefits and the thin con-
cave curve represents individual benefits. The thin convex curve represents individual
costs. In the Nash equilibrium qN , each player free rides to maximize individual util-
ity. In the collective optimum, qK each player maximizes collective utility.
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C D
C αi, αj γi, βj
D βi, γj 0, 0
Figure 5.2. A Prisoners’ Dilemma.
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This dissertation focuses on international cooperation problems that give rise to inef-
ficient compromise. When an international cooperation problem permits various ef-
fective solutions, but these effective solutions carry stark distributional consequences
that some bargaining parties cannot accept, states must sometimes “water down”
down the resulting international agreement. This empirically prevalent phenomenon
raises two questions of substantive interest. First, why does inefficient compromise
occur? Second, how can states avoid it through institutional design?
I have shown that increasing returns provide a coherent and broadly applicable ex-
planation for inefficient compromise. When the marginal returns to increasing one’s
share of the product of international cooperation are increasing, effective solutions
to an international cooperation problem are asymmetric and thus carry stark dis-
tributional consequences. In these circumstances, states must find a way to choose
one of these effective solutions without recourse to costly bargaining. The set of is-
sues for which increasing returns are relevant contains territorial conflict, reputation,
legal precedents, standard setting and regulation, and the choice of principles that
underpin international regimes.
To avoid inefficient compromise, states can choose from a broad range of poten-
tially applicable institutional designs. While the extant literature has focused on issue
linkage and side payments, I have shown that a random allocation of the asset is an
equally useful and feasible practice. The key to avoiding inefficient compromise is to
find mechanisms that permit a credible commitment to effective but asymmetric al-
locations. Alternatively, states can try to prevent problems of inefficient compromise
from emerging in the first place.
Specifically, the dissertation presents the following results. In Chapter 2, I show
that the institutional features of interstate arbitration, as practiced inter alia at
the Permanent Court of Arbitration and in the International Court of Justice, are a
remarkably effective method to allocate a disputed asset randomly. It requires mutual
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consent, so it cannot be used against the interests of a sovereign state. The states that
submit a dispute for arbitration can design the proceedings, so they can tailor the
rules of dispute resolution to resolve the dispute as effectively as possible. Arbitration
tribunals tend to choose asymmetric allocations that indicate a clear winner, which
is optimal when the disputed asset is subject to increasing returns.
In Chapter 3, I find that in international regulation, states can prevent the emer-
gence of international cooperation problems that give rise to inefficient compromise.
By coordinating the development of nascent domestic regulatory institutions, they
lock in mutual compatibility and ensure harmonious cooperation over time. As an
empirical application, I have studied the empirical record of transatlantic regulatory
cooperation on chemical testing requirements.
In Chapter 4, I turn to multilateral cooperation. I show that both issue linkage
and delegation of decision-making power to an international committee, while quite
unproblematic in bilateral disputes, can cause rather than avoid inefficient compro-
mise in multilateral policy coordination. This finding reveals a finding gap in the
logic of institutional design between bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
In Chapter 5, I show that when enforcement power is necessary to fully exploit
bargaining power because asymmetric and exploitative agreements create incentives
to defect, powerful states benefit from choosing such weak enforcement mechanisms
as reciprocity. When they do so, they entice weak states to enter the negotiations.
This is particularly important in problems of international public good provision,
which explains why states deliberately choose weak enforcement mechanisms despite
the availability of stronger alternatives, such as trade restrictions against defectors.
Many questions remain for future research. The empirical content of the analysis is
limited, so it is important to find indicators for the presence of increasing returns and
rigorously test the arguments made in this dissertation. On the theoretical side, the
results on preventing international cooperation problems and multilateral cooperation
suggest fruitful avenues for future research.
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